Damage to Dignity

Simpson v. Pranajen Group Ltd. o/a Nimigon Retirement Home, 2019 HRTO 10 (CanLII)

[1] The Application alleges that the respondent failed to accommodate the applicant’s special needs related to childcare, and terminated her employment, at least in part, because she was unable to offer more flexible hours given her duties as a mother. When it was filed, the Application alleged discrimination with respect to employment because of family status and also reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

[26] The Federal Court of Appeal issued a decision that clarified that the sorts of parental obligations that fall within the protected ground of “family status” under human rights legislation are substantive obligations that engage a parent’s legal responsibility to a child. See, Canada (Attorney General) v. Johnstone, 2014 FCA 110 (“Johnstone”).

[42] As the Tribunal stated in Conklin v. Ron Joyce Jr. Enterprises Ltd. o/a Tim Horton’s, 2017 HRTO 723, where the Tribunal has found that an applicant lost employment for discriminatory reasons, compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect has ranged considerably. In most cases, the range has been between $10,000 and $35,000. In the applicant’s case, she lost long-term employment and I am satisfied that her particular experience in response to the discrimination was very serious. She was particularly vulnerable given her responsibilities and feelings towards her children. I am therefore prepared to order compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect that is at the high end of the range of compensation.

[43] I find that it is appropriate to award $30,000 in compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect in this case.

Noe v. Ranee Management, 2014 HRTO 1658 (CanLII)

[2] The Tribunal held a hearing in this matter on February 21, 2014. In Decision 2014 HRTO 746, dated May 23, 2014, I found that the applicant has a disability that causes her to be sensitive to chemicals. I further found that she asked the respondent to accommodate her regarding its use of chemicals (paints, solvents, cleaners, etc.) in the apartment building in which she lived at 195 Barrington Avenue in Toronto. The respondent declined to accommodate the applicant, which I found was a breach of her right to be free from discrimination in the occupancy of accommodation under section 2(1) of the Code.

[9] The applicant requested $10,000 for compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. The applicant did not participate in the remedy hearing and, as a result, the evidence before me regarding the subjective effect the respondent’s conduct had on the applicant is limited. Accordingly, I am not prepared to make the award requested by the applicant. Based on the objective seriousness of the respondent’s conduct in refusing the applicant’s request for accommodation, I find that an award of $5,000 for compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect is appropriate. I also find it appropriate to order that all of the respondent’s managerial employees take the eLearning module “Human Rights 101” that is found on the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s website at www.ohrc.on.ca and confirm completion of same in writing to the applicant within 90 days of the date of this decision.

ORDER

[10] The Tribunal orders as follows:

a. Within 30 days of the date of this Decision on Remedy, the respondent shall pay to the applicant $5,000.00 as compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect;

B.M. v. Cambridge (City), 2010 HRTO 1104 (CanLII)

[1] This is a Decision in respect of an Application filed on October 28, 2008 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The applicant, through his next friend, his mother, alleges discrimination in services on the basis of disability.

[2] The applicant was 10 years old and diagnosed with Asperger’s Syndrome at the time of filing the Application. Prior to the Application, he had been a camper for many years at a summer day camp in Cambridge (the “Dolson camp”) that the corporate respondent (the “City”) operates. He alleges that the respondents refused to allow him to attend the Dolson camp in 2008 unless he was accompanied by one of their inclusion facilitators whom they would only provide for 2 of the 9 weeks of the summer programme.

[38] It is clear that the applicant’s disability was a factor in his inability to attend camp for the entire period camp was being offered in the summer of 2008. He has therefore established a prima facie case of discrimination and the onus shifts to the City to establish that it met its duty of procedural and substantive accommodation to the point of undue hardship.