Duty to Report Accidents

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-11-26
CLNP Page ID:	2272
Page Categories:	{{{categories}}}
Citation:	Duty to Report Accidents, CLNP 2272, <{{{shortlink}}}>, retrieved on 2024-11-26
Editor:	Rstojni
Last Updated:	2023/09/11

Need Legal Help?
Call (888) 655-1076

Join our ranks and become a Ninja Initiate today

R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27 (CanLII)

Overview

[1] In Shah v. Becamon (2009), 94 O.R. (3d) 297, [2009] O.J. No. 478, 2009 ONCA 113, this court held that the graduated [page339] licence scheme set out in the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 ("HTA" or the "Act") applied only to the operation of a motor vehicle on a "highway" as defined in the HTA. The court further held that the shopping plaza parking lot where the accident occurred was not a "highway" within the definition in the HTA. No one questions the correctness of either holding.

[2] In Shah, the court went on in obiter dicta, at para. 23, to hold "[t]he entire HTA, including the graduated licensing system, is limited to 'highways'". In this case, counsel for the Crown (the "appellant") submits that this obiter is wrong insofar as it limits the operation of the "entire HTA" to only "highways". Counsel contends that "highway" is a defined term in the HTA that appears in many, but not all, provisions of the HTA. He submits that the definition of "highway" cannot be read into the sections of the HTA that do not use the word "highway" or some other word that incorporates the definition of "highway". Specifically, counsel submits that the accident reporting requirement in s. 199 makes no reference to "highway" and applies even when the accident triggering the reporting requirement occurs on property that does not fall within the meaning of "highway".

[3] Counsel appointed as amicus, however, submits that the obiter in Shah is correct. He contends that the purpose and object of the HTA is the protection of persons using public roadways and that the reach of the HTA has been limited to "highways" in various contexts by this court. In support of his argument, counsel points to the difference between the HTA and corresponding legislation in many other provinces, which, unlike the HTA, does not restrict the meaning of the word "highway" by reference to public access and use. Counsel submits that the obiter in Shah is consistent with the more limited definition of "highway" used in the HTA.

[4] I agree with the position advanced by the appellant. I would hold that the obiter in Shah limiting the operation of the "entire HTA" to "highways" is wrong and should not be followed. Many provisions of the HTA are by their terms limited to "highways". Other provisions, however, are not so limited. Nothing in the overall structure of the HTA or its purpose compels the reading of the word "highway" into sections in which it does not appear. Section 199 is one such section. I would hold that the reporting requirement in s. 199 generally applies even if the accident does not occur on a "highway" as defined in the HTA. [page340]

...

[22] As the obiter in Shah does not resolve the question of whether s. 199 applies to accidents that do not occur on the "highway", it is necessary to engage in a full interpretive analysis. The obiter in Shah does not assist in that process.

V

The Interpretation of Section 199 of the HTA

A. The statutory language and context

[23] Professor Driedger's oft-repeated "modern principle" of statutory interpretation begins with the words of the relevant provision, but recognizes that those words take their meaning from the context in which they are used: Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87. Context can be multi-layered, extending outward from the provision in issue to other related statutory provisions, the statute as a whole, related statutes and the relevant Interpretation Act. Context also includes applicable legal norms and the purpose or intent of the legislation: see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, 2002 SCC 42, at paras. 26-30; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008), at pp. 353-58.