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==Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162<ref name="Endean"/>==
==Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162<ref name="Endean"/>==


[23] The inherent powers of superior courts are central to the role of those courts, which form the backbone of our judicial system. Inherent jurisdiction derives from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law and may be defined as a “reserve or fund of powers” or a “residual source of powers”, which a superior court “may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them”: I. H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), 23 Curr. Legal Probs. 23, at p. 51, cited with approval in, e.g., <i>Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 20</i><ref name="Criminal Lawyers"/>; <i>R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78, at para. 24</i><ref name="Caron"/>; and <i>MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 29-31.</i><ref name="MacMillan"/>
[23] The inherent powers of superior courts are central to the role of those courts, which form the backbone of our judicial system. <b><u>Inherent jurisdiction derives from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law and may be defined as a “reserve or fund of powers” or a “residual source of powers”, which a superior court “may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them”:</b></u> I. H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), 23 Curr. Legal Probs. 23, at p. 51, cited with approval in, e.g., <i>Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 20</i><ref name="Criminal Lawyers"/>; <i>R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78, at para. 24</i><ref name="Caron"/>; and <i>MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 29-31.</i><ref name="MacMillan"/>


[24] The courts have recognized that, given the broad and loosely defined nature of these powers, they should be “exercised sparingly and with caution”: Caron, at para. 30. It follows that courts should first determine the scope of express grants of statutory powers before dipping into this important but murky pool of residual authority that forms their inherent jurisdiction: see, e.g., <i>Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, at paras. 63-68.</i><ref name="Century Services"/>  As The Honourable Georgina Jackson and Janis Sarra write, “[i]t is only where broad statutory authority is unavailable that inherent jurisdiction needs to be considered as a possible judicial tool to utilize in the circumstances”: “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007 (2008), 41, at p. 73.
[24] <b><u>The courts have recognized that, given the broad and loosely defined nature of these powers, they should be “exercised sparingly and with caution”:</b></u> Caron, at para. 30. It follows that courts should first determine the scope of express grants of statutory powers before dipping into this important but murky pool of residual authority that forms their inherent jurisdiction: see, e.g., <i>Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, at paras. 63-68.</i><ref name="Century Services"/>  As The Honourable Georgina Jackson and Janis Sarra write, “[i]t is only where broad statutory authority is unavailable that inherent jurisdiction needs to be considered as a possible judicial tool to utilize in the circumstances”: “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007 (2008), 41, at p. 73.


<ref name="Endean">Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162, <https://canlii.ca/t/gv6g4>, retrieved on 2021-09-10</ref>
<ref name="Endean">Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162, <https://canlii.ca/t/gv6g4>, retrieved on 2021-09-10</ref>

Revision as of 13:42, 10 September 2021


Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved: 2024-11-23
CLNP Page ID: 790
Page Categories: [Legal Principles]
Citation: Inherent Jurisdiction, CLNP 790, <38>, retrieved on 2024-11-23
Editor: P08916
Last Updated: 2021/09/10

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Cerberus Business Financial, LLC v. B & W Heat Treating Canada, ULC, 2020 ONSC 3781 (CanLII)[1]

[20] First, there is no jurisprudence directly on point which, in my view, does not assist the Trustee. Second, courts have held that inherent jurisdiction does not operate where Parliament or the legislature has acted and cannot be used so as to contradict a statute or rule: see Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd., 1975 CanLII 164 (SCC), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 475[2], at p. 480 and Stephen Francis Podgurski (Re), 2020 ONSC 2552, at para. 69[3]. I do not see a functional gap or vacuum in s. 38(2) of the CTA. The three-month period is clearly set out.

[1] [2] [3]

Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162[4]

[23] The inherent powers of superior courts are central to the role of those courts, which form the backbone of our judicial system. Inherent jurisdiction derives from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law and may be defined as a “reserve or fund of powers” or a “residual source of powers”, which a superior court “may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them”: I. H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970), 23 Curr. Legal Probs. 23, at p. 51, cited with approval in, e.g., Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 20[5]; R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78, at para. 24[6]; and MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 29-31.[7]

[24] The courts have recognized that, given the broad and loosely defined nature of these powers, they should be “exercised sparingly and with caution”: Caron, at para. 30. It follows that courts should first determine the scope of express grants of statutory powers before dipping into this important but murky pool of residual authority that forms their inherent jurisdiction: see, e.g., Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, at paras. 63-68.[8] As The Honourable Georgina Jackson and Janis Sarra write, “[i]t is only where broad statutory authority is unavailable that inherent jurisdiction needs to be considered as a possible judicial tool to utilize in the circumstances”: “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters”, in J. P. Sarra, ed., Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007 (2008), 41, at p. 73.

[4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Cerberus Business Financial, LLC v. B & W Heat Treating Canada, ULC, 2020 ONSC 3781 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j8bgq>, retrieved on 2020-06-25
  2. 2.0 2.1 Baxter Student Housing Ltd. et al. v. College Housing Co-operative Ltd. et al., 1975 CanLII 164 (SCC), [1976] 2 SCR 475, <http://canlii.ca/t/1z6gt>, retrieved on 2020-06-25
  3. 3.0 3.1 Stephen Francis Podgurski (Re), 2020 ONSC 2552 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j6sc0>, retrieved on 2020-06-25
  4. 4.0 4.1 Endean v. British Columbia, 2016 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2016] 2 SCR 162, <https://canlii.ca/t/gv6g4>, retrieved on 2021-09-10
  5. 5.0 5.1 Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 3, <https://canlii.ca/t/fzw43>, retrieved on 2021-09-10
  6. 6.0 6.1 R. v. Caron, 2011 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2011] 1 SCR 78, <https://canlii.ca/t/2fkpf>, retrieved on 2021-09-10
  7. 7.0 7.1 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 725, <https://canlii.ca/t/1frdw>, retrieved on 2021-09-10
  8. 8.0 8.1 Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 (CanLII), [2010] 3 SCR 379, <https://canlii.ca/t/2dz21>, retrieved on 2021-09-10