General Damages (LTB)

EAT-58948-16 (Re), 2016 CanLII 72081 (ON LTB)

34. The Tenant next requested $10,000.00 for “general non-pecuniary damages” and a further $10,000.00 for compensation for the injury the Tenant felt to his “dignity, feelings and self-respect” due to a breach of subsection 2(1) of the Human Rights Code.

35. First, the Tenant’s lawyer submitted no arguments as to how the Tenant’s rights under the Human Rights Code were breached. As a result, the request for compensation as a result of any alleged breach of the Human Rights Code is denied.

36. Second, on the question of an award for general damages, following the hearing, I researched whether the Board has the jurisdiction to award general damages, and found that it does. Subsection 31(1)(f) of the Act states that the Board may “make any other order that it considers appropriate”.

37. In considering whether and how much to award for general damages, I considered the impact that the Landlord’s many breaches of his obligations under the Act had on the Tenant. I accept the Tenant’s testimony that his pre-existing medical conditions of anxiety, a panic disorder, and major depression were exacerbated. I also accept that the Tenant felt exhausted, angry, frustrated, anxious, and bullied. I find that a reasonable award for general damages, given the extent of the Tenant’s distress, is $2,500.00. That amount shall be ordered to be paid by the Landlord.

SOT-97745-18 (Re), 2019 CanLII 86899 (ON LTB)

39. The Tenant requested an award in general damages based upon the Landlord’s egregious conduct pursuant to paragraph (f) of subsection 31(1) of the Act. The Ontario Divisional Court considered the application of this remedy in Mejia v. Cagini.[4] In that case, an unquestionably toxic relationship between the parties culminated in an assault upon the tenant by three friends of the landlord, in the presence of the landlord. The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal found the assault took place in the presence of the tenant’s family and that its purpose was to put pressure upon the tenant to vacate the premises. The tenant was required to attend hospital for treatment. The Tribunal did not find that the landlord had himself committed the assault, but found that he did nothing to stop it and that he was responsible for the actions of his friends. The Tribunal found that the landlord had thereby interfered with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the apartment by the tenant and his family.

40. As in the present case, the tenant in Mejia did not seek damages in tort, but rather damages arising out of the breach of his right to quiet enjoyment of his apartment, pursuant to the rental contract.

41. While I recognize that the facts in Mejia were substantially more extreme, the basis of the Divisional Court’s findings regarding unacceptable conduct that impaired the Tenants’ right to quiet enjoyment remain applicable to the present case. Following the analysis in Mejia, I find that the Landlord’s protracted and unlawful attempts to coerce and intimidate the Tenants into vacating the rental unit represented an outrageous breach of the rental agreement. As well, her reckless actions in exacerbating the conflict between the Tenants and A.H. could have foreseeably resulted in violence. In light of all of the circumstances, I find that an award of $2,000.00 in general damages for the Landlord’s breach of the Tenants’ contractual right to quiet enjoyment is warranted.

42. Although the Landlord’s Legal Representative noted the absence of any quantifiable losses to the Tenants in support of their request for damages such as medical evidence, in light of the analysis in Mejia, this is necessarily fatal to the request. As the Court noted with respect to the scope of now paragraph (f) of subsection 31(1) of the Act:

Those cases and the grammatical and ordinary sense of the language giving the power to “make any other order that it considers appropriate” persuades us that the Tribunal has the power to award damages for breach of the contract of lease. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intent of the legislature which gave to the Tribunal the jurisdiction under section 162 to which I have previously referred, to determine all matters arising out of the landlord and tenant relationship.[5]

43. The Tenants withdrew their other requested remedies with respect to the T2 Application at the hearing.