Breach of Contract (LTB)

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Date Retrieved:	2024-09-28
CLNP Page ID:	2399
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Citation:	Breach of Contract (LTB), CLNP 2399, <>, retrieved on 2024-09-28
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2024/08/03

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Residential Tenancies Act, 2006

22 A landlord shall not at any time during a tenant’s occupancy of a rental unit and before the day on which an order evicting the tenant is executed substantially interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit or the residential complex in which it is located for all usual purposes by a tenant or members of his or her household. 2006, c. 17, s. 22.

23 A landlord shall not harass, obstruct, coerce, threaten or interfere with a tenant. 2006, c. 17, s. 23.

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29 (1) A tenant or former tenant of a rental unit may apply to the Board for any of the following orders:

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3. An order determining that the landlord, superintendent or agent of the landlord has substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit or residential complex for all usual purposes by the tenant or a member of his or her household.

4. An order determining that the landlord, superintendent or agent of the landlord has harassed, obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the tenant during the tenant’s occupancy of the rental unit.

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31 (1) If the Board determines that a landlord, a superintendent or an agent of a landlord has done one or more of the activities set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 of subsection 29 (1), the Board may,

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(f) make any other order that it considers appropriate. 2006, c. 17, s. 31 (1).

(2) If in an application under any of paragraphs 2 to 6 of subsection 29 (1) it is determined that the tenant was induced by the conduct of the landlord, the superintendent or an agent of the landlord to vacate the rental unit, the Board may, in addition to the remedies set out in subsection (1), order that the landlord pay a specified sum to the tenant for,

(a) all or any portion of any increased rent which the tenant has incurred or will incur for a one-year period after the tenant has left the rental unit; and

(b) reasonable out-of-pocket moving, storage and other like expenses which the tenant has incurred or will incur. 2006, c. 17, s. 31 (2).

TET-89788-18 (Re), 2018 CanLII 113779 (ON LTB)

35. When a tenancy agreement includes a service like free laundry it is a breach of the Act for a landlord to simply cease to provide the service. Most tenants file a T3 application alleging discontinuance of a service or a facility. Sometimes the discontinuance is retaliatory and done deliberately to upset a tenant in which case it is a breach of s. 23 of the Act. But fundamentally, regardless of what type of application a tenant files, the failure to provide a service like laundry that is included in a tenancy agreement is a substantial interference with the rights of a tenant. It is a contractual right granted to the tenant and is treated like a breach of contract.

36. So I am satisfied that when the Landlord cut off laundry access to the Tenant he breached section 22 of the Act.

TET-92081-18 (Re), 2018 CanLII 113788 (ON LTB)

38. In contract law, an unforeseeable unusual harm suffered by a plaintiff due to that person’s particular vulnerabilities will not be compensable in breach of contract unless the other party had prior knowledge of the person’s particular sensitivity. (See: Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., [2008] 2 SCR 114, 2008 SCC 27 (CanLII).)

TST-62276-15-RV (Re), 2015 CanLII 75859 (ON LTB)

21. The Landlord’s maintenance obligations and the irrelevance of fault have been referred to by the Divisional Court in Offredi v. 751768 Ontario Ltd 1994 CanLII 11006 (ON SCDC), [1994] O.J. No. 1204. In that case the Divisional Court held: “The question of fault on the landlord’s part is not the issue... What the tenants claim is a breach of contract. The tenants were paying full rent for premises which the landlord was under an obligation… to keep in a good state of repair and fit for habitation. The landlord failed to do that. That is the basis for the claim for an abatement …”

TST-68104-15 (Re), 2016 CanLII 88326 (ON LTB)

68. It is well settled that the Board is limited to considering the relief requested in an application. While an order for damages for mental distress arising from breach of the contract between the parties herein (Taft v. Whitesands Apartments, [2009] O.J. No. 3198 (Div. Ct)) might have been appropriate had the original application specified such remedy and an amount claimed, applying the Divisional Court’s decision in Beauge, supra, I am unable to order what is not specifically requested in the application. For these reasons, an order will not issue in this regard.

Gallen v. Butterley, 1984 CanLII 752 (BC CA)

[10] A statement in Anson's Law of Contracts, 25th ed., at p. 126 was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carman Const. Ltd. v. C.P.R., 1982 CanLII 52 (SCC), (1982) 1 S.C.R. 958, 18 B.L.R. 65, 136 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 42 N.R. 147. It shows that an oral warranty must be strictly proved and that the existence of an intention to contract on the part of all parties must be clearly shown. This test is set out [at p. 966]:

"The question therefore is: On the totality of evidence, must the person making the statement be taken to have warranted its accuracy, i.e. promised to make it good?"

The evidence in this case falls far short of the test propounded there.

[53] The third comment is that Hawrish, Bauer and Carman Const. illustrate, by the attention given to the evidence, that the principle is not an absolute one. In Hawrish, at p. 520, Judson J. said:

Bearing in mind these remarks to the effect that there must be a clear intention to create a binding agreement, I am not convinced that the evidence in this case indicates clearly the existence of such intention. Indeed, I am disposed to agree with what the Court of Appeal said on this point.

In Bauer, at p. 111, McIntyre J. said:

For reasons which will appear later in that part of this judgment dealing with the collateral contract argument, I am of the view that there is no evidence which would support any such finding against the bank.

In Carman Const, at p. 967, Martland J. said:

In my opinion, there is no evidence in the present case to establish an intention to warrant the accuracy of the statement made by the C.P.R. employee to Fielding, i.e. no promise to make it good.

If the principle were an absolute one, there would have been no need in those cases to mention the evidence because the statement alleged in each case, if established by the evidence, clearly contradicted the document. So the cases could have been disposed of by the application of the absolute principle, no matter how convincing the evidence, even if both parties agreed that the oral warranty was given, and was intended to be binding, and was intended to override or modify the document.

[54] The fourth point is that Bauer v. Bank of Montreal explicitly recognizes a particular exception to the principle, where, at p. 111, Mclntyre J., for the Supreme Court of Canada, said:

Various authorities were cited for the proposition that a contract induced by misrepresentation or by an oral representation, inconsistent with the form of the written contract, would not stand and could not bind the party to whom the representation had been made. These authorities included Can. Indemnity Co. v. Okanagan Mainline Real Estate Bd. (1970) CanLII 152 (SCC), (1971) S.C.R. 493], [1971 1 W.W.R. 289, [1970] I.L.R. 1-383, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 715 (sub nom. Can. Indemnity Co. v. Okanagan Mainline Real Estate Bd.; Okanagan Mainline Real Estate Bd. v. Whillis, Harding Ins. Agencies Ltd.)], per Judson J. at p. 500, Jaques v. Lloyd D. George & Partners [[1968] 1 W.L.R. 625, [1968] 2 All E.R. 187], per Lord Denning at pp. 630-631, Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Vokins & Co., [[1951] 1 Lloyds Rep. 32 (K.B.D.)], see Devlin J. at p. 39, and Mendelssohn v. Normand Ltd. [[1970] 1 Q.B. 177, [1969] 3 W.L.R. 139, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1215 (C.A.)].

No quarrel can be made with the general proposition advanced on this point by the appellant. To succeed, however, this argument must rest upon a finding of some misrepresentation by the bank, innocent or not, or on some oral representation inconsistent with the written document which caused a misimpression in the guarantor's mind, or upon some omission on the part of the bank manager to explain the contents of the document which induced the guarantor to enter into the guarantee upon a misunderstanding as to its nature.

So, if the contract is induced by an oral misrepresentation that is inconsistent with the written contract, the written contract cannot stand.