Parliamentary Supremacy

From Riverview Legal Group


Singh v. Canada ( Attorney General ), 1999 CanLII 9359 (FC), [1999] 4 FC 583[1]

[18] The applicants challenge the constitutionality of section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act which vests, in the executive branch of government, an absolute right to determine whether "confidence[s] of the Queen's Privy Council" should be excluded from evidence in a case before a court or administrative tribunal even where the content of such "cabinet documents" would be relevant to the proceedings. The applicants assert that Canada is now a constitutional democracy, that is, the Constitution of Canada is supreme and has displaced the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. They rely on Reference re Secession of Quebec , 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217[1] (the Quebec Secession case) to support this proposition. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada stated at page 258: "This Court has noted on several occasions that with the adoption of the Charter , the Canadian system of government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy." The applicants submit that section 39 is contrary to the largely unwritten fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution of Canada. The principles relevant to this matter are: the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. The applicants argue that, given the supremacy of the Constitution, section 39 should be declared invalid.


[1]

Collins v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FC 1431 (CanLII)[2]

[13] In the Applicant's view, « the new legislation can in no way revive an alleged fiscal debt that was already extinguished one year earlier by the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada [Markevich v. Canada, supra[3]], for if that were the case, it would have for effect the retroactive annulment of the actual ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada, which makes absolutely no sense » . With deference for the Applicant, the Parliament has discretion to overrule Supreme Court judgments. The principle of parliamentary supremacy is a foundation of Canadian constitutional law: the judiciary must abide by the statutes adopted by Parliament.

[2] [3]

Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2015 FCA 17 (CanLII), [2015] 4 FCR 467[4]

[51] At the conceptual level, the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir identified two principles that underlie our law of judicial review, principles that are in tension with each other (at paragraphs 27-31). First, there is the constitutional principle of Parliamentary supremacy. Absent constitutional objection, courts are bound by the laws of Parliament, including those that vest exclusive power in an administrative decision-maker over a certain type of decision. Second, there is the constitutional principle of the rule of law. In some circumstances, courts must intervene even in the face of Parliamentary language forbidding intervention: Crevier v. A.G. (Québec) et al., 1981 CanLII 30 (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 1.

[4]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Singh v. Canada ( Attorney General ), 1999 CanLII 9359 (FC), [1999] 4 FC 583, <http://canlii.ca/t/473z>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  2. 2.0 2.1 Collins v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FC 1431 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/1m0mq>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  3. 3.0 3.1 Markevich v. Canada, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2003] 1 SCR 94, <http://canlii.ca/t/1g2hz>, retrieved on 2020-07-22
  4. 4.0 4.1 Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2015 FCA 17 (CanLII), [2015] 4 FCR 467, <http://canlii.ca/t/gg41h>, retrieved on 2020-07-22