Commercially Reasonable: Difference between revisions

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<b><u>[62] I conclude from this review that enunciating a general organizing principle of good faith and recognizing a duty to perform contracts honestly will help bring certainty and coherence to this area of the law in a way that is consistent with reasonable commercial expectations.</b></u>
<b><u>[62] I conclude from this review that enunciating a general organizing principle of good faith and recognizing a duty to perform contracts honestly will help bring certainty and coherence to this area of the law in a way that is consistent with reasonable commercial expectations.</b></u>


[73]  In my view, we should. I would hold that there is a general duty of honesty in contractual performance. This means simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract. This does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s contractual performance. Recognizing a duty of honest performance flowing directly from the common law organizing principle of good faith is a modest, incremental step. The requirement to act honestly is one of the most widely recognized aspects of the organizing principle of good faith: see Swan and Adamski, at § 8.135; O’Byrne, “Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments”, at p. 78; Belobaba; <b><I>Greenberg v. Meffert (1985), 1985 CanLII 1975 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (2d) 755 (C.A.), at p. 764</b></i><ref name="Greenberg"/>; Gateway Realty, at para. 38, per Kelly J.; <b><i>Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp. (2003), 2003 CanLII 52151 (ON CA), 64 O.R. (3d) 533 (C.A.)</b></i><ref name="Shelanu"/>, at para. 69. For example, the duty of honesty was a key component of the good faith requirements which have been recognized in relation to termination of employment contracts: Wallace, at para. 98; Honda Canada, at para. 58.
[73]  In my view, we should. <b><u>I would hold that there is a general duty of honesty in contractual performance. This means simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract. This does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s contractual performance.</b></u> Recognizing a duty of honest performance flowing directly from the common law organizing principle of good faith is a modest, incremental step. The requirement to act honestly is one of the most widely recognized aspects of the organizing principle of good faith: see Swan and Adamski, at § 8.135; O’Byrne, “Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments”, at p. 78; Belobaba; <b><I>Greenberg v. Meffert (1985), 1985 CanLII 1975 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (2d) 755 (C.A.), at p. 764</b></i><ref name="Greenberg"/>; Gateway Realty, at para. 38, per Kelly J.; <b><i>Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp. (2003), 2003 CanLII 52151 (ON CA), 64 O.R. (3d) 533 (C.A.)</b></i><ref name="Shelanu"/>, at para. 69. For example, the duty of honesty was a key component of the good faith requirements which have been recognized in relation to termination of employment contracts: Wallace, at para. 98; Honda Canada, at para. 58.


<ref name="Bhasin">Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 494, <http://canlii.ca/t/gf84s>, retrieved on 2020-07-22</ref>
<ref name="Bhasin">Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 494, <http://canlii.ca/t/gf84s>, retrieved on 2020-07-22</ref>

Revision as of 16:46, 22 July 2020


Resolute FP Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 60 (CanLII)[1]

[79] As we will explain below, contractual interpretation also requires courts to consider the principle of commercial reasonableness and efficacy. Contracts ought therefore to be interpreted “in accordance with sound commercial principles and good business sense” (Scanlon v. Castlepoint Development Corp. (1992), 1992 CanLII 7745 (ON CA), 11 O.R. (3d) 744, at p. 770[2]). As Lord Diplock explained in Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B., [1985] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.), at p. 201, “if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of a word in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense”. The principle that requires contracts to be read in a commercially reasonable and efficient manner is therefore an important interpretive aid in construing contractual terms.

[80] Ultimately, contractual interpretation involves the application of various tools — including consideration of the factual matrix and the principle of commercial reasonableness — in order to properly understand the meaning of the words used by the parties to express their agreement.


[1] [2]

Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 494[3]

[61] The fact that commercial parties expect honesty on the part of their contracting partners can also be seen from the fact that it was the American Bar Association’s Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law that urged the adoption of “honesty in fact” in the original drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.ˮ): E. A. Farnsworth, “Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Codeˮ (1963), 30 U. Chicago L. Rev. 666, at p. 673. Moreover, empirical research suggests that commercial parties do in fact expect that their contracting parties will conduct themselves in good faith: see, e.g., S. Macaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study” (1963), 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55, at p. 58; H. Beale and T. Dugdale, “Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies” (1975), 2 Brit. J. Law & Soc. 45, at pp. 47-48; S. Macaulay, “An Empirical View of Contract”, [1985] Wis. L. Rev. 465; V. Goldwasser and T. Ciro, “Standards of Behaviour in Commercial Contracting” (2002), 30 A.B.L.R. 369, at pp. 372-77. It is, to say the least, counterintuitive to think that reasonable commercial parties would accept a contract which contained a provision to the effect that they were not obliged to act honestly in performing their contractual obligations.

[62] I conclude from this review that enunciating a general organizing principle of good faith and recognizing a duty to perform contracts honestly will help bring certainty and coherence to this area of the law in a way that is consistent with reasonable commercial expectations.

[73] In my view, we should. I would hold that there is a general duty of honesty in contractual performance. This means simply that parties must not lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of the contract. This does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead the other party about one’s contractual performance. Recognizing a duty of honest performance flowing directly from the common law organizing principle of good faith is a modest, incremental step. The requirement to act honestly is one of the most widely recognized aspects of the organizing principle of good faith: see Swan and Adamski, at § 8.135; O’Byrne, “Good Faith in Contractual Performance: Recent Developments”, at p. 78; Belobaba; Greenberg v. Meffert (1985), 1985 CanLII 1975 (ON CA), 50 O.R. (2d) 755 (C.A.), at p. 764[4]; Gateway Realty, at para. 38, per Kelly J.; Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp. (2003), 2003 CanLII 52151 (ON CA), 64 O.R. (3d) 533 (C.A.)[5], at para. 69. For example, the duty of honesty was a key component of the good faith requirements which have been recognized in relation to termination of employment contracts: Wallace, at para. 98; Honda Canada, at para. 58.

[3] [4] [5]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Resolute FP Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 60 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j3sv1>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  2. 2.0 2.1 Scanlon v. Castlepoint Development Corp., 1992 CanLII 7745 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/g122g>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  3. 3.0 3.1 Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (CanLII), [2014] 3 SCR 494, <http://canlii.ca/t/gf84s>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  4. 4.0 4.1 Greenberg v. Meffert et al., 1985 CanLII 1975 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/g1hg2>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  5. 5.0 5.1 Shelanu Inc. v. Print Three Franchising Corp., 2003 CanLII 52151 (ON CA), <http://canlii.ca/t/624n>, retrieved on 2020-07-22