View source for Contract Law - Re: LTB

[[Category:Contract Law, Leases, & Sub-Letting (LTB)]]
[[Category:Interference of Reasonable Enjoyment (LTB)]]
[[Category:Contract Law]]
[[Category:Maintenance Obligations (LTB)]]
[[Category:Payment of Rent (LTB)]]
[[Category:Section 34 (RTA)]]

{{Citation: 
| categories = [Contract Law, Leases, & Sub-Letting (LTB)], [Interference of Reasonable Enjoyment (LTB)], [Contract Law], [Maintenance Obligations (LTB)], [Payment of Rent (LTB)], [Section 34 (RTA)]
| shortlink = https://rvt.link/3x
}}

==Shnier v. Begum, 2023 ONSC 5556 (CanLII)==

[16] The Appellant submits that the Board’s reasons show that it neither identified nor applied the relevant principles of contractual interpretation to the question of what the renewal provision in this lease meant. These include the principles of contra preferentum, seeking an interpretation which makes commercial sense and avoids absurdity or redundancy and the requirement that it reads the terms in the context of the whole agreement.

[17] The portion of the Board’s reasons concerning the renewal provision and the timing of the Respondent’s notice to reoccupy are as follows:

::The Tenant submits that there is an agreement that the Tenant has the option to renew the tenancy agreement for a one-year term is [sic] he exercises his right to do so. The tenancy agreement under Schedule A states “The Landlord and Tenant agree that the lease may be renewed for a further period of one year on the same terms and conditions at a mutually agreed upon rent, with the Tenant having the option to terminate the Lease by giving 60 days notice to the Landlord. The 60 days period would be counted from the last day of the month”.
 

::The Tenant argues that he provided the Landlord with 60 days notice and therefore the end of the term would be November 30, 2022 and not the termination date on the notice of November 30, 2021.
 

:3. I note that the wording of Schedule A says the lease “may” be renewed. The word suggests that this is not mandatory for either party to agree to this renewal period. This Schedule also states that it is renewed at a mutually agreed upon rent which could be contrary to the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act for a rent increase which the Act limits.


<ref name="Shnier">Shnier v. Begum, 2023 ONSC 5556 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/k0gb4>, retrieved on 2023-10-07</ref>

==Mejia v. Cargini, 2007 CanLII 2801 (ON SCDC)<ref name="Mejia"/>==

12) Section 157 of the Act gives the Tribunal “exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act”.

<b><u>13) Section 162 of the Act gives to the Tribunal “authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Act”.</b></u>

14) Having found as a fact that the landlord “harassed, threatened the tenant and interfered with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the rental unit”, the Tribunal could grant remedies pursuant to the provisions set out in section 35 of the Act.  That section provides in part that if the Tribunal determines that a landlord has done what the landlord did in this case, the Tribunal may, amongst a number of specific remedies “make any other order that it considers appropriate”. 

15) Similar language was used in section 94(3)(c) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the predecessor statute to the Tenant Protection Act, which provided that a judge to whom application was made to enforce obligations imposed under the statute, may “make such further or other orders as the judge considers appropriate”.

<b><u>16) In <b><i>Shaw v. Pajelle, (1985) O.J. No. 833</b></i><ref name="Shaw"/>, Montgomery J. sitting as a single judge of this Court held that section 96(3)(c) (later section 94(3)(c)) of the Landlord and Tenant Act gave the Court in a landlord and tenant proceeding, the power to award damages.</b></u>  In so doing, he held that the decision in <b><i>Beyer et al v. Absamco Developments Ltd. et al, 1976 CANLII 733 (ON SC), 12 O.R. (2d) 768</b></i><ref name="Beyer"/>, which held to the contrary, was wrong.

<b><u>17) In <b><i>MacKay v. Sanghera, (2001) CarswellOnt 2349 (Div. Ct.) (e)(C)</b></i><ref name="Mackay"/>, <span style=background:yellow>this court held that the residual clause in the Act, then section 34(1)(5) which permits the Tribunal to “make any other order that it considers appropriate” afforded a basis for an award of damages to tenants for consequential damage arising from a landlord’s breach of its obligations under the Act.</span></b></u>  See also <b><i>Nesha v. Bezrukova, (2003) O.J. 3787 at para 4 (Div. Ct.)</b></i><ref name="Nesha"/>

<b><u>18) Those cases and the grammatical and ordinary sense of the language giving the power to “make any other order that it considers appropriate” persuades us that the Tribunal has the power to award damages for breach of the contract of lease.</b></u>  To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the legislature which gave to the Tribunal the jurisdiction under section 162 to which I have previously referred, to determine all matters arising out of the landlord and tenant relationship.

<b><u>19) Accordingly, we find that the Tribunal was incorrect and erred in law in determining that it had no jurisdiction to award damages for breach of contact.</b></u>

<ref name="Mejia">Mejia v. Cargini, 2007 CanLII 2801 (ON SCDC), <http://canlii.ca/t/1qg88>, retrieved on 2020-06-23</ref>
<ref name="Shaw">Shaw v. Pajelle Investments Ltd., 1985 CarswellOnt 1587, <[[File:Shaw v Pajelle Investments Ltd.pdf]]>, retrieved on 2020-06-23</ref>
<ref name="Beyer">Beyer et al. v. Absamco Developments Ltd. et al., 1976 CanLII 733 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g18wp>, retrieved on 2020-06-23</ref>
<ref name="Mackay">Mackay v. Sanghera, 2001 CarswellOnt 2349, <[[File:Mackay v Sanghera.pdf]]>, retrieved on 2020-06-23</ref>
<ref name="Nesha">Nesha v. Bezrukova, 2003 CarswellOnt 3674, <[[File:Nesha v Bezrukova.pdf]]>, retrieved on 2020-06-23</ref>

==References==