Hostile Witness Rule

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Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved: 2024-11-23
CLNP Page ID: 2362
Page Categories:
Citation: Hostile Witness Rule, CLNP 2362, <>, retrieved on 2024-11-23
Editor: Sharvey
Last Updated: 2024/03/28

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Commonwealth Plywood Co. Ltd. v Rancourt, 2018 CanLII 72583 (ON LRB)[1]

13. Ontario’s Divisional Court has confirmed an employer can call the grievor as its own witness in a labour arbitration: Canada Post Corporation v. Canadian Union of Postal Workers, (1991), 1991 CanLII 13501 (CA LA), 21 L.A.C. (4th) 350 (CPC), rev’d Ont. Div. Crt., November 12, 1991.  The Divisional Court’s decision is unreported, but extracts from its decision overturning an arbitrator’s refusal to allow Canada Post to call the grievor as its own witness have been quoted in various arbitral awards[1]:

Generally speaking, although the arbitrator is and remains the master of the procedure to be followed, each party should be free to call whatever evidence and in whatever sequence it chooses. Canada Post sought to exercise that right. It proposed to proceed in a somewhat unusual way, but one which, in the circumstances was entirely understandable and justifiable. It is also a right which has been legitimated by the court. Bourdouhxe v. Institut Albert-Prevost (1974), 77 C.L.L.S.C. 14, 212 (Que. C.A.). The arbitrator's order denies Canada Post's right to proceed in that fashion.

...

20. An adverse witness is not the same thing as a hostile witness, the latter finding allowing for impeachment.  As noted at paragraph 16.69 in The Law of Evidence in Canada, supra:

16.69 …This is a right which has not been taken away by the statutory provisions. It is arguable that this right is available only if hostility is established in the Common Law sense, and not in its watered-down version based on judicial interpretation of adversity. Certainly something more than a “bad answer” on examination in chief ought to be required before the party calling the witness is allowed to cross-examine him or her. It seems quite plausible to allow contradiction by a previous inconsistent statement, but not to allow full cross-examination simply because the witness has given evidence that is unfavourable to the party calling the witness. In the former case, the change of posture warrants an explanation by cross-examination. The latter case is just one of the hazards of litigation. It is a truism that every witness can be a double-edged sword.
...

21. In D'Alessandro v. Labourers' International Union of North America, Local 1089, 1984 CanLII 975 (D’Alessandro), the Board examined the concept of a hostile witness, as well as s. 23 of the Evidence Act.  It refused to declare a witness hostile and permit cross-examination:

8. A party seeking leave of the Board to embark upon a full cross-examination of a witness called by that party must satisfy the Board that the witness has proven "hostile" (or that some other proper basis exists for granting such leave). Having duly considered the written submissions of counsel and all of Ms. Iacobelli's testimony to date, we have concluded that there is no factual or legal basis for the complainants' contention that Ms. Iacobelli is a hostile witness. In Reference re R. v. Coffin, 1956 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 191, at page 213, Kellock J. defined "hostile" as "not giving. . . evidence fairly and with a desire to tell the truth because of a hostile animus toward the [party who called the witness]." The issue of hostility is determined by the Board observing the witness as she gave her evidence, and considering her demeanour, general attitude, and the substance of her evidence (see, for example, The Corporation of the Town of Meaford, [1981] OLRB Rep. June 634, and the authorities referred to in that decision). We are not, of course, in a position to conclusively determine at this stage of the proceedings the matter of Ms. Iacobelli's credibility as a witness, or the weight to be given to her evidence. That can only be done after we have heard and considered all of her testimony, and all of the other evidence that has been and will be adduced during the course of this case. It is sufficient for the purposes of this decision to find that Ms. Iacobelli has not in any of her testimony to date demonstrated hostility towards the complainants
12. In summary, complainants' counsel has not satisfied us that he should be permitted to cross-examine Ms. Iacobelli at this stage of the proceedings on the basis of common law principles concerning hostile witnesses, on the basis of section 23 of the Evidence Act, or on any other basis. Counsel has not cited, nor has the Board's independent research revealed, any authority which would support the proposition that inconsistencies between a witness's testimony during examination-in-chief and her testimony in cross-examination make it appropriate for a tribunal to permit counsel to cross-examine the witness during re-examination, in the absence of a finding of hostility on the part of the witness. Nor are we satisfied as a matter of policy or procedure that the Board should permit such cross-examination in the circumstances of this case.


[1]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Commonwealth Plywood Co. Ltd. v Rancourt, 2018 CanLII 72583 (ON LRB), <https://canlii.ca/t/htbt1>, retrieved on 2024-03-27