Concurrent Civil, Administrative, and Criminal Matters

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Date Retrieved:	2025-02-24
CLNP Page ID:	2458
Page Categories:	[Hearing Process (LTB)]
Citation:	Concurrent Civil, Administrative, and Criminal Matters, CLNP 2458, <>, retrieved on 2025-02-24
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2025/01/28

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3349659 Canada Inc. v. Young, 2022 NSSC 36 (CanLII)

[11] The leading case in Canada is Stickney v. Trusz (1973), 1973 CanLII 423 (ON SC), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 275. The rule was summarized by Hallet J. (as he then was) in Lindsay (Re), [1986] N.S.J. No. 101 as follows (citations omitted):

The law with respect to whether or not a civil proceeding should be stayed pending the criminal trial of a party is authoritatively set forth in the decision of Zuber, J., in Stickney … which decision was confirmed by the Divisional Court in Ontario and subsequently by the Ontario Court of Appeal…Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused without written reasons… As stated in that case, the mere fact that both civil and criminal proceedings are pending against a person and arise out of the same or related facts is not a sufficient ground to qualify as an exceptional case in which the civil proceeding should be stayed. It is incumbent upon the applicant to show some specific or particular way in which he will be prejudiced in his criminal trial if the civil action is allowed to proceed prior to the criminal proceeding. (emphasis added)

[As appears in original]

[12] The cases show that there is a considerable burden on the applicant for a stay to show prejudice or a real apprehension of prejudice. Municipal Enterprises Ltd. v. Rowlings, [1990] N.S.J. No. 385.

[13] The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Laxton Holdings Ltd. v. Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s, London [1987] S.J. No. 131, affirmed the principle that the discretion to grant a stay should only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances and cited its decision in Leier v. Shumiatcher and Luboff (1962), 1962 CanLII 330 (SK CA), 39 W.W.R. 446 as correctly stating the law at pages 447-448:

The exercise of the discretion must not, of course, be capricious or arbitrary, but must have as its foundation admissible evidence of record from which the judge may reasonably draw conclusions…With respect, in the present case, I am unable to find an evidence from which a conclusion of prejudice might be drawn.

Stickney v. Trusz, 1973 CanLII 423 (ON SC)

For several reasons it would appear that this rule has passed into history. The concept of felony has been deleted from our criminal law. Public authorities have assumed the burden of criminal prosecution and lastly, s. 10 of the Criminal Code now provides:

10. No civil remedy for an act or omission is suspended or affected by reason that the act or omission is a criminal offence.

Some concern has been expressed with respect to the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to civil remedies. With respect to those views, the purpose of this section is to declare that the common law rule suspending civil remedies is no longer necessary to ensure adequate criminal prosecution. Viewed from that standpoint s. 10 deals with the criminal law and is within the power of Parliament.

Entirely apart from the old rule however, civil Courts retain power to control their own proceedings. A Court may in its discretion exercise this power and order an action stayed:

Goldberg v. Steinberg (1931), 40 O.W.N. 59; Illingworth v. Coyle, 1933 CanLII 429 (BC SC), [1933] 3 W.W.R. 607. Mr. Kellock argued that the rule is that a Court should exercise its discretion to stay a civil action because of a parallel criminal action only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances. Mr. Roebuck took the position that the discretion was of a more general character and is not restricted to exceptional or extraordinary cases.

Initially, the restriction to "exceptional or extraordinary cases" appeared in cases concerned with the demise of the old felonious tort rule: MacKenzie v. Palmer (1921), 1921 CanLII 565 (SCC), 62 S.C.R. 517 at p. 520, 63 D.L.R. 362, [1922] 1 W.W.R. 880; Canada Starch Co. Ltd. v. St. Lawrence Starch Co. Ltd., 1936 CanLII 60 (ON CA), [1936] O.R. 261, 65 C.C.C. 270, [1936] 2 D.L.R. 142. But the same language was adopted in later cases dealing with the exercise of discretion:

Stone et al. v. Clark et al., 1942 CanLII 383 (ON SC), [1942] O.W.N. 331, 77 C.C.C. 345; Rowe v. Brandon Packers Ltd. et al. (1961), 1961 CanLII 340 (MB CA), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 246, 35 C.R. 410, 35 W.W.R. 625; Re Nordstrom, 1961 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1962] S.C.R. 147, 31 D.L.R. (2d) 255, 37 W.W.R. 16. Mr. Roebuck argued with great skill that the language in these latter cases was adopted because of a confusion of the old rule with the new and urged me to accept a wider view of discretion as suggested in Leier v. Shumiatcher and Luboff (No. 2) (1962), 1962 CanLII 330 (SK CA), 39 W.W.R. 446.

...

Enlarging somewhat on that language, it is my opinion that the mere fact that there are both criminal and civil proceedings pending against a person arising out of the same facts is not a sufficient ground to qualify as an exceptional case in which the civil proceedings should be stayed. It is incumbent upon the applicant to show some specific or particular way in which he will be prejudiced in his criminal trial. In this case the applicant has not done so and the application will be dismissed with costs in the cause.

Application dismissed.

Nordstrom v. Baumann, 1961 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1962] SCR 147

[Page 157]

right to determine such an issue is a necessary concomitant of the jurisdiction which civil courts have long exercised in such cases.

It is true that if such an issue is raised in a civil court at a time when proceedings are pending for the determination of the same question in a criminal court, application may be made in the civil court for a stay of proceedings until the criminal prosecution has been concluded, but no such application was made in the present case, and in any event the view has been authoritatively expressed that such a discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances (see Canada Starch Company v. St. Lawrence Starch Company[17], and MacKenzie v. Palmer[18]).

In view of the above, I am of opinion that an originating summons was a permissible, though not desirable, method of initiating these proceedings and that the learned trial judge was clothed with jurisdiction to determine the issue of whether or not the appellant was sane when she lit the fire that caused her husband's death, and I would, accordingly, allow this appeal.