Burden of Proof (General): Difference between revisions

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==[http://canlii.ca/t/hr5t7 Moore v Morad, 2013 CanLII 105063 (ON SCSM)]==
==[http://canlii.ca/t/hr5t7 Moore v Morad, 2013 CanLII 105063 (ON SCSM)]==


38. In this connection, plaintiff’s counsel advanced a rather innovative and bold argument based on an expansionary approach to the juristic reason for denying or allowing unjust enrichment set out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Supreme Court of Canada case of Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25 (CanLII), [2004] SCJ No. 21, where it was described in the following words:
38. In this connection, plaintiff’s counsel advanced a rather innovative and bold argument based on an expansionary approach to the juristic reason for denying or allowing unjust enrichment set out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Supreme Court of Canada case of [http://canlii.ca/t/1gzjn Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25 (CanLII), (2004) SCJ No. 21], where it was described in the following words:
<i>
::44 But recalling that [unjust enrichment] is an equitable remedy that will necessarily involve discretion and questions of fairness, I believe that some redefinition and reformulation is required. Consequently, in my view, the proper approach to the juristic reason analysis is in two parts. First, the plaintiff must show that no juristic reason from an established category exists to deny recovery… If there is no juristic reason from an established category, then the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under the juristic reason component of the analysis.
::44 But recalling that [unjust enrichment] is an equitable remedy that will necessarily involve discretion and questions of fairness, I believe that some redefinition and reformulation is required. Consequently, in my view, the proper approach to the juristic reason analysis is in two parts. First, the plaintiff must show that no juristic reason from an established category exists to deny recovery… If there is no juristic reason from an established category, then the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under the juristic reason component of the analysis.


::45 The prima facie case is rebuttable, however, where the defendant can show that there is another reason to deny recovery. As a result, there is a de facto burden of proof placed on the defendant to show the reason why the enrichment should be retained. This stage of the analysis thus provides for a category of residual defence in which courts can look to all of the circumstances of the transaction in order to determine whether there is another reason to deny recovery. (emphasis added)
::45 The prima facie case is rebuttable, however, where the defendant can show that there is another reason to deny recovery. As a result, there is a de facto burden of proof placed on the defendant to show the reason why the enrichment should be retained. This stage of the analysis thus provides for a category of residual defence in which courts can look to all of the circumstances of the transaction in order to determine whether there is another reason to deny recovery. (emphasis added)</i>

Revision as of 02:00, 9 March 2020


Paramount Painting & Renovations Inc. v Shamuon, 2018 CanLII 99167 (ON SCSM)

[36] The Defendant agrees that the contract does not contain a term requiring the contractor to obtain a building permit but suggests this is because Jason expressly told the Defendant or his father that no permit was necessary. Although the Defendant did not plead or argue rescission based on misrepresentation, this representation is the basis of the defence in the main claim. It is also the basis for the Defendant’s own negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Defendant’s entire case (defence and Defendant’s claim) depends on a finding of fact that the alleged statement was made by Jason. The burden of proof is on the Defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that this representation was made. The Defendant has not met this burden.

F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), (2008) 3 SCR 41

[40] Like the House of Lords, I think it is time to say, once and for all in Canada, that there is only one civil standard of proof at common law and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. Of course, context is all important and a judge should not be unmindful, where appropriate, of inherent probabilities or improbabilities or the seriousness of the allegations or consequences. However, these considerations do not change the standard of proof. I am of the respectful opinion that the alternatives I have listed above should be rejected for the reasons that follow.

McGrath v Franz, 2017 CanLII 21771 (ON SCSM)

31. The plaintiff’s submission is that it defies logic for the defendant to suggest that the plaintiff was holding the property from 2004 on a resulting trust. The evidence shows that there was a $38,000.00 loan made to the defendant by the plaintiff to be repaid when the property was sold. There was an element of trust that there would be compliance with this verbal arrangement given it was his son-in-law, that they could not purchase the property without the plaintiff’s contribution, that the plaintiff was giving up as an outright gift his entire capital in return for living in a rental property for which he had worked all his life. Furthermore, to consider it a gift in the absence of a juristic reason for doing so unjustly enriched the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense. The law presumes a loan unless defendant can prove it was a gift and the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The Statute of frauds does not apply because it was not a conveyance in land or a transmission of interest in land, which must be in writing. Finally, the action was commenced on time as there was a demand for payment in January 2013, followed by the sale of the property on February 17, 2013, the date upon which the debt became due.

Preferred Credit Resources Limited v Harding, 2013 CanLII 61481 (ON SCSM)

[28] The simple issue in this matter is whether the Defendant is responsible for the credit card debts under review. I find he is not liable for same.

[29] Stripped to its essentials, this is first and foremost a burden of proof case. Credit card cases unfortunately consume a large share of the work in Small Claims Court, be it assessments or trials. Inevitably part of the proof offered is the credit card application. It was not produced.

[31] The signature on the credit card application would go a long way to establishing who sought the credit cards: the Defendant [as the Plaintiff assumes] or the Defendant’s wife [as the Defendant assumes]. The Plaintiff is seeking to make the Defendant responsible for the debt. It is the Plaintiff’s burden of proof.

1369349 Ontario Inc. v. Yanch Heating and Air conditioning, 2012 ONCA 182 (CanLII)

[2] The appellant advances several grounds of appeal. First, it submits that the respondent was required to provide an explanation, based on evidence, for the cause of fire in order to rebut the presumption of negligence suggested by the experts.

[3] The appellant next submits that the trial judge ignored, misapprehended or misunderstood the jointly retained expert’s evidence. In the alternative, it argues that the reasons of the trial judge for rejecting this evidence and accepting the respondent’s denial of negligence are inadequate.

[4] We reject these grounds of appeal.

[5] The task of the trial judge in this case was to decide on all the evidence, whether it could be fairly inferred that the fire was the result of the respondent’s conduct. If a review of the evidence revealed that the cause of the fire remained unknown, then the required burden of proof upon the plaintiff would not have been satisfied and the trial judge would be required to dismiss the action. That is what occurred in this case.

Mohammed v Mangat, 2019 CanLII 127222 (ON SCSM)

[26] As with any action in Small Claims Court, a Plaintiff has the burden of proof, to prove that on a balance of probabilities, his/her case/claim is true. This means that the Court must be satisfied that on the evidence before it, the occurrence of an event more than likely transpired, than not. This requires a responsibility to present a case effectively and to ensure credible evidence, including oral testimony, be used to support the claim for damages.

Moore v Morad, 2013 CanLII 105063 (ON SCSM)

38. In this connection, plaintiff’s counsel advanced a rather innovative and bold argument based on an expansionary approach to the juristic reason for denying or allowing unjust enrichment set out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Supreme Court of Canada case of Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., 2004 SCC 25 (CanLII), (2004) SCJ No. 21, where it was described in the following words:

44 But recalling that [unjust enrichment] is an equitable remedy that will necessarily involve discretion and questions of fairness, I believe that some redefinition and reformulation is required. Consequently, in my view, the proper approach to the juristic reason analysis is in two parts. First, the plaintiff must show that no juristic reason from an established category exists to deny recovery… If there is no juristic reason from an established category, then the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case under the juristic reason component of the analysis.
45 The prima facie case is rebuttable, however, where the defendant can show that there is another reason to deny recovery. As a result, there is a de facto burden of proof placed on the defendant to show the reason why the enrichment should be retained. This stage of the analysis thus provides for a category of residual defence in which courts can look to all of the circumstances of the transaction in order to determine whether there is another reason to deny recovery. (emphasis added)