Accommodation

J.O v. London District Catholic School Board, 2012 HRTO 732 (CanLII)

[49] The parties devoted most of their efforts in this case to the issue of accommodation. However, as the Tribunal noted in Baber v. York Region District School Board, 2011 HRTO 213 (CanLII), the duty to accommodate is not a free standing obligation under the Code. Rather, it arises only pursuant to sections 11, 17 or 24 of the Code where a person is disadvantaged because of a prohibited ground of discrimination and the respondent defends its otherwise discriminatory actions. The Supreme Court of Canada noted in Meoirin and Grismer that the inquiry moves to the bona fides of the requirement in question only if a prima facie case has been made out that the requirement is discriminatory. In other words, the duty to accommodate arises only where an applicant has been subject to direct or adverse effect discrimination. The applicant bears the onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which, if established, shifts the evidentiary burden to the respondent to show that it accommodated the applicant to the point of undue hardship.

[56] Having found that the Primary Address Policy is prima facie discriminatory, I must determine whether the policy is a bona fide requirement in the circumstances, pursuant to section 11(1)(a) of the Code. As the respondent noted, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the test for assessing whether a requirement is bona fide in Meoirin and Grismer, which the Tribunal has adopted. Accordingly, I find the respondents must show the following in order to establish the Primary Address Policy is a bona fide requirement:

(1) that the respondents adopted the policy for a purpose rationally connected to the delivery of school bus services;

(2) that the respondents adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that purpose; and

(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of this purpose. To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, the respondent must show that it could not accommodate the needs of the group of which the applicant is a member without undue hardship.

"In Meiorin, the Supreme Court of Canada also established that the duty to accommodate has both a procedural and a substantive component. To meet the procedural aspect of the duty to accommodate, a respondent must take adequate steps to explore what accommodation is needed, and to assess accommodation options. The substantive component of the analysis considers whether the accommodation offered was reasonable or whether a respondent was justified in not providing accommodation. The respondent bears the onus of demonstrating the considerations, assessments, and steps it undertook to accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship."

Bain v. River Poker Tour, 2015 HRTO 734 (CanLII)

[22] The Supreme Court of Canada has accepted that the duty to accommodate has both a substantive and procedural component; see British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (“Meiorin”), and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), 1999 CanLII 646 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 (“Grismer”). The Court found that the procedural component requires an individualized investigation of accommodation measures and assessment of the applicant’s needs.