Assault and Battery (Tort of)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-06-29
CLNP Page ID:	2061
Page Categories:	[Tort Law]
Citation:	Assault and Battery (Tort of), CLNP 2061, <https://rvt.link/2->, retrieved on 2024-06-29
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2024/06/20

Deluca v. Bucciarelli, 2022 ONCA 774 (CanLII)

[16] The motion judge relied on Bruce v. Dyer, 1966 CanLII 191 (ON SC), [1966] 2 O.R. 705 (H.C.) aff’d 1967 CanLII 653 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 482 (C.A.), for a description of the elements of the tort of assault. The motion judge said, “[t]he [appellant] must prove on a balance of probabilities that she had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in danger of violence from [the respondent], that she feared imminent harmful or offensive contact (emphasis in the original).” The motion judge was not satisfied the appellant had adduced evidence that could meet this standard.

[17] The appellant submitted that, particularly when viewed in the context of an evolving understanding of domestic violence and controlling behaviour, in assessing her evidence, the motion judge took too narrow a view of “imminence” and of the scope of “an assault” as that term appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act. The appellant pointed to Warman v. Grosvenor (2008), 2008 CanLII 57728 (ON SC), 92 O.R. (3d) 663 (S.C.) and Dunne v. Gauthier, 2000 BCSC 1603, as examples of cases that illustrate that imminence can mean different things in different contexts. The appellant also argued that the motion judge erred in failing to recognize that the term “assault”, as it appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i), can and should be interpreted broadly, so as to encompass threatening and harassing behaviour giving rise to fear of harm at some future unspecified point in time.

[18] We do not accept these submissions. Section 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act provides that there is no limitation period in respect of “a proceeding based on an assault” where at the time of the assault the parties “had an intimate relationship.” In our view, the appellant’s arguments are foreclosed by this court’s recent decision in Barker v. Barker, 2022 ONCA 567, [2022] O.J. No. 3526 (C.A.), in which this court considered the scope of the tort of assault. At paras. 137-138, this court explained that a tortious assault “involves intentionally causing another to fear imminent contact of a harmful or offensive nature (citations omitted, emphasis added).” At para. 171 of Barker, this court confirmed that “imminence is a critical component of the tort of assault.”

...

[20] At para. 173 of Barker, this court described the conduct in Warman, which the trial judge found amounted to an assault, as involving a relentless, two-year campaign of harassment involving internet postings and email. The communications were homophobic and anti-Semitic. Among other things, the defendant’s internet posts referred to the victim as a “dead [] walking”, shared his address including a map of his residence, and urged readers to “pay him a visit” and let him “meet his fate – execution at the hands of a people’s government”. One post concluded, “I have a Ruger P-90 and its bullets have your name on them”.

[21] At para. 174 of Barker, this court emphasized that the Warman trial judge recognized that damages are recoverable for assault “by someone who is made apprehensive of immediate physical contact” (emphasis in the original). Significantly, the Warman trial judge stated: “Frightening or threatening someone, however, does not constitute an assault unless the event feared is imminent….”

[22] At para. 176 of Barker, this court described Dunne as a case that involved a conditional threat to cause harm if the plaintiff school bus driver ever drove on the defendant’s laneway again. Significantly, in Dunne, the conditional threat was made immediately after the defendant finished physically battering the school bus driver. Moreover, the victim was aware that the defendant drove a large tractor trailer unit that could “take out” the victim and his bus.

[23] At para. 176 of Barker, this court agreed with comments of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that “[b]oth Dunne and Warman are useful examples of how imminence might be understood, but they do not attenuate the fundamental requirements of the tort of civil assault.”

[24] Given this court’s decision in Barker, we see no error in the motion judge’s appreciation of the scope of s. 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act or in her articulation or application of the elements of the tort of assault. The motion judge’s articulation of the elements of assault is consistent with Barker. Based on the evidence adduced by the appellant, the motion judge concluded that the appellant had not adduced evidence capable of demonstrating a genuine issue for trial concerning whether the respondent’s alleged conduct met the threshold of “an assault”. In general, she assessed the appellant’s evidence as lacking in particulars and unpersuasive. Concerning the police occurrence reports on which the appellant relied, the motion judge noted that they contained a comment that the appellant did not fear for her safety. The facts of both Warman and Dunne are distinguishable from the facts of this case. The Warman trial judge was satisfied based on the specific facts of that case that the plaintiff was “reasonably apprehensive of imminent physical contact”. The physical battering that preceded the conditional threat in Dunne and the victim’s knowledge of the appellant’s capabilities were specific circumstances creating support for the finding of an assault. Here, the appellant’s allegations and evidence did not rise to a similar level. We see no basis on which to interfere with the motion judge’s findings and conclusions.

Costantini v. Constantini, 2013 ONSC 1626 (CanLII)

57. I have no difficulty concluding the Applicant’s claim in tort should succeed. The Respondent’s aggressive and intimidating behaviour was outrageous. He chose to say and do things with the specific intention of causing physical pain and injury, and significant emotional upset. The Applicant suffered physical and emotional injuries, precisely as the Respondent intended.

58. As stated, the Applicant did not pursue a claim for punitive damages. There was no wage loss or out of pocket expense claim.

59. In assessing general damages, I have considered:

a. The Respondent’s physically aggressive behaviour on August 4, 2011 in the context of the earlier verbal abuse on February 15, 2011.

b. These two incidents were relatively isolated (although there had been lesser problems earlier in the relationship).

c. The most egregious event on August 4, 2011 was not a spontaneous event, or a sudden lapse of judgment. The parties had already been separated for about six months. The Respondent telephoned and appeared to be in the vicinity of the Applicant’s residence early in the evening. Three or four hours later he entered the Applicant’s home in the middle of the night, when he would have known she was alone and likely asleep. He certainly knew he no longer lived there, was not wanted, and shouldn’t be there. It was a pre-meditated break-in.

d. The Respondent’s behaviour when he entered the home (and set off the alarm) was needlessly aggressive. The Applicant did nothing wrong; nothing to provoke or aggravate the situation.

e. The assault entailed more than a single physical action. The Respondent engaged in a terrifying, aggressive application of force which included grabbing, squeezing by the neck, pulling away from a door, banging the Applicant’s head against a wall, and then slamming her face against a ceramic floor. He took advantage of his physical superiority. He took advantage of the Applicant’s vulnerability. He violated her right to a sense of safety, while asleep in her own home, in the middle of the night.

f. He tormented her with threats and degrading insults.

g. The Respondent has not behaved inappropriately toward the Applicant since then. Apart from two e-mails (dealt with through the criminal courts) he has had no further contact with her since the assault.

h. The Applicant suffered painful injuries. Fortunately none were permanent, or long-lasting.

i. The Applicant has suffered pervasive and continuing emotional upset as a result of the Respondent’s intentionally hurtful behaviour. Her fear, even within her own home, is understandable given the manner in which she was targeted and victimized – in her own home. Her life – her world – has changed.

j. Her stress has been compounded by dealing with the fallout on her teenage daughter, also a victim of the Respondent’s abuse.

60. I have a significant amount of sympathy for the Applicant – a blameless victim of a serious assault within a relationship of trust. I have no difficulty concluding she is entitled to compensation. The perplexing issue is quantum.

61. The Applicant’s request for $50,000.00 general damages would equate her situation to some of the aforementioned “high award” cases like Shaw v. Shaw, Bird v. Kohl, Megeval v. Megeval, and N.C. v. W.R.B. - cases which involved significantly more egregious (and protracted or repeated) misconduct, with more serious (permanent) injuries.

62. While no two cases (or victims) are identical, I find that the Applicant’s experiences and injuries are more similar to those described in cases like Rezel v. Rezel and Valenti v. Valenti.

63. As a result, attempting to maintain some consistency with other domestic assault cases – and taking into account the aggravating factors -- I find that $15,000.00 is an appropriate general damages award.

THE ORDER

64. A Divorce order shall issue.

65. The Respondent shall pay to the Applicant general and aggravated damages in relation to assault fixed in the sum of $15,000.00.

66. Applicant’s counsel may provide written submissions regarding costs, to be filed within 30 days.