Assault and Battery (Tort of): Difference between revisions
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==Deluca v. Bucciarelli, 2022 ONCA 774 (CanLII)<ref name="Deluca"/>== | ==Deluca v. Bucciarelli, 2022 ONCA 774 (CanLII)<ref name="Deluca"/>== | ||
[16] The motion judge relied on <i>Bruce v. Dyer, 1966 CanLII 191 (ON SC), <i>[1966] 2 O.R. 705 (H.C.)</i><ref name="Dyer"/> <i>aff’d 1967 CanLII 653 (ON CA)</i><ref name="Dyer1967">, [1970] 1 O.R. 482 (C.A.), for a description of the elements of the tort of assault. The motion judge said, “[t]he [appellant] must prove on a balance of probabilities that she had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in danger of violence from [the respondent], that she feared imminent harmful or offensive contact (emphasis in the original).” The motion judge was not satisfied the appellant had adduced evidence that could meet this standard. | [16] The motion judge relied on <i>Bruce v. Dyer, 1966 CanLII 191 (ON SC), <i>[1966] 2 O.R. 705 (H.C.)</i><ref name="Dyer"/> <i>aff’d 1967 CanLII 653 (ON CA)</i><ref name="Dyer1967"/>, [1970] 1 O.R. 482 (C.A.), for a description of the elements of the tort of assault. The motion judge said, “[t]he [appellant] must prove on a balance of probabilities that she had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in danger of violence from [the respondent], that she feared imminent harmful or offensive contact (emphasis in the original).” The motion judge was not satisfied the appellant had adduced evidence that could meet this standard. | ||
[17] The appellant submitted that, particularly when viewed in the context of an evolving understanding of domestic violence and controlling behaviour, in assessing her evidence, the motion judge took too narrow a view of “imminence” and of the scope of “an assault” as that term appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act. The appellant pointed to <i>Warman v. Grosvenor (2008), 2008 CanLII 57728 (ON SC), 92 O.R. (3d) 663 (S.C.)</i><ref name="Warman"/> and <i>Dunne v. Gauthier, 2000 BCSC 1603</i><ref name="Dunne"/>, as examples of cases that illustrate that imminence can mean different things in different contexts. The appellant also argued that the motion judge erred in failing to recognize that the term “assault”, as it appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i), can and should be interpreted broadly, so as to encompass threatening and harassing behaviour giving rise to fear of harm at some future unspecified point in time. | [17] The appellant submitted that, particularly when viewed in the context of an evolving understanding of domestic violence and controlling behaviour, in assessing her evidence, the motion judge took too narrow a view of “imminence” and of the scope of “an assault” as that term appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act. The appellant pointed to <i>Warman v. Grosvenor (2008), 2008 CanLII 57728 (ON SC), 92 O.R. (3d) 663 (S.C.)</i><ref name="Warman"/> and <i>Dunne v. Gauthier, 2000 BCSC 1603</i><ref name="Dunne"/>, as examples of cases that illustrate that imminence can mean different things in different contexts. The appellant also argued that the motion judge erred in failing to recognize that the term “assault”, as it appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i), can and should be interpreted broadly, so as to encompass threatening and harassing behaviour giving rise to fear of harm at some future unspecified point in time. | ||
Revision as of 17:20, 23 January 2023
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| Date Retrieved: | 2024-11-10 |
| CLNP Page ID: | 2061 |
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| Citation: | Assault and Battery (Tort of), CLNP 2061, <>, retrieved on 2024-11-10 |
| Editor: | Sharvey |
| Last Updated: | 2023/01/23 |
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Deluca v. Bucciarelli, 2022 ONCA 774 (CanLII)[1]
[16] The motion judge relied on Bruce v. Dyer, 1966 CanLII 191 (ON SC), [1966] 2 O.R. 705 (H.C.)[2] aff’d 1967 CanLII 653 (ON CA)[3], [1970] 1 O.R. 482 (C.A.), for a description of the elements of the tort of assault. The motion judge said, “[t]he [appellant] must prove on a balance of probabilities that she had reasonable grounds to believe that she was in danger of violence from [the respondent], that she feared imminent harmful or offensive contact (emphasis in the original).” The motion judge was not satisfied the appellant had adduced evidence that could meet this standard.
[17] The appellant submitted that, particularly when viewed in the context of an evolving understanding of domestic violence and controlling behaviour, in assessing her evidence, the motion judge took too narrow a view of “imminence” and of the scope of “an assault” as that term appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i) of the Act. The appellant pointed to Warman v. Grosvenor (2008), 2008 CanLII 57728 (ON SC), 92 O.R. (3d) 663 (S.C.)[4] and Dunne v. Gauthier, 2000 BCSC 1603[5], as examples of cases that illustrate that imminence can mean different things in different contexts. The appellant also argued that the motion judge erred in failing to recognize that the term “assault”, as it appears in s. 16(1)(h.2)(i), can and should be interpreted broadly, so as to encompass threatening and harassing behaviour giving rise to fear of harm at some future unspecified point in time.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Deluca v. Bucciarelli, 2022 ONCA 774 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jszsl>, retrieved on 2023-01-23
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Bruce v. Dyer, 1966 CanLII 191 (ON SC), <https://canlii.ca/t/g1c6c>, retrieved on 2023-01-23
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Bruce v. Dyer, 1967 CanLII 653 (ON CA), <https://canlii.ca/t/gxnxn>, retrieved on 2023-01-23
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Warman v. Grosvenor, 2008 CanLII 57728 (ON SC), <https://canlii.ca/t/21gdw>, retrieved on 2023-01-23
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Dunne v. Gauthier, 2000 BCSC 1603 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/1fmfx>, retrieved on 2023-01-23
