Corporate Owners - Re: Personal Use (RTA): Difference between revisions

From Riverview Legal Group
Access restrictions were established for this page. If you see this message, you have no access to this page.
mNo edit summary
Line 1: Line 1:
[[Category:Personal Use Application (LTB)]]
[[Category:Personal Use Application (LTB)]]
{{Citation:
| categories = [Personal Use Application (LTB)]
| shortlink =
}}


==Slapsys (1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (CanLII)<ref name="Slapsys"/>==
==Slapsys (1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (CanLII)<ref name="Slapsys"/>==

Revision as of 14:47, 24 September 2021


Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved: 2024-05-19
CLNP Page ID: 1661
Page Categories: [Personal Use Application (LTB)]
Citation: Corporate Owners - Re: Personal Use (RTA), CLNP 1661, <>, retrieved on 2024-05-19
Editor: P08916
Last Updated: 2021/09/24


Slapsys (1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (CanLII)[1]

[13] Furthermore, by its language, s. 202 obligates the Board to ascertain the true substance of transactions, activities and the good faith of the parties when making findings on an application. It allows the Board to disregard the separate corporate existence of the parties to the transaction in doing so. These are matters that are relevant to an enquiry under s.48. As a result, we are satisfied that s. 202 is relevant to the determination of an application under s. 48 of the Act.

[14] For these reasons, we are satisfied that s. 48 is available to permit a tenancy to be terminated for the personal use of the sole shareholder of the corporate owner of rental premises. Accordingly, we do not give effect to this ground of appeal.

[15] The appellant further submits that, in any event, the landlord was precluded by issue estoppel from seeking the tenant’s eviction. The landlord had a previous unsuccessful application by the landlord under s. 48. However, the Divisional Court was correct in holding that the change in circumstances that the landlord’s family was expecting an additional child was evidence upon which the Board could conclude that issue estoppel did not apply.

[16] Finally, we see no reason to disturb the Divisional Court’s conclusion that there was evidence upon which the Board could conclude as it did on the issue of good faith.


[1]

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Slapsys (1406393 Ontario Inc.) v. Abrams, 2010 ONCA 676 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/2d05l>, retrieved on 2021-09-24