Owner - Definition

O. Reg. 213/07: FIRE CODE

SECTION 1.2 COMPLIANCE Subsection 1.2.1. Compliance with this Code

Owner’s responsibility

1.2.1.1. Unless otherwise specified, the owner is responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code.

1.3.1.1. Where a building or its contents must be tested for compliance with this Code, the tests shall be carried out by the owner or the owner’s agent within such reasonable time as the Chief Fire Official may determine.

1.4.1.2. The words and terms used in this Code that are in bold face, and either in upper and lower case or in lower case, have the following meanings:

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Owner means any person, firm or corporation having control over any portion of the building or property under consideration and includes the persons in the building or property.

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Supervisory staff means those occupants of a building who have some delegated responsibility for the fire safety of other occupants under the fire safety plan and may include the fire department where the fire department agrees to accept these responsibilities.

9.1.4.5. An owner or the owner’s agent may apply to the Chief Fire Official for an extension of the compliance date to permit time for a Life Safety Study to be submitted.

9.1.4.6. (1) Where an owner or the owner’s agent has received an Order that requires compliance with this Part, the owner or the owner’s agent may apply within five days of receipt of the Order to the Chief Fire Official to extend the time for compliance pending submission of a Life Safety Study.

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(3) The Chief Fire Official shall notify the owner or the owner’s agent of the Chief Fire Official’s decision in writing.

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(6) An owner or the owner’s agent, within five days of being notified of a refusal to grant an extension of the time to submit a Life Safety Study, may request the reasons for the refusal in writing.

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(8) An owner or the owner’s agent who feels aggrieved by a decision to refuse an extension of time to submit a Life Safety Study may, within 30 days of the refusal, appeal the refusal in the same manner as though it were an Order.

City of Toronto v. Barrasso and 1298781 Ontario Inc., 2006 ONCJ 463 (CanLII)

[29] The Ontario Fire Code, O. Reg. 388/97, is a regulation made under the F.P.P.A., 1997.

[30] The responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the Ontario Fire Code are on the owner of a building and is set out in s. 1.1.1.1. of the Fire Code:

1.1.1.1. Unless otherwise specified, the owner shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code.

[31] This focus on the “owner” being ultimately responsible for compliance with the Ontario Fire Code is also seen in a provision dealing with required testing under the Fire Code. This requirement that owners of buildings or premises must carry out the testing is set out in s. 1.1.4.1 of the Fire Code:

1.1.4.1. Where a building or its contents must be tested for compliance with this Code, the tests shall be carried out by the owner or the owner’s agent within such reasonable time as the Chief Fire Official may determine.

[32] On the other hand, if the director of a corporation knows that the corporation is violating or has violated a provision of the Fire Code then they are guilty of committing an offence under s. 28(5), and if they knowingly commit an offence under s. 28(1) the F.P.P.A., 1997 they are guilty of committing an offence under s. 28(6):

Offence, director or officer of corporation

28(5) A director or officer of a corporation who knows that the corporation is violating or has violated a provision of the fire code is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both.

Liability of directors

28(6) Despite subsections (1) and (3), every director or officer of a corporation who knowingly commits an offence under subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $25,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both.

[124] As for the charges laid under s. 28(1)(c) of the F.P.P.A., 1997 against Vincenzo Barrasso for failing to comply with provisions of the Ontario Fire Code, only the owner of the building, as set out in s. 1.1.1.1. of the Fire Code, is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the Fire Code are complied with. Barrasso is not the registered owner of the building located at 1011 Lansdowne Avenue. Therefore, Barrasso is not guilty of committing the 20 charges laid against him under s. 28(1)(c). Furthermore, Barrasso, as the director of the corporation would have been only liable for committing an offence under s. 28(1)(c), if the prosecution had charged him with an offence in relation to ss. 28(5) or (6) of the F.P.P.A., 1997, where he had known that the corporate defendant had violated or was violating provisions of the Fire Code. On the other hand, the corporate defendant, 1298781 Ontario Inc., is the registered owner of the building located at 1011 Lansdowne Avenue. As for the 20 charges laid against the corporate defendant, I find that the prosecution has proven that it has committed the actus reus of those 20 offences under s. 28(1)(c), by failing to ensure that the provisions of the Fire Code were complied with, beyond a reasonable doubt.

[128] Accordingly, the 20 charges laid under s. 28(1)(c) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, C.4, against Vincenzo Barrasso are dismissed, as he is not the registered owner of the building, and therefore, is not in his personal capacity obligated to ensure that the building at 1011 Lansdowne Avenue is in compliance with the Ontario Fire Code. However, the corporate defendant, 1298781 Ontario Inc., as the owner of the building located at 1011 Lansdowne Avenue, is guilty of committing the actus reus of the 20 offences laid under s. 28(1)(c) of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 on March 8, 2005, beyond a reasonable doubt by failing to ensure that the building was in compliance with provisions of the Ontario Fire Code. Convictions will also be entered against the corporate defendant on all 20 counts in the information, as it has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that it had taken all reasonable care in the circumstances to avoid the offences from occurring.

Town of Ajax v. Haydon Youth Services Inc., 2007 ONCJ 114 (CanLII)

3. Center for Rational Learning Inc. as “Owner”:

Neither side adduced any case law on this point, here or at trial. No one filed a definition for “owner’. The intent of the defence evidence was to show that the Center owned the real estate known as 4 Elizabeth Street, and Haydon operated a Group Home there. Hence it was argued that the “owner” within the meaning of the Fire Code, was Haydon, and the Center should have been acquitted.

The evidence, however, proved much more equivocal. Mr. Hayes, the Executive Director of both companies, testified that he Center had operated for years as Haydon Youth Services, and that Haydon had been incorporated relatively recently. The Justice of the Peace could fairly have felt the distinctions between the two corporate entities were blurred.

More importantly, the Fire Code appears to cast a wide net in an effort to have more people responsible for fire safety, in the public interest, rather than fewer. It is not just left to any employees on scene.

In a case where a Group Home is owned and operated by one person or company, and the home is rented from an independent, arms length person, such that the title holder would not reasonably be expected to monitor or know the day to day occupancy, employees and activities in the Group Home, Mr. Reczulski’s argument might have some attraction. Where related companies are involved, there is the danger that the critically important requirements of the Fire Code might be ignored, side-stepped or avoided, by each company advancing a cogent argument why it expected the other to maintain smoke detectors or fire suppression equipment or construction.

In the case at bar, on the evidence before the learned Justice of the Peace, I consider he was entitled to find that both companies were “owners”.