Judicial Comity

Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, 1909 CanLII 3 (SCC), 41 SCR 516

English Court of Appeal—should such a case arise—in view of what was said by the Privy Council in Trimble v. Hill[90], the duty of this court would require most careful consideration. (See Jacobs v. Beaver[91].) But we should not, in my opinion, hesitate now to determine that, in other cases, unless perhaps in very exceptional circumstances, a previous deliberate and definite decision of this court will be held binding, if it is clear that it was not the result of some mere slip or inadvertence: Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council[92]. The decision of this court in the Stanstead Election Case[93], which is in accord with the views expressed in such cases as Smith v. Lambeth Assessment Committee[94], at page 328, and The “Vera Cruz” No. 2[95], at page 98, may be deemed conclusive authority that judgments of dismissal which have proceeded upon an equal division of opinion are not to be regarded as decisions of this court, but merely as decisions of the court whose judgment has been thus affirmed. See, however, Lumsden v. Temiskaming and Northern Railway Commission[96], at pages 473, 474.

Though, as stated by Brett M.R. in The “Vera Cruz” No. 2[97], it is (except in Ontario, as to which see R.S.O. [1897], ch. 51, sec. 81) no doubt true that

there is no common law or statutory rule to oblige a court of law to bow to its own decision—it does so on the ground of judicial comity it is of supreme importance that people may know with certainty what the law is, and this end can only