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| == Limitations as a Substantive Right == | | == Limitations as a Substantive Right == |
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| ===[http://canlii.ca/t/1frp2 Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, (1994) 3 SCR 1022, 1994 CanLII 44 (SCC)],===
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| This pragmatic approach is illustrated by [http://canlii.ca/t/23p5w Block Bros. Realty Ltd. v. Mollard (1981), 1981 CanLII 504 (BC CA), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 323 (B.C.C.A.)]. In that case the issue was whether the requirement of s. 37 of the Real Estate Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 356, that a real estate agent be licensed in British Columbia, should be categorized as procedural or substantive. The parties had executed a real estate listing agreement in Alberta for land situated in British Columbia. The plaintiff, an agent licensed in Alberta, sold the land to Alberta residents. The defendant vendor failed or refused to pay the commission. The plaintiff sued in British Columbia. The lex causae was Alberta. The defendant pleaded that the British Columbia licensing requirement was procedural. The court, however, ruled that it was substantive, notwithstanding that the section read: "A person shall not maintain an action . . .", language traditionally relied on for a finding that a statute is procedural because it purported to extinguish the remedy, but not the right. The court expressly relied on policy reasons for its decision. It stated at pp. 327-28:
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| ::<i>"If, however, the contract is governed by the law of Alberta and if the contract is valid under the law of Alberta, the characterization of s. 37 as procedural would deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to enforce his legal rights in a British Columbia Court. The only purpose of s. 37 is to enforce the licensing sections, and it should be examined in this context. I think that legislation should be categorized as procedural only if the question is beyond any doubt. If there is any doubt, the doubt should be resolved by holding that the legislation is substantive."</i>
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| This approach makes sense to me. It is right to say, however, that it is significantly different from the early common law position as it relates to statutes of limitation.
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| '''The common law traditionally considered statutes of limitation as procedural, as contrasted with the position in most civil law countries where it has traditionally been regarded as substantive.''' The common law doctrine is usually attributed to the seventeenth century Dutch theorist Ulrich Huber, whose celebrated essay De conflictu legum diversarum in diversis imperiis (1686), became known in England during the reign of William and Mary (see Edgar H. Ailes, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws" (1933), 31 Mich. L. Rev. 474, at p. 487; and Ernest G. Lorenzen, "Huber's De Conflictu Legum" (1919), 13 Ill. L. Rev. 375, reprinted in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws (1947), at p. 136). By the early nineteenth century, the doctrine was firmly established in England and in the United States. From the cases and academic commentary of the time (see, for example, Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Bing. N.C. 202, 132 E.R. 80; Leroux v. Brown (1852), 12 C.B. 801, 138 E.R. 1119; Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caines 402 (N.Y.S.C. 1803); Ernest G. Lorenzen, "Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws -- One Hundred Years After" (1934), 48 Harv. L. Rev. 15, reprinted in Selected Articles, supra, at p. 181), one can glean the two main reasons for the ready acceptance of this doctrine in Anglo/American jurisprudence. The first was the view that foreign litigants should not be granted advantages that were not available to forum litigants. This relates to the English preference for the lex fori in conflict situations. The second reason was the rather mystical view that a common law cause of action gave the plaintiff a right that endured forever. A statute of limitation merely removed the remedy in the courts of the jurisdiction that had enacted the statute.
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| Such reasoning mystified continental writers such as M. Jean Michel (La Prescription Libératoire en Droit International Privé, Thesis, University of Paris, 1911, paraphrased in Ailes, supra, at p. 494), who contended that "the distinction is a specious one, turning upon the language rather than upon the sense of limitation acts . . . ." '''In the continental view, all statutes of limitation destroy substantive rights.'''
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| I must confess to finding this continental approach persuasive. The reasons that formed the basis of the old common law rule seem to me to be out of place in the modern context. The notion that foreign litigants should be denied advantages not available to forum litigants does not sit well with the proposition, which I have earlier accepted, that '''the law that defines the character and consequences of the tort is the lex loci delicti'''. <u>The court takes jurisdiction not to administer local law, but for the convenience of litigants, with a view to responding to modern mobility and the needs of a world or national economic order.</u>
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| Disposition
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| <u>'''The appeal should be allowed with costs throughout. The appellants' application for a declaration that the proper choice of law to be applied is the law of Saskatchewan and that the Saskatchewan limitation period is substantive should be granted, and the action should be referred to the Supreme Court of British Columbia Chambers for determination.'''</u>
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