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==Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 (CanLII)==
==Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 (CanLII)==


[63] There are three modes in which the defamation took place. There are Ms. Van Nes’ own remarks, published by her to her own Facebook page; there is the republication of Ms. Van Nes’ remarks, as they propagated through Facebook and, in one case, through email; and there are defamatory remarks made by third parties in reaction to Ms. Van Nes’ post. The plaintiff submits the defendant is liable for all defamation that occurred in these three modes.
<i>Defendant’s Liability for her own Facebook Posts</i>
[64] The elements required to establish a claim in defamation were summarized in Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, at para. 28:
::[28] A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to obtain judgment and an award of damages: (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. If these elements are established on a balance of probabilities, falsity and damage are presumed, though this rule has been subject to strong criticism… . (The only exception is that slander requires proof of special damages, unless the impugned words were slanderous per se… . The plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant intended to do harm, or even that the defendant was careless. The tort is thus one of strict liability.
::[Citations omitted.]
[65] I find Mr. Pritchard has proven that Ms. Van Nes’ initial Facebook posts and her subsequent replies to her “friends”’ comments were defamatory, in that they tended to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. The ordinary and natural meaning of Van Nes’ comments unequivocally described Mr. Pritchard as a “nutter”, a “creep”, and an abnormal person.
[66]        Liability for defamation also arises in this case through the innuendo of the defendant’s words. An innuendo is made where the defamatory meaning of words arises from inference or implication: Hodgson v. Canadian Newspapers Co., (1998), 1998 CanLII 14820 (ON SC), 39 OR (3d) 235 (Ont. Gen. Div.); rev’d in part on other grounds, [(2000), 2000 CanLII 14715 (ON CA), 49 OR (3d) 161; leave to appeal ref’d [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 465. The innuendo must be one that a reasonable reader would draw from the words and it must not be one guided by any special knowledge, legal or otherwise: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (1998: Sweet & Maxwell), at 82, §3.15.





Revision as of 16:29, 15 October 2021


Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved: 2024-11-23
CLNP Page ID: 1776
Page Categories: [Defamation]
Citation: Facebook Posts - Re: Defamation, CLNP 1776, <>, retrieved on 2024-11-23
Editor: Sharvey
Last Updated: 2021/10/15

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Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 (CanLII)

[63] There are three modes in which the defamation took place. There are Ms. Van Nes’ own remarks, published by her to her own Facebook page; there is the republication of Ms. Van Nes’ remarks, as they propagated through Facebook and, in one case, through email; and there are defamatory remarks made by third parties in reaction to Ms. Van Nes’ post. The plaintiff submits the defendant is liable for all defamation that occurred in these three modes.

Defendant’s Liability for her own Facebook Posts

[64] The elements required to establish a claim in defamation were summarized in Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, at para. 28:

[28] A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to obtain judgment and an award of damages: (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. If these elements are established on a balance of probabilities, falsity and damage are presumed, though this rule has been subject to strong criticism… . (The only exception is that slander requires proof of special damages, unless the impugned words were slanderous per se… . The plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant intended to do harm, or even that the defendant was careless. The tort is thus one of strict liability.
[Citations omitted.]

[65] I find Mr. Pritchard has proven that Ms. Van Nes’ initial Facebook posts and her subsequent replies to her “friends”’ comments were defamatory, in that they tended to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. The ordinary and natural meaning of Van Nes’ comments unequivocally described Mr. Pritchard as a “nutter”, a “creep”, and an abnormal person.

[66] Liability for defamation also arises in this case through the innuendo of the defendant’s words. An innuendo is made where the defamatory meaning of words arises from inference or implication: Hodgson v. Canadian Newspapers Co., (1998), 1998 CanLII 14820 (ON SC), 39 OR (3d) 235 (Ont. Gen. Div.); rev’d in part on other grounds, [(2000), 2000 CanLII 14715 (ON CA), 49 OR (3d) 161; leave to appeal ref’d [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 465. The innuendo must be one that a reasonable reader would draw from the words and it must not be one guided by any special knowledge, legal or otherwise: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (1998: Sweet & Maxwell), at 82, §3.15.


[1]

References

  1. Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/gplvp>, retrieved on 2021-10-15