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| [[Category:Landlord Tenant]]
| | https://caselaw.ninja/index.php/Non-Application_of_the_RTA_(5.(i)) |
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| ==See Also:==
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| * [[Hotel Room (Rental Unit)]]
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| * [[Trespass to Property (LTB)]]
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| * [[Shared Accommodations (With-Landlord)]]
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| ==[https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/06r17 Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17]==
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| Exemptions from Act<br>
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| 5 This Act does not apply with respect to,
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| ::(a) living accommodation intended to be provided to the travelling or vacationing public or occupied for a seasonal or temporary period in a hotel, motel or motor hotel, resort, lodge, tourist camp, cottage or cabin establishment, inn, campground, trailer park, tourist home, bed and breakfast vacation establishment or vacation home;
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| ::(i) living accommodation whose occupant or occupants are required to share a bathroom or kitchen facility with the owner, the owner’s spouse, child or parent or the spouse’s child or parent, and where the owner, spouse, child or parent lives in the building in which the living accommodation is located;
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| ::(n) any other prescribed class of accommodation.
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| ==[http://canlii.ca/t/gt6wx SOT-66425-16 (Re), 2016 CanLII 57313 (ON LTB)]==
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| 5. The tenancy began in 2013. At that time, a written rental agreement was entered into by the Respondent and AE. AE is the son of EE and IE. The rental agreement listed AE as "Leaseholder/Occupant" and IE as "Occupant." It makes no mention of EE.
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| 7. The Respondent's position is that simply accepting EE's rent payments does not make him a tenant. The Respondent had a tenancy with AE, and as long as his rent was being paid, they did not care who was paying it. Ultimately, the Respondent's position was that EE is a mere occupant.
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| 8. EE argued that by paying rent and residing in the rental unit, he should be considered a tenant as it is defined by section 2(1) of the Act, particularly as “occupant” is not defined by the Act.
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| 9. Section 2(1) of the Act defines “tenant,” as “includ(ing) a person who pays rent in return for the right to occupy a rental unit and includes the tenant’s heirs, assigns and personal representatives.”
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| 10. As the Divisional Court stated in its reasons for remitting this application back to the Board for a new hearing, the Court of Appeal has recognized, in [http://canlii.ca/t/1cx63 Ontario (Rental Housing Tribunal) v. Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority, 2002 CanLII 41961 (ON CA)], that the Act should be interpreted with an "expansive and liberal approach," and with a "tenant protection focus."
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| 11. However, I am also mindful of the Divisional Court's pronouncement in [https://caselaw.ninja/img_auth.php/0/01/Jemiola_v_Firchuk.pdf Jemiola v. Firchuk, (2005) O.J. No. 6085 (Div. Ct.)] which stated that while “tenant” should be broadly and liberally construed, it should also be recognized that,
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| ::<i>“… the legislation does not prohibit tenants from having roommates, family and friends living with them. The Member found, correctly in our view, that this does not necessarily confer on them the status of tenant.”</i>
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| 12. Further, while <u>'''EE is correct in submitting that “occupant” is not defined within the Act, this does not mean that there is no such thing as a non-tenant “occupant” of a rental unit for the purposes of the Act'''</u>. It is recognized in various provisions of the Act that there may be occupants that are not tenants. One need only look at a number of provisions in the Act referring to “occupants,” and "other members of (a tenants') household," including:
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| ::- Section 22, which states that landlords may not interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of rental units by a tenant or “members of his or her household;
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| ::- Section 60, which allows landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “other members of his or her household,” misrepresent their income;
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| ::- Section 61, which allows landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “another occupant of the rental unit commits an illegal act…;”
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| ::- Section 62, which allows landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “another occupant of the rental unit…” wilfully or negligently causes undue damage;
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| ::- Section 63, which allows landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “another occupant of the rental unit” wilfully causes undue damage or uses the rental unit in a manner inconsistent with use as a residential premises;
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| ::- Sections 64 and 65, which allow landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “another occupant of the rental unit” substantially interferes with reasonable enjoyment of a residential complex by other tenants or a landlord, or a landlord’s lawful rights, privileges or interests; and
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| ::- Section 66, which allows landlords to apply to terminate a tenancy if a tenant or “another occupant of the rental unit” seriously impairs the safety of any person in the residential complex.
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| 13. Just as the Act recognizes that persons other than tenants may reside in a rental unit, <u>'''it also recognizes that persons other than tenants may pay rent,''</u>' as section 2(1) of the Act defines “rent” as “includ(ing) the amount of any consideration paid or given or required to be '''<u>paid or given by or on behalf of a tenant</u> to a landlord or the landlord’s agent for the right to occupy a rental unit.'''..” [emphasis added]
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| 15. It is worth noting that implied tenancies usually arose where, before the continuation of expired leases on a month to month basis was made automatic by statute, tenants continued to occupy rental units and continued to pay rent after fixed term tenancies had ended. However, implied tenancies could also arise where tenants moved out or died, but other persons paid rent to landlords for the right to remain in rental units.
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| 16. In my view, consideration of the evidence in its full context in the current case did not support the creation of an implied tenancy between EE and the Respondent. The evidence did not show that EE paid rent for continuation of a lapsed or terminated tenancy. He testified that he has lived in the rental unit, and paid the rent, since the commencement of his son's tenancy, which is still in effect. The tenancy with AE has never lapsed or terminated. The Landlord's staff members have approached EE about being added in writing as an occupant, not a tenant. These facts comfortably support a conclusion that EE has lived in the rental unit as an occupant by benefit of his son's tenancy, that he has paid rent on behalf of his son, and that he has never become a tenant himself.
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| ==[http://canlii.ca/t/j5dbs Ravnaski v. Zolis, 2020 ONSC 923 (CanLII)]==
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| [10] First, is Mr. Ravnaski a tenant of the estate such that any request for him to vacate the condominium is governed by the Residential Tenancies Act? The answer to this question will resolve both the estate’s application and part of Mr. Ravnaski’s application to set aside the arbitration award. If Mr. Ravnaski is a tenant of the estate and his tenancy is exclusively governed by the Residential Tenancies Act, the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to order him to vacate the property and this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the estate’s application for vacant possession. On the other hand, <b><u>if Mr. Ravnaski is not a tenant of the estate, the estate is entitled to an order for vacant possession of the condominium.</b></u> If this Court grants the estate’s application and orders Mr. Ravnaski to vacate the condominium, his application to set aside the arbitrator’s order that he vacate the condominium would be moot.
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| <b><u>[15] The Residential Tenancies Act did not apply to the rental agreement Mr. Ravnaski had with his mother while she was alive, even though he paid her rent. The Residential Tenancies Act does not apply with respect to living accommodation whose occupant shares a bathroom or kitchen facility with the owner.[4] Mr. Ravnaski’s mother owned the condominium and they shared a kitchen. Mr. Ravnaski’s tenancy was, therefore, not covered by the Residential Tenancies Act while his mother was alive.</b></u>
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| [17] For the reasons that follow, <b><u>I find that Mr. Ravnaski had a contract with his mother to live in her condominium for a month at a time in exchange for rent. The estate was required to permit Mr. Ravnaski to live in the condominium for the remainder of the month for which he paid before his mother passed away.</b></u> <u>Mr. Ravnaski never entered into a contract with the estate that would permit him to continue to live in the condominium after the agreement he had with his mother expired. As a result, he is not a tenant of the estate and has no legal entitlement to stay in the condominium.</u>
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| [33] I find that Mr. Ravnaski is not a tenant of his mother’s estate and there has never been a valid tenancy agreement between Mr. Ravnaski and the estate. <b><u>Mr. Ravnaski’s occupation of the condominium was not governed by the Residential Tenancy Act while his mother was alive and that did not change after her death.</b></u> The Estate Trustee is entitled to vacant possession of the condominium and Ms. Zolis’ application (CV-19-00624557-000) is granted.
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| [60] Mr. Ravnaski is not now and has never been a tenant of the estate. His occupation of the condominium is not governed by the Residential Tenancies Act. The estate’s application (CV‑19‑00624557-000) for vacant possession of the condominium is granted.
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| <b><u>[61] In her application, Ms. Zolis asked for an Order that Mr. Ravnaski vacate the property immediately. She also asked for an Order authorizing her to seek the assistance of the Sheriff to secure the vacant possession of the property if Mr. Ravnaski does not voluntarily leave.</b></u>
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| [62] Mr. Ravnaski is ordered to vacate the property within 90 days from today. If Mr. Ravnaski refuses to leave the condominium in compliance with my order, Ms. Zolis, in her capacity as the Estate Trustee, is granted leave to issue a writ of possession in relation to the condominium and require the Sheriff of the City of Toronto (the “Sheriff”) to put her in vacant possession of the condominium. Ms. Zolis, in her capacity as the Estate Trustee, can seek the assistance of the Toronto Police Service, the Sheriff and any qualified and licensed locksmith to obtain and secure vacant possession of the condominium. To the extent that the Toronto Police Service, the Sheriff of the City of Toronto or a locksmith are involved with securing vacant possession of the condominium for the Estate Trustee, they are to be held harmless.
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