Real Estate Agent (Standard of Care): Difference between revisions
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==Lippa v Colletta, 2017 ONSC 1122 (CanLII)<ref name="Lippa"/>== | ==Lippa v Colletta, 2017 ONSC 1122 (CanLII)<ref name="Lippa"/>== | ||
[30] The general standard of care applicable to real estate agents is a legal question. It does not vary from case to case. Simply put, a real estate agent must exercise the standard of care that would be expected of a reasonable and prudent agent in the same circumstances. As the Court of Appeal has held, however, the translation of that general standard to a particular factual matrix is a question of fact: <i>Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352 at para 125.</i><ref name="Krawchuk"/> | <b><u>[30] The general standard of care applicable to real estate agents is a legal question. It does not vary from case to case. Simply put, a real estate agent must exercise the standard of care that would be expected of a reasonable and prudent agent in the same circumstances.</b></u> As the Court of Appeal has held, however, the translation of that general standard to a particular factual matrix is a question of fact: <i>Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352 at para 125.</i><ref name="Krawchuk"/> | ||
[31] The question for determination in this case is whether a reasonable and prudent real estate agent in Mr. Latimer’s position would have advised Ms. Lippa of the possible existence of Tarion warranty coverage. | [31] The question for determination in this case is whether a reasonable and prudent real estate agent in Mr. Latimer’s position would have advised Ms. Lippa of the possible existence of Tarion warranty coverage. |
Revision as of 03:13, 16 September 2020
Lippa v Colletta, 2017 ONSC 1122 (CanLII)[1]
[30] The general standard of care applicable to real estate agents is a legal question. It does not vary from case to case. Simply put, a real estate agent must exercise the standard of care that would be expected of a reasonable and prudent agent in the same circumstances. As the Court of Appeal has held, however, the translation of that general standard to a particular factual matrix is a question of fact: Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352 at para 125.[2]
[31] The question for determination in this case is whether a reasonable and prudent real estate agent in Mr. Latimer’s position would have advised Ms. Lippa of the possible existence of Tarion warranty coverage.
[32] There is scant evidence in the record upon which the court could make the determination. Evidence will often be presented of trade custom or practice. Sometimes there is a statutory standard that must be met. The Court of Appeal has directed, however, that, in general, it is inappropriate for a trial judge to determine the standard of care in the context of an allegation of professional negligence in the absence of expert evidence: Krawchuk, as above, at para. 130. There are two identified exceptions to this general requirement:
- (a) Where the standard of care may reliably be determined in the absence of expert evidence, such as where the case is about non-technical matters that an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge about; and,
- (b) Where the conduct of the defendant is so egregious that it obviously falls below the standard of care.
See Krawchuk, as above, at paras. 132-135.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Lippa v Colletta, 2017 ONSC 1122 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/gxldj>, retrieved on 2020-09-15
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/fl99f>, retrieved on 2020-09-15