A Court of Competent Jurisdiction

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-11-23
CLNP Page ID:	2359
Page Categories:	[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Annotated)]
Citation:	A Court of Competent Jurisdiction, CLNP 2359, <>, retrieved on 2024-11-23
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2024/03/21

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R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22 (CanLII), [2010] 1 SCR 765

[20] We do not have one Charter for the courts and another for administrative tribunals (Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), 1996 CanLII 152 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, per McLachlin J. (in dissent), at para. 70; Dunedin; Douglas College; Martin). This truism is reflected in this Court’s recognition that the principles governing remedial jurisdiction under the Charter apply to both courts and administrative tribunals. It is also reflected in the jurisprudence flowing from Mills and the Cuddy Chicks trilogy according to which, with rare exceptions, administrative tribunals with the authority to apply the law have the jurisdiction to apply the Charter to the issues that arise in the proper exercise of their statutory functions.

[21] The jurisprudential evolution has resulted in this Court’s acceptance not only of the proposition that expert tribunals should play a primary role in the determination of Charter issues falling within their specialized jurisdiction, but also that in exercising their statutory discretion, they must comply with the Charter.

[22] All of these developments serve to cement the direct relationship between the Charter, its remedial provisions and administrative tribunals. In light of this evolution, it seems to me to be no longer helpful to limit the inquiry to whether a court or tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction only for the purposes of a particular remedy. The question instead should be institutional: Does this particular tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies generally? The result of this question will flow from whether the tribunal has the power to decide questions of law. If it does, and if Charter jurisdiction has not been excluded by statute, the tribunal will have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate (Cuddy Chicks trilogy; Martin). A tribunal which has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies is a court of competent jurisdiction. The tribunal must then decide, given this jurisdiction, whether it can grant the particular remedy sought based on its statutory mandate. The answer to this question will depend on legislative intent, as discerned from the tribunal’s statutory mandate (the Mills cases).

[23] This approach has the benefit of attributing Charter jurisdiction to the tribunal as an institution, rather than requiring litigants to test, remedy by remedy, whether it is a court of competent jurisdiction. It is also an approach which emerges from a review of the three distinct constitutional streams flowing from this Court’s jurisprudence. As the following review shows, this Court has gradually expanded the approach to the scope of the Charter and its relationship with administrative tribunals. These reasons are an attempt to consolidate the results of that expansion.

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[34] More recently, the Court has had two further opportunities to consider the Mills test. In Dunedin, the issue was whether a provincial court judge with jurisdiction under Ontario’s Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, was a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of ordering costs against the Crown for failure to comply with the Charter. McLachlin C.J., writing for a unanimous Court, again confirmed that applying the Mills test is, first and foremost, a matter of discerning legislative intent. The question in each case is whether the legislature intended to give the court or tribunal the power to apply the Charter:

[W]here a legislature confers on a court or tribunal a function that involves the determination of matters where Charter rights may be affected, and furnishes it with processes and powers capable of fairly and justly resolving those incidental Charter issues, then it must be inferred, in the absence of a contrary intention, that the legislature intended to empower the tribunal to apply the Charter. [para. 75]

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[44] In the 1997 case of Eaton, the Ontario Special Education Tribunal, acting pursuant to the Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, had ordered that Emily Eaton, a child with cerebral palsy, be placed in a special classroom for students with disabilities. The Eatons alleged discrimination, arguing that their daughter’s education should take place in the mainstream schools. Lamer C.J. wrote brief reasons to clarify what he had said in Slaight:

[S]tatutory silences should be read down to not authorize breaches of the Charter, unless this cannot be done because such an authorization arises by necessary implication. I developed this principle in the context of administrative tribunals which operate pursuant to broad grants of statutory powers, and which can potentially violate Charter rights. Whatever section of the Act or of Regulation 305, R.R.O. 1990, grants the authority to the Tribunal to place students like Emily Eaton . . . Slaight Communications would require that any open‑ended language in that provision (if there were any) be interpreted so as to not authorize breaches of the Charter. [para. 3]

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[50] La Forest J., writing for the Court on this issue, concluded that the jurisdiction lay with the arbitrator. Under the Industrial Relations Act, the arbitrator had express authority to “provide a final and conclusive settlement of a dispute”. To fulfill this mandate, arbitrators acting under the Act could interpret and apply any statute that regulated employment. This included the Charter. La Forest J. noted that arbitrators were bound by the same Constitution as the courts. Accordingly, if a collective agreement was illegal or unconstitutional, an arbitrator must decline to apply it just as a court would.

[51] La Forest J. rejected the College’s argument that the informal arbitration process was unsuited to litigating a Charter issue, concluding that any disadvantages of allowing administrative tribunals to decide constitutional questions were outweighed by the “clear advantages” of granting them this jurisdiction. In his view, such jurisdiction promotes respect for the Constitution because “[t]he citizen, when appearing before decision-making bodies set up to determine his or her rights and duties, should be entitled to assert the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution” (p. 604). Constitutional issues should be raised at an early stage in the context in which they arise, without the claimant having to first resort to an application in superior court, which is more expensive and time-consuming than the administrative process. In addition, a “specialized competence can be of invaluable assistance in constitutional interpretation” (p. 605). Specialized arbitrators and agencies can sift through the facts and quickly compile a record for the benefit of a reviewing court. In this way, the parties (and the reviewing courts) benefit from the arbitrators’ expertise. This practice also allows for all related aspects of a matter to be dealt with by the most appropriate decision maker. As La Forest J. pointed out, “it would be anomalous if tribunals responsible for interpreting the law on the issue were unable to deal with the issue in its entirety, subject to judicial review” (p. 599).

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[53] In rejecting the employer’s argument that the superior court, not the Labour Board, should deal with the constitutional question, and drawing on his reasons in Douglas College, La Forest J.’s “overarching consideration” was that where administrative bodies like the Labour Board have specialized expertise, that expertise makes them the appropriate forum for assessing Charter compliance:

It is apparent, then, that an expert tribunal of the calibre of the Board can bring its specialized expertise to bear in a very functional and productive way in the determination of Charter issues which make demands on such expertise. In the present case, the experience of the Board is highly relevant to the Charter challenge to its enabling statute, particularly at the s. 1 stage where policy concerns prevail. At the end of the day, the legal process will be better served where the Board makes an initial determination of the jurisdictional issue arising from a constitutional challenge. In such circumstances, the Board not only has the authority but a duty to ascertain the constitutional validity of s. 2(b) of the Labour Relations Act. [Emphasis added; p. 18.]

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[78] The jurisprudential evolution leads to the following two observations: first, that administrative tribunals with the power to decide questions of law, and from whom constitutional jurisdiction has not been clearly withdrawn, have the authority to resolve constitutional questions that are linked to matters properly before them. And secondly, they must act consistently with the Charter and its values when exercising their statutory functions. It strikes me as somewhat unhelpful, therefore, to subject every such tribunal from which a Charter remedy is sought to an inquiry asking whether it is “competent” to grant a particular remedy within the meaning of s. 24(1).

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[103] Remedies granted to redress Charter wrongs are intended to meaningfully vindicate a claimant’s rights and freedoms (Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 55; Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, at para. 30). Yet, it is not the case that effective, vindicatory remedies for harm flowing from unconstitutional conduct are available only through separate and distinct Charter applications (R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 2). Charter rights can be effectively vindicated through the exercise of statutory powers and processes (Nasogaluak; Dagenais; Okwuobi). In this case, it may well be that the substance of Mr. Conway’s complaint about where his room is located can be fully addressed within the framework of the Board’s statutory mandate and the exercise of its discretion in accordance with Charter values. If that is what the Board ultimately concludes to be the case, resort to s. 24(1) of the Charter may not add either to the Board’s capacity to address the substance of the complaint or to provide appropriate redress.

[104] I would dismiss the appeal. In accordance with the request of the parties, there will be no order for costs.