Hotel Room (Rental Unit)
TST-64688-15-RV-IN-AM (Re), 2017 CanLII 9473 (ON LTB)
4. The Tenants in response to the on-line advertisement contacted the Landlord to inquire about renting a two bedroom unit on the third floor of the complex for the entire school year. The Landlord and Tenants RG and JA signed a “Booking Agreement” which outlines the term of the agreement including the duration August 21, 2014 to May 21, 2015. The total amount the Tenants were to pay for the nine month stay is $17,010.00 payment to be made in four installments. The document also sets out what is provided or not, amounts for key and damage deposits, and costs associated with overnight guests.
15. I am unable to agree with Landlord’s counsel that the Member’s decision falls within a reasonable range of possible outcomes. In my view, and for the reasons that follow, the Member, respectfully, erred in failing to apply Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp., [2010] O.J. No. 2710 (C.A.) (“Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp.”) as binding precedent on the interpretation and applicability of the Act to types of accommodation, including that at issue herein, and, had the Member so done, this would, more likely than not, have led to a different outcome.
18. In Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp. while the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the proper interpretation of the Act and its applicability to land leases for recreational land lease homes, the Court, nonetheless, engages in an extensive analysis of the applicability of subsection 5(a) of the Act and the appropriate interpretation in connection therewith. While some of the facts in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp. are certainly different from those in the instant case, in keeping with Glanville Williams, above, it is the ratio decidendi [reason of deciding] of a case, the material facts of the case plus the decision thereon that matters. Moreover, the Court in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp. does, at paragraphs 28, 29 and 33 to 35, inclusive, and as will be referred to below, directly address the very relevant issue of whether a type of occupation is for a temporary period, which issue is at the heart of the Member’s decision in the instant case.
20. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the meaning of legislation must focus on the words of the relevant statutory provisions, read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense and interpreted harmoniously with the scheme and the object of the legislation and with drafters’ intention. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory interpretation, including in R. v. Gladue,1999 CanLII 679 (SCC) and Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), as did the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Matthews v. Algoma Timberlakes Corp.
21. It is clear, as outlined in section 1, that one of the intended main purposes of the Act is to protect tenants from unlawful rent increases and evictions. Moreover, to give effect to the stated legislative intent it is necessary to ascribe a broad definition to “rental unit”.
22. In my view, the unit herein meets the definition of a “rental unit”. That is, the unit was “living accommodation” and intended for use as “rented residential premises”. The Tenants lived in the unit and the unit contained a sleeping and living area. No evidence was presented that the Tenants, during the time that they lived in the unit, engaged in activities other than what people ordinarily do in a residential unit.
23. With respect to the unit being “rented residential premises”, I am satisfied, based on the evidence presented, that this requirement is also met. There is no suggestion that the unit was “commercial”. More importantly, the Tenants paid rent to the Landlord in order to be entitled to occupy the unit and, as such, the unit was “rented”.
