Seizure of Evidence (Without-Warrent): Difference between revisions

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==R. v. Ringler, 2004 ONCJ 104 (CanLII){{Ringler}}==
==R. v. Ringler, 2004 ONCJ 104 (CanLII){{Ringler}}==


Section 8 provides that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  Although the onus on a Charter application is prima facie on the applicant, where, as here, a warrantless entry and seizures were made in a private residence, there is a presumption of unreasonableness and Section 8 breach, which can be rebutted by the Crown on a balance of probabilities if it shown that the entry and seizures were authorized by law, a reasonable law, and done in a reasonable manner.  <i>Feeney 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), 115 CCC (3d) 129, SCC</i>{{Feeney}} provides, inter alia, that the police cannot make warrantless arrests in private dwellings unless exceptional circumstances exist, and that an individual’s privacy interest in one’s dwelling house generally outweighs the interests of the police, and thus warrantless arrests in dwelling houses are prohibited, subject to very limited exceptions. These exceptions would include hot pursuit, or entry in circumstances reflected in Golub 111 CCC (3d) 193, where police have safety concerns including the possible existence of persons in the premises, or Godoy 1999 CanLII 709 (SCC), 1999 1 SCR 311 where a situation presents concerns as to the life and safety of an occupant in a dwelling.
Section 8 provides that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  Although the onus on a Charter application is prima facie on the applicant, where, as here, a warrantless entry and seizures were made in a private residence, there is a presumption of unreasonableness and Section 8 breach, which can be rebutted by the Crown on a balance of probabilities if it shown that the entry and seizures were authorized by law, a reasonable law, and done in a reasonable manner.  <i>Feeney 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), 115 CCC (3d) 129, SCC</i>{{Feeney}} provides, inter alia, that the police cannot make warrantless arrests in private dwellings unless exceptional circumstances exist, and that an individual’s privacy interest in one’s dwelling house generally outweighs the interests of the police, and thus warrantless arrests in dwelling houses are prohibited, subject to very limited exceptions. These exceptions would include hot pursuit, or entry in circumstances reflected in Golub 111 CCC (3d) 193, where police have safety concerns including the possible existence of persons in the premises, or <i>Godoy 1999 CanLII 709 (SCC), 1999 1 SCR 311</i>{{Golub}} where a situation presents concerns as to the life and safety of an occupant in a dwelling.


In the case at bar, where there has been a warrantless entry and a prima facie Section 8 breach, the principles and directions in Waterfield 1963  3 AER 659, and Dedman 1985 CanLII 41 (SCC), 1985 2 SCR 2, must be applied. That engages the inquiry as to determining whether the conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or common law, and if so, did there exist an unjustifiable use of those powers associated with the duty. As I have already stated, Section 42 of the Police Services Act sets out certain duties of the police including preserving the peace, prevention of crime, and protection of life and property.
In the case at bar, where there has been a warrantless entry and a prima facie Section 8 breach, the principles and directions in Waterfield 1963  3 AER 659, and Dedman 1985 CanLII 41 (SCC), 1985 2 SCR 2, must be applied. That engages the inquiry as to determining whether the conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or common law, and if so, did there exist an unjustifiable use of those powers associated with the duty. As I have already stated, Section 42 of the Police Services Act sets out certain duties of the police including preserving the peace, prevention of crime, and protection of life and property.

Revision as of 17:12, 10 May 2021


Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33[1]

R. v. Ringler, 2004 ONCJ 104 (CanLII)[2]

Section 8 provides that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. Although the onus on a Charter application is prima facie on the applicant, where, as here, a warrantless entry and seizures were made in a private residence, there is a presumption of unreasonableness and Section 8 breach, which can be rebutted by the Crown on a balance of probabilities if it shown that the entry and seizures were authorized by law, a reasonable law, and done in a reasonable manner. Feeney 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), 115 CCC (3d) 129, SCC[3] provides, inter alia, that the police cannot make warrantless arrests in private dwellings unless exceptional circumstances exist, and that an individual’s privacy interest in one’s dwelling house generally outweighs the interests of the police, and thus warrantless arrests in dwelling houses are prohibited, subject to very limited exceptions. These exceptions would include hot pursuit, or entry in circumstances reflected in Golub 111 CCC (3d) 193, where police have safety concerns including the possible existence of persons in the premises, or Godoy 1999 CanLII 709 (SCC), 1999 1 SCR 311[4] where a situation presents concerns as to the life and safety of an occupant in a dwelling.

In the case at bar, where there has been a warrantless entry and a prima facie Section 8 breach, the principles and directions in Waterfield 1963 3 AER 659, and Dedman 1985 CanLII 41 (SCC), 1985 2 SCR 2, must be applied. That engages the inquiry as to determining whether the conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or common law, and if so, did there exist an unjustifiable use of those powers associated with the duty. As I have already stated, Section 42 of the Police Services Act sets out certain duties of the police including preserving the peace, prevention of crime, and protection of life and property.

The OSPCAA spells out certain rules concerning entries, and Section 12 permits entry into a dwelling place where a Justice of the Peace has issued a warrant authorizing entry, and Section 12 (2) provides for entry into buildings other than a dwelling place without warrant where an animal is in immediate distress. Section 12 (5) provides that if an inspector finds an animal in distress in any building, the inspector is authorized to supply the animal with food, care, or treatment. Section 13 (1) provides that where reasonable grounds exist to an inspector that an animal is in distress, and the owner is present, that the inspector may order the said owner to take the necessary action to relieve the animal of its distress, or have the animal treated by a veterinarian at the owner’s expense. Section 14 (1) provides for an inspector removing an animal from a building in order to provide it with food, care or treatment to relieve its distress in circumstances where, inter alia, a veterinarian has examined and advises that removal is required, or the inspector reasonably believes that the animal is in distress and the owner cannot be found promptly.

Section 1 defines distress as meaning the state of being in need of proper care, water, food or shelter or being injured, sick or in pain or suffering or being abused or subject to undue or unnecessary hardship, privation or neglect.

Section 3 of the Act sets out the objects of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, to facilitate and provide for the prevention of cruelty to animals and their protection and relief thereunder. Section 11 (1) provides that for purposes of enforcement of that Act, or any other act or law in force in Ontario pertaining to the welfare of or the prevention of cruelty to animals, every inspector and agent of the Society may exercise any of the powers of a police officer.

References

  1. Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, <https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90p33>, reterived 2021-05-10
  2. R. v. Ringler, 2004 ONCJ 104 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/1hf8z>, retrieved on 2021-05-10
  3. R. v. Feeney, 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), [1997] 2 SCR 13, <https://canlii.ca/t/1fr1w>, retrieved on 2021-05-10
  4. R. v. Godoy, 1999 CanLII 709 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 311, <https://canlii.ca/t/1fqpk>, retrieved on 2021-05-10