Forfeiture (CTA): Difference between revisions

From Riverview Legal Group
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Access restrictions were established for this page. If you see this message, you have no access to this page.
Line 7: Line 7:
It is trite law that a landlord must elect between the remedies of termination and distress. He cannot exercise both. Atlantic relies on the landlord's changing of the locks, and its efforts to re-let the premises as proof that it acted in a manner inconsistent with the continued existence of the lease.
It is trite law that a landlord must elect between the remedies of termination and distress. He cannot exercise both. Atlantic relies on the landlord's changing of the locks, and its efforts to re-let the premises as proof that it acted in a manner inconsistent with the continued existence of the lease.


<b><u>It is true that where a landlord locks the premises and excludes the tenant, the courts generally consider this to be an act of forfeiture, disentitling the landlord to the remedy of distress</b></u>: see, for example, <i>Clarkson Co. v. Consortium Group Ltd. (1983), 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), 40 O.R. (2d) 771, 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 273 (H.C.J.)</i><ref name="Clarkson"/>, and the cases discussed therein. But here, the evidence is that the tenant was not excluded, having regard to the face of the warrant and the bailiff's subsequent acts, and that the locks were changed to protect the property, and the right of distress, the goods being too bulky to remove. In addition, removal of the booth would have necessitated repairs to the premises. The cases have recognized that in some circumstances, changing the locks may reflect an impounding of the goods distrained, and not forfeiture. In <i>Lussier v. Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 652 at p. 655, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (Co. Ct.)</i><ref name="Lussier"/>, affirmed without reasons 1972 CanLII 378 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 656n, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 164n (C.A.), P.J. Macdonald Co. Ct. J. stated:
<b><u>It is true that where a landlord locks the premises and excludes the tenant, the courts generally consider this to be an act of forfeiture, disentitling the landlord to the remedy of distress</b></u>: see, for example, <i>Clarkson Co. v. Consortium Group Ltd. (1983), 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), 40 O.R. (2d) 771, 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 273 (H.C.J.)</i><ref name="Clarkson"/>, and the cases discussed therein. But here, the evidence is that the tenant was not excluded, having regard to the face of the warrant and the bailiff's subsequent acts, and that the locks were changed to protect the property, and the right of distress, the goods being too bulky to remove. In addition, removal of the booth would have necessitated repairs to the premises. The cases have recognized that in some circumstances, changing the locks may reflect an impounding of the goods distrained, and not forfeiture. In <i>Lussier v. Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 652 at p. 655, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (Co. Ct.)</i><ref name="Lussier"/>, affirmed without reasons <i>1972 CanLII 378 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 656n, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 164n (C.A.)</i><ref name="Greenback"/>, P.J. Macdonald Co. Ct. J. stated:


It is argued for the landlord that in this case there was an impounding of the premises which amounted to a distress and not a forfeiture and that while usually a landlord would remove the distrained articles from the premises, it would be difficult and impractical in this situation to remove the machinery which was of a heavy type and that off-premises storage would be expensive. There is no evidence before me that would suggest that taking of the goods from the premises would be impractical.
It is argued for the landlord that in this case there was an impounding of the premises which amounted to a distress and not a forfeiture and that while usually a landlord would remove the distrained articles from the premises, it would be difficult and impractical in this situation to remove the machinery which was of a heavy type and that off-premises storage would be expensive. There is no evidence before me that would suggest that taking of the goods from the premises would be impractical.
Line 14: Line 14:
<ref name="Clarkson">Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Consortium Group Ltd., 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g124b>, retrieved on 2020-08-07</ref>
<ref name="Clarkson">Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Consortium Group Ltd., 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g124b>, retrieved on 2020-08-07</ref>
<ref name="Lussier">Re Lussier et al. and Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g12b4>, retrieved on 2020-08-07</ref>
<ref name="Lussier">Re Lussier et al. and Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g12b4>, retrieved on 2020-08-07</ref>
<ref name="Greenback">Greenback Investments (Hamilton) Ltd. v. O'Connell et al, 1972 CanLII 378 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g1j3f>, retrieved on 2020-08-07</ref>


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 21:03, 7 August 2020


859587 Ontario Ltd. v. Starmark Property Management Ltd., 1997 CanLII 12153 (ON SC)[1]

Termination, forfeiture or surrender

It is trite law that a landlord must elect between the remedies of termination and distress. He cannot exercise both. Atlantic relies on the landlord's changing of the locks, and its efforts to re-let the premises as proof that it acted in a manner inconsistent with the continued existence of the lease.

It is true that where a landlord locks the premises and excludes the tenant, the courts generally consider this to be an act of forfeiture, disentitling the landlord to the remedy of distress: see, for example, Clarkson Co. v. Consortium Group Ltd. (1983), 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), 40 O.R. (2d) 771, 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 273 (H.C.J.)[2], and the cases discussed therein. But here, the evidence is that the tenant was not excluded, having regard to the face of the warrant and the bailiff's subsequent acts, and that the locks were changed to protect the property, and the right of distress, the goods being too bulky to remove. In addition, removal of the booth would have necessitated repairs to the premises. The cases have recognized that in some circumstances, changing the locks may reflect an impounding of the goods distrained, and not forfeiture. In Lussier v. Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 652 at p. 655, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 160 (Co. Ct.)[3], affirmed without reasons 1972 CanLII 378 (ON SC), [1972] 3 O.R. 656n, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 164n (C.A.)[4], P.J. Macdonald Co. Ct. J. stated:

It is argued for the landlord that in this case there was an impounding of the premises which amounted to a distress and not a forfeiture and that while usually a landlord would remove the distrained articles from the premises, it would be difficult and impractical in this situation to remove the machinery which was of a heavy type and that off-premises storage would be expensive. There is no evidence before me that would suggest that taking of the goods from the premises would be impractical.

[1] [2] [3] [4]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 859587 Ontario Ltd. v. Starmark Property Management Ltd., 1997 CanLII 12153 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/1vv87>, retrieved on 2020-08-07
  2. 2.0 2.1 Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Consortium Group Ltd., 1983 CanLII 1995 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g124b>, retrieved on 2020-08-07
  3. 3.0 3.1 Re Lussier et al. and Denison, 1971 CanLII 737 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g12b4>, retrieved on 2020-08-07
  4. 4.0 4.1 Greenback Investments (Hamilton) Ltd. v. O'Connell et al, 1972 CanLII 378 (ON SC), <http://canlii.ca/t/g1j3f>, retrieved on 2020-08-07