C70966.FAP.Harvey v. Bingemans Inc. ONCA

Grounds for Appeal

• The hearing judge applied the wrong test to determine whether or not there was a tenancy under the Commericial Tenancies Act, RSO 1990.
• The hearing judge made an overriding and palpable error of fact in finding that the appellant did not have exclusive possession of the campsite known as 268A.
• The hearing judge did not apply the correct test to determine whether the appellant was a trespasser within the meaning of the Tresspass to Property Act, RSO. 1990.

Summary of the Facts

1. In the Affidavit of Shaun David Harvey, at Tab A, the document known as the License to Occupy, it states in part:

i. Page one states in part: “The Owner has agreed to grant a license to the Occupant to use the following site with the services specified:

Site: 268A (the Site) at Bingemans Camping Resort 425 Bingemans Centre Dr, Kitchener, Ontario (the Park)”

ii. Paragraph 22 of the License to Occupy states in part that:

“19. In the event of any default of any of the terms and conditions of this license agreement. and except where otherwise stated, the Owner shall have the following rights:

a) On fourteen days prior written notice of default delivered, or deemed received under the terms of this license. to terminate this license agreement and re-enter upon the above Site and repossess it. [Emphasis Added]

b) To sue for any overdue payments or damages arising out of a breach of this license together with interest. (at the Courts of Justice Act Rate), Legal Costs together with any other costs of any nature or kind which may be incurred in repossessing the Site and collecting overdue payments or damages.

c) To seize any goods or property on the Site subject to any applicable provisions of the law and to sell the same to recover any monies or damages owing.

d) To bar the Occupant, members of their family, guests, visitors or other persons attending at the Occupant's Site or with the Occupant's permission from:

i) Staying past 8:00 p.m. on any night of the aforementioned fourteen (14) days

ii) Attending or participating in any common activities as may be held in the Park.”

iii. Paragraph 22 of the License to Occupy states in part that:

“In the event that this Site shall be repossessed under the terms of this license, any goods including any trailer that the Occupant has left on the Site shall be deemed to be an article as defined by the Repair and Storage Liens Act of Ontario, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), and may be removed by the Owner who shall be deemed to be a lien claimant and storer under the Act, to whatever location the Owner deems appropriate and the Owner in such removal and storage will not be responsible for any loss or damage to such goods. The Occupant will be responsible for any storage costs and moving costs incurred, together with any outstanding rent or charges or any other monies due under this agreement and the Owner may recover costs and/or monies owing in accordance with the provisions of the Act”, as well as,

iv. Paragraph 24 of the License to Occupy states:

“The Occupant of the Site shall exercise such care as is required in the maintenance of the Site during the term of his License to ensure that persons entering on the Site and the property brought on the Site by such persons are reasonably safe while on the Site and shall save the Owner harmless from any claims as a result of the failure of the Occupant to do so. This clause is included to exclude and modify the Owner’s liability as described above and in accordance with the exclusion and modification permitted by the Occupiers’ Liability Act, Ontario”

v. The final page of the License to Occupy reads in part:

This Agreement signed the 4^th day of July, 2020, at the city of Kitchener Ontario shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and permitted assigns of the parties hereto.

2. There is no dispute that,

a. no other person outside the License to Occupy was permitted to use the campsite known as Site 268A.

b. The term of the License to Occupy commenced on July 1, 2020, and ended on October 31, 2020.

c. The Appellant was exclusively responsible for maintaining the Site and was liable to the owner for any damages that arouse under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

3. As demonstrated under paragraph 22 of the License to Occupy, repossession of the site may be subject to a breach of the terms of the agreement, meaning that unless the terms of the agreement were breached, Bingemans Inc. did not have possession of the site 268A.

4. The length of the agreement was for more than a brief period, such as a few days, or even a few weeks. The length of the agreement imputes lease hold interest in site 268A.

5. The hearing judge misapplied to whom the Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21 (“TPA”) may be applied. The hearing judge erred in finding that arrest of the appellant was lawful under the TPA.

Legal Analysis

Standard of Review

In Wu v. Adler, 2022 ONSC 188 (CanLII) the court states:

[12] The appellate standard of review is set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33. On questions of law, the standard is correctness. On questions of fact, the standard is palpable and overriding error. On questions of mixed fact and law, the standard is palpable and overriding error, unless there is an extricable question of law, in which case, the standard of review on that extricable question is correctness.

[13] A palpable and overriding error is an error that can be plainly seen and that affected the result. “The same proposition is sometimes stated as prohibiting an appellate court from reviewing a trial judge’s decision, if there was some evidence upon which he or she could have relied to reach that conclusion”: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, at para. 1.

Who is a Tenant

The Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7 defines a landlord and tenant as follows:

1 In this Act,

...

“landlord” includes a person who is lessor, owner, the person giving or permitting the occupation of the premises in question, and these persons’ heirs and assigns and legal representatives, and in Parts II and III also includes the person entitled to possession of the premises; (“locateur”)

...

“tenant” includes a person who is lessee, occupant, sub-tenant, under-tenant, and the person’s assigns and legal representatives. (“locataire”)

2 This Act does not apply to tenancies and tenancy agreements to which the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applies. 1997, c. 24, s. 213 (3); 2006, c. 17, s. 247.

2.1 This Act does not apply with respect to a property in which the Crown in right of Ontario has an interest if one of the following circumstances applies in respect of the property:

1. The property was forfeited to the Crown in right of Ontario under any Ontario statute or the Criminal Code (Canada).

2. Possession of the property has been or may be taken in the name of the Crown in right of Ontario under the Escheats Act, 2015.

3. The property is forfeited corporate property to which the Forfeited Corporate Property Act, 2015 applies. 2015, c. 38, Sched. 7, s. 46.

3 The relation of landlord and tenant does not depend on tenure, and a reversion in the lessor is not necessary in order to create the relation of landlord and tenant, or to make applicable the incidents by law belonging to that relation; nor is it necessary, in order to give a landlord the right of distress, that there is an agreement for that purpose between the parties. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 3.

...

Tenant v. Licensee

In MacKinnon Estate v. MacKinnon, 2010 ONCA 170 (CanLII) the courts addressed the important differences between a tenant and a licensee. Looking at paragraphs 46 to 49 the court states:

[46] In the end, as I see it, this case turns on the first of those questions, namely, whether Duke and Fanny occupied the property as tenants at will. The answer to that question lies in the nature of the relationship that existed between Duke and his sisters, Mercy and Flora, under the original arrangement by which Duke occupied the property and thereafter, the nature of the relationship that existed between Fanny and her sons, Charles and Warren, under the arrangement by which Fanny occupied the property.

[47] Did Duke and Fanny occupy the property as tenants at will or as licensees? The distinction between the two legal concepts is important in possessory title claims because a tenancy at will creates an estate or interest in the land, whereas a licence to use the land does not, although it may give rise to contractual rights (see Street v. Mountford, [1985] 2 All E.R. 289 at 291 and Errington at p. 154).

[48] For present purposes, s. 5(7) of the Act only comes into play if Duke and Fanny occupied the property as tenants at will. The right of recovery contemplated by that provision carries with it the notion that either the person or persons seeking recovery, or their predecessors, have conveyed an estate or interest in the land. If no such estate has passed, as is the case where the property is occupied pursuant to a licence, there is nothing to be reclaimed.

[49] What then is a tenant at will and what distinguishes a tenancy from a licensee? In Ocean Harvesters, at p. 686 Dickson J. explained that “[A] tenancy at will is created when one person permits another to occupy lands on the agreement, express or implied, that the tenancy is determinable at the will of either”. He further observed at p. 687 that “[E]exclusive possession by the tenant is essential to the demise and the statute will not bar the owner unless the owner is out of possession”.

[50] As for the distinction between a tenant and licensee, at pp. 687-88 Dickson J. adopted as correct the following statement of law expressed by Windeyer J. in Radiach at p. 222:

What then is the fundamental right which a tenant has that distinguishes his position from that of a licensee? It is an interest in land as distinct from a personal permission to enter the land and use it for some stipulated purpose or purposes. And how is it to be ascertained whether such an interest in land has been given? By seeing whether the grantee was given a legal right of exclusive possession of the land for a term or from year to year or for a life or lives. If he was, he is a tenant. [Emphasis in original.]

Other considerations are also found in Rahimi v. Regional Assessment Commissioner, Region No. 9, 1997 CanLII 12097 (ON SC), in it the court states:

Tenancy or licence

Notwithstanding the applicants' submission that I should expound the words "rented" or "leased" in their grammatical and ordinary sense, counsel referred me to no fewer than 15 legal authorities to assist the court with the interpretation of "leased" and several authoritative dictionary definitions and judicial pronouncements on the meaning of "rented". In my view, I need go no further on the question of tenancy than the decision of the House of Lords in Street v. Mountford, [1985] A.C. 809, [1985] 2 All E.R. 289 (H.L.), which establishes the test for a tenancy at common law. The hallmarks of a tenancy are exclusive possession for a term at a rent. But, as I read this case, the court there determined that if the agreement confers on the occupier exclusive possession, this is prima facie a grant of an interest in land. The question to be asked and answered is what is the fundamental right that the occupier has secured? The House of Lords adopted at p. 827 the summary of the issue as stated in a decision of the Australian High Court in Radaich v. Smith (1959), 101 C.L.R. 209 at p. 222:

What then is the fundamental right which a tenant has that distinguishes his position from that of a licensee? It is an interest in land as distinct from a personal permission to enter the land and use it for some stipulated purpose or purposes. And how is it to be ascertained whether such an interest in land has been given? By seeing whether the grantee was given a legal right of exclusive possession of the land for a term. If he was, he is a tenant. And he cannot be other than a tenant, because a legal right of exclusive possession is a tenancy and the creation of such a right is a demise. A reservation to the landlord, either by contract or statute, of a limited right of entry, as for example to view or repair, is, of course not inconsistent with the grant of exclusive possession. Subject to such reservations, a tenant for a term or from year to year or for a life or lives can exclude his landlord as well as strangers from the demised premises . . .

In my view, Street v. Mountford stands for the proposition that, while the parties may call it otherwise, the grant of exclusive possession is the singular distinguishing feature between a licence and a lease. It is true that exclusive possession is not decisive. The court may well find exceptional circumstances which, notwithstanding exclusive possession, negative an intention to create the legal relationship of landlord and tenant: Errington v. Errington, [1952] 1 K.B. 290, [1952] 1 All E.R. 149 (C.A.); Booker v. Palmer, [1942] 2 All E.R. 674, 87 Sol. Jo. 30 (C.A.); Cobb v. Lane, [1952] 1 All E.R. 1199, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1037 (C.A.). These cases are explained by Denning L.J. in Facchini v. Bryson, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1386 at pp. 1389-90, 96 Sol. Jo. 395 (C.A.), as follows:

In all the cases where an occupier has been held to be a licensee there has been something in the circumstances, such as a family arrangement, an act of friendship or generosity, or such like to negative any intention to create a tenancy . . .

What is Exclusive Possession

The concept of exclusive possession was explained in Gottardo Properties (Dome) Inc. v. Toronto (City of), 1998 CanLII 6184 (ON CA), at paragraphs 31 - 33 the court states:

[31] The licensees suggested that their occupancy of the SkyBoxes was too transient to be assessable. I would not give effect to this argument. Whether occupancy is transient or permanent depends on the context. Realistically the SkyBoxes are used only during sports and other entertainment events at the SkyDome. In that context the licensees' occupancy of the boxes is sufficiently permanent to be assessable.

[32] A second and important qualification on assessable occupancy or use turns on the concept of exclusivity. Although the requirement of exclusivity permeates the caselaw there have been few judicial explanations of the concept. In my view, the explanations that have been offered are not entirely satisfactory because they do not determine assessability when there is simultaneous occupancy. One explanation suggests that the exclusivity required is not absolute exclusivity but is related to the purpose of the occupancy or use. The occupancy or use must be sufficiently exclusive to permit the occupant to carry out the purpose for which it acquired an interest in the land. As Krever J. observed in Saga, supra, at p.78:

It is not difficult to discern in the case law the need for the exclusiveness of the occupation or use to be related to the purpose for which the land is occupied or used ...

[33] Similarly, Widdicombe et al., Ryde on Rating 13th ed. (1976), a leading English text on assessment states at p. 27: "that one of the ingredients of rateable occupation is that the occupation must be exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor. ... Occupation is exclusive if the occupier can exclude all other persons from using the land in the same way as he does."