Certificate of Offence

Corporation of the City of Thunder Bay v. Kamenawatamin, 2009 CanLII 15905 (ON SC)

[6] In R. v. Coté, 1977 CanLII 1 (SCC), (1978) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.), at para. 11, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of the sufficiency of an information charging an offence under the Criminal Code:

”… the golden rule is for the accused to be reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against him, thus giving him the possibility of a full defence and a fair trial.”

[7] In my opinion, this golden rule is applicable to the issue of whether a certificate of offence is complete and regular on its face.

[8] In R. v. Wilson, (2001) O.J. No. 4907, (O.C.J.), at para. 20, Livingstone J. concluded that a certificate of offence which is “regular on its face,” must set out:

1. who is commencing the process – an informant;

2. who is charged under the process – name of the defendant;

3. what the process is – statute name and section number;

4. where and when the allegation arose; and

5. what the result will be from a conviction from the process – set fine.

[15] In this case, by signing the certificate, the provincial offences officer certified that the offence occurred in a public place. Pursuant to s. 48.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, that certified statement is proof of the public nature of the sidewalk, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Therefore, not only is not necessary to add the word “public” before the words “sidewalk in front of 775 John Street,” for the purpose of providing reasonable notice of the location, it is also not necessary for the purpose of designating the offence. The offence is sufficiently designated by the prescribed words, “Being intoxicated in a public place.”

York (Regional Municipality) v. Wilson 2005 CarswellOnt 7377Ontario Superior Court of Justice

16 Many of the cases interpreting the term "complete and regular on its face", in my view fell into error as the court was concerned about whether or not there were errors in fine amounts on the face of the certificate. This applies to cases such as R. v. Wilson, (2001) O.J. No. 4907, 23 M.V.R. (4th) 296 (Ont. C.J.), R. v. Khoshael, (2001) O.J. No. 2110 (Ont. C.J.), that fail to consider what the Act actually requires for the certificate to be complete and regular on its face. Rather these cases look to the form of the certificate as prescribed by regulation and are in my view therefore wrongly decided. Generally where the provision to be interpreted appears in regulation, it is read in the context of both the regulation and the enabling Act as a whole. See: R. v. Cie immobilière BCN, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 865 (S.C.C.). However, where conflict is unavoidable between the Act and the regulations provisions, normally the statutory provision prevails. See: Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), (1992) 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). There is in my view unavoidable conflict between the form used as prescribed under the regulations and the Act and the latter must prevail making the additional information "surplusage" for purposes of determining whether the certificate is regular and complete on its face.

R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6718 (CanLII)

[46] In my view, the officers’ grounds to detain and investigate all three occupants of the car for Liquor License Act infractions, easily rose to the standard of “reasonable suspicion”. There were two large bottles of open vodka on the floor of the rear seat, both bottles had been partially consumed, there was a strong odour of alcohol coming from the car, it was a Saturday night, both passengers acknowledged having been out drinking, the driver was nervous and attributed the strong smell of alcohol in the car to his two passengers, and Graham appeared to be anxious to leave. In particular, the fact that two separate vodka bottles had been opened and partially consumed, and the strong odour of alcohol coming from the car, reasonably inferred that more than one person had been drinking in the car. It was unlikely that the rear seat passenger (Fraser) had been drinking on his own from two separate bottles of vodka.

[47] For all the above reasons, the detention of the Applicant Graham for a Liquor License Act investigation was lawful and there was no s.9 Charter violation.