Falling Within a Statute (Statutory Interpretation)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-11-23
CLNP Page ID:	1963
Page Categories:	[Statutory Interpretation]
Citation:	Falling Within a Statute (Statutory Interpretation), CLNP 1963, <>, retrieved on 2024-11-23
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2022/08/02

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Barreiro v. Arana, 2003 BCCA 58 (CanLII)

[14] I will not delve deeply into this complex subject, but I will note that the interpretation of words and phrases within a statute is said by Professor F. Bowers to be a “situational” analysis. In his book, Linguistic Aspects of Legislative Expression, University of British Columbia Press, 1989, he says as follows at page 53:

A public statute, whether it is declaratory, remedial, codifying, enabling, or penal is concerned with the conduct of social affairs and the granting of permissions or the imposing of obligations on members of society. The particular status of a statute, then, is at the very summit of seriousness and authority within a society.

[15] Professor Bowers cites Brett v. Brett (1826), 3 Addams 210, wherein at 216 Sir John Nicholl, M.R. said that to arrive at the true meaning of a phrase in a statute, it is “not to be viewed detached from its context, meaning by this as well the title and the preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute.” I would say that to arrive at the true meaning of a word or concept within a statute requires the same approach. It is important to note that the consent under analysis in the case at bar is the consent referred to in legislation that governs liability for the use of motor vehicles.

CFFO Accreditation (Re), 2012 ONAFRAAT 22 (CanLII)

This inconsistent use of the word “member” is in apparent conflict with a basic principle of statutory interpretation, often described as the “presumption of consistent expression.” As stated in Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed., at pp. 214-215, “[i]t is presumed that the legislature uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings.” This presumption is particularly strong where the provisions in which the repeated words appear are close together or otherwise related to each other (see Sullivan, supra, at pp. 215-216 and 221).