Permissive v. Restrictive (Assumptions): Difference between revisions
(Created page with " [66] Subsection 126(1) begins as follows: “The Minister ... may disclose or communicate personal information ...” [emphasis added]. Under s 28(2)(c) of the Interpretati...") |
mNo edit summary |
||
| (4 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
[[Category:Statutory Interpretation]] | |||
[[Category:Legal Principles]] | |||
==Alberta (Director of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement) v DCR, 2019 ABQB 47 (CanLII)<ref name="DCR"/>== | |||
[66] Subsection 126(1) begins as follows: “The Minister ... may disclose or communicate personal information ...” [emphasis added]. Under s 28(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act, | [66] Subsection 126(1) begins as follows: “The Minister ... may disclose or communicate personal information ...” [emphasis added]. Under s 28(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act, | ||
| Line 10: | Line 12: | ||
[67] Paragraph 28(2)(c) is compelling. However, s 3(1) of the Interpretation Act qualifies its application: “This Act applies to the interpretation of every enactment except to the extent that a contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment” [emphasis added]. Professor Sullivan has cautioned that “may” language is not determinative. Statutory context may dictate that what might appear to signal a discretion is actually an obligation. “Both conceptually and in practice, permission and obligation are overlapping categories. An official who is obliged to do a thing is implicitly permitted to do it; an official who is permitted to do a thing may, in addition, be obliged to do it:” Construction of Statutes, §4.57. “The interpreter must determine whether there is anything in the statute or in the circumstances that expressly or impliedly obliges the exercise of the power:” Construction of Statutes, §4.62. See Alberta v Sykes at paras 24 and 31. | [67] Paragraph 28(2)(c) is compelling. However, s 3(1) of the Interpretation Act qualifies its application: “This Act applies to the interpretation of every enactment except to the extent that a contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment” [emphasis added]. Professor Sullivan has cautioned that “may” language is not determinative. Statutory context may dictate that what might appear to signal a discretion is actually an obligation. “Both conceptually and in practice, permission and obligation are overlapping categories. An official who is obliged to do a thing is implicitly permitted to do it; an official who is permitted to do a thing may, in addition, be obliged to do it:” Construction of Statutes, §4.57. “The interpreter must determine whether there is anything in the statute or in the circumstances that expressly or impliedly obliges the exercise of the power:” Construction of Statutes, §4.62. See Alberta v Sykes at paras 24 and 31. | ||
[68] It is not that the word “may” can ever itself be transformed to mean “shall.” Rather, the authority or power denoted by “may” could be coupled with a duty. The duty would be inferred from statutory purpose and other aspects of the Act or (as in the SKD case) from legislative or constitutional sources outside the Act. | <b><u>[68] It is not that the word “may” can ever itself be transformed to mean “shall.” Rather, the authority or power denoted by “may” could be coupled with a duty. The duty would be inferred from statutory purpose and other aspects of the Act or (as in the SKD case) from legislative or constitutional sources outside the Act.</b></u> | ||
<ref name="DCR">Alberta (Director of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement) v DCR, 2019 ABQB 47 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/hx5h0>, retrieved on 2020-09-10</ref> | |||
==References== | |||
Latest revision as of 16:31, 10 September 2020
Alberta (Director of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement) v DCR, 2019 ABQB 47 (CanLII)[1]
[66] Subsection 126(1) begins as follows: “The Minister ... may disclose or communicate personal information ...” [emphasis added]. Under s 28(2)(c) of the Interpretation Act,
In an enactment, ...
(c) “may” shall be construed as permissive and empowering.
[67] Paragraph 28(2)(c) is compelling. However, s 3(1) of the Interpretation Act qualifies its application: “This Act applies to the interpretation of every enactment except to the extent that a contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment” [emphasis added]. Professor Sullivan has cautioned that “may” language is not determinative. Statutory context may dictate that what might appear to signal a discretion is actually an obligation. “Both conceptually and in practice, permission and obligation are overlapping categories. An official who is obliged to do a thing is implicitly permitted to do it; an official who is permitted to do a thing may, in addition, be obliged to do it:” Construction of Statutes, §4.57. “The interpreter must determine whether there is anything in the statute or in the circumstances that expressly or impliedly obliges the exercise of the power:” Construction of Statutes, §4.62. See Alberta v Sykes at paras 24 and 31.
[68] It is not that the word “may” can ever itself be transformed to mean “shall.” Rather, the authority or power denoted by “may” could be coupled with a duty. The duty would be inferred from statutory purpose and other aspects of the Act or (as in the SKD case) from legislative or constitutional sources outside the Act.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Alberta (Director of Child, Youth and Family Enhancement) v DCR, 2019 ABQB 47 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/hx5h0>, retrieved on 2020-09-10
