Duty to Report Accidents

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Date Retrieved:	2024-05-06
CLNP Page ID:	2272
Page Categories:	Highway Traffic, Provincial Offences
Citation:	Duty to Report Accidents, CLNP 2272, <https://rvt.link/8t>, retrieved on 2024-05-06
Editor:	Rstojni
Last Updated:	2023/09/13

Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 199

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Duty to report accident

199 (1) Every person in charge of a motor vehicle or street car who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident shall report the accident immediately to the nearest police officer and provide the officer the information concerning the accident as may be required by the officer under subsection (3) if,

(a) the accident results in personal injuries or in damage to property apparently exceeding an amount prescribed by regulation; or

(b) the accident involves any door of the motor vehicle that is open or opening coming into contact with a cyclist, a bicycle or a moving vehicle, even if the motor vehicle is stationary, stopped or parked. 2021, c. 26, Sched. 1, s. 18.

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R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 596: GENERAL, s. 11

under Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8

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11. For the purpose of subsection 199 (1) of the Act, the prescribed amount for damage to property is $2,000. O. Reg. 537/97, s. 1; O. Reg. 228/15, s. 1.

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R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27 (CanLII)

Overview

[1] In Shah v. Becamon (2009), 94 O.R. (3d) 297, [2009] O.J. No. 478, 2009 ONCA 113, this court held that the graduated [page339] licence scheme set out in the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 ("HTA" or the "Act") applied only to the operation of a motor vehicle on a "highway" as defined in the HTA. The court further held that the shopping plaza parking lot where the accident occurred was not a "highway" within the definition in the HTA. No one questions the correctness of either holding.

[2] In Shah, the court went on in obiter dicta, at para. 23, to hold "[t]he entire HTA, including the graduated licensing system, is limited to 'highways'". In this case, counsel for the Crown (the "appellant") submits that this obiter is wrong insofar as it limits the operation of the "entire HTA" to only "highways". Counsel contends that "highway" is a defined term in the HTA that appears in many, but not all, provisions of the HTA. He submits that the definition of "highway" cannot be read into the sections of the HTA that do not use the word "highway" or some other word that incorporates the definition of "highway". Specifically, counsel submits that the accident reporting requirement in s. 199 makes no reference to "highway" and applies even when the accident triggering the reporting requirement occurs on property that does not fall within the meaning of "highway".

[3] Counsel appointed as amicus, however, submits that the obiter in Shah is correct. He contends that the purpose and object of the HTA is the protection of persons using public roadways and that the reach of the HTA has been limited to "highways" in various contexts by this court. In support of his argument, counsel points to the difference between the HTA and corresponding legislation in many other provinces, which, unlike the HTA, does not restrict the meaning of the word "highway" by reference to public access and use. Counsel submits that the obiter in Shah is consistent with the more limited definition of "highway" used in the HTA.

[4] I agree with the position advanced by the appellant. I would hold that the obiter in Shah limiting the operation of the "entire HTA" to "highways" is wrong and should not be followed. Many provisions of the HTA are by their terms limited to "highways". Other provisions, however, are not so limited. Nothing in the overall structure of the HTA or its purpose compels the reading of the word "highway" into sections in which it does not appear. Section 199 is one such section. I would hold that the reporting requirement in s. 199 generally applies even if the accident does not occur on a "highway" as defined in the HTA. [page340]

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[22] As the obiter in Shah does not resolve the question of whether s. 199 applies to accidents that do not occur on the "highway", it is necessary to engage in a full interpretive analysis. The obiter in Shah does not assist in that process.

V

The Interpretation of Section 199 of the HTA

A. The statutory language and context

[23] Professor Driedger's oft-repeated "modern principle" of statutory interpretation begins with the words of the relevant provision, but recognizes that those words take their meaning from the context in which they are used: Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87. Context can be multi-layered, extending outward from the provision in issue to other related statutory provisions, the statute as a whole, related statutes and the relevant Interpretation Act. Context also includes applicable legal norms and the purpose or intent of the legislation: see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, 2002 SCC 42, at paras. 26-30; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008), at pp. 353-58.

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(i)     Section 199

[25] I begin my examination of the statute with the language of s. 199(1). For ease of reference, I repeat the relevant part of the section:

199(1) Every person in charge of a motor vehicle . . . who is directly or indirectly involved in an accident shall, if the accident results in personal injuries or in damage to property apparently exceeding an amount prescribed by regulation, report the accident forthwith to the nearest police officer and furnish him or her with the information concerning the accident as may be required by the officer[.]

[26] The officer to whom the accident is reported must prepare a report in the form provided by the Minister of Transportation and forward that report to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles: s. 199(3)-(4).

[27] A plain reading of s. 199(1) reveals no reference to the word "highway" or any word that incorporates the definition of "highway". The reporting obligation in s. 199(1) is placed on "every person in charge of a motor vehicle". If the legislature has defined certain terms in the definition section of legislation, but chooses to use other undefined terms in a particular section, the interpretative exercise must strive to give some meaning to the choice made by the legislature. In s. 199, the legislature chose to use the phrase "every person in charge of a motor vehicle", a more expansive phrase than the word "driver". This choice suggests a reporting requirement that is not limited to persons who fall within the definition of the word "driver", that is, persons who drive a vehicle on a "highway".

(ii)   Related provisions in the HTA

[28] Expanding the context from the words of s. 199(1) to the language of related sections takes me to s. 205 of the HTA. Section 205 places certain responsibilities on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, the official who receives the reports generated under s. 199.

[29] Under s. 205, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles must

--		investigate motor vehicle accidents, traffic conditions and other matters (s. 205(1)(b));
--		keep records of all motor vehicle accidents in Ontario reported to him or her (s. 205(1)(c)(i));
--		keep an operating record of every driver showing "all accidents in which the records of the registrar indicate the driver has been involved" (s. 205(1)(c)(v)); [page346]
--		develop adequate uniform methods of accident and traffic statistics (s. 205(1)(d));
--		study accident causes and trends, traffic problems and regulations (s. 205(1)(d)); and
--		prepare an annual report for the minister containing recommendations for the prevention of motor vehicle accidents and the solution of traffic problems (s. 205(1) (e)).

[30] None of the responsibilities of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles set out in s. 205 are limited to accidents or other traffic-related concerns on "highways". The responsibilities relate to all accidents and related traffic conditions in the province. The broad responsibilities of the registrar, particularly as they relate to the accident reports generated by s. 199(1) and other sections of the HTA, are consistent with an interpretation of s. 199 that requires the reporting of all motor vehicle accidents that meet the criteria specified in that section.

(iii)  Part XIV

[31] A further broadening of the context leads next to a review of the entirety of Part XIV of the HTA, the part of the HTA containing s. 199. That Part includes various reporting requirements. A review of the four reporting requirements most closely connected to s. 199 reveals that two use the word "highway" while the other two do not.

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[35] My review of the language used in the various reporting requirements in Part XIV satisfies me that if the legislature determined that the particular reporting requirement should be triggered only by events which occurred on a "highway", it expressly said so. When it chose to impose a broader reporting requirement, it refrained from using the word "highway" or any other defined word, such as "driver", that would restrict the reporting requirement to "highways". The obiter in Shah would effectively erase one of the distinctions written into the various reporting requirements by the legislature.

(iv)  The HTA as a whole

[36] Broadening the context from Part XIV to the entirety of the HTA offers no support for reading "highway" into s. 199. Numerous provisions in the HTA, like s. 199, do not use the word "highway" or any related word. Many of those sections create duties that are intended to protect the public by regulating various activities relating to motor vehicles. Many of those duties cannot reasonably be seen as contingent upon or properly limited to circumstances in which a motor vehicle is used on a "highway".

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[40] In summary, my review of the HTA as a whole demonstrates that many of the duties created by various sections of the HTA that do not use the word "highway" cannot be limited to "highways". Viewed from the perspective of the HTA as a whole, context contraindicates reading all sections of the HTA as applicable only to "highways".

(v)   Section 1.1

[41] My contextual review of the HTA brings me next to s. 1.1, which reads:

1.1 The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations providing that this Act or any provision of this Act or of a regulation applies to a specified place or class of place that is not a highway.

[42] Section 1.1 was added to the HTA by the Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act, 2007, S.O. 2007, c. 13, s. 2. Mocha J. interpreted s. 1.1 as indicating that provisions of the HTA could extend to places beyond a "highway" only by the exercise of the regulation-making power in s. 1.1: at paras. 19-20. She read the section as supporting the obiter in Shah.

[43] Section 1.1 does not suggest that, absent an appropriate regulation, all provisions of the HTA are limited to "highways". The section permits the extension by regulation of the HTA, or a provision of the HTA, to places other than highways. Thus, a section that by its terms was limited to "highways" could be extended to other places by regulation without the need to amend the provision itself. Section 1.1 offers no support for the [page349] contention that absent an appropriate regulation, all provisions of the HTA are referable only to "highways".

[44] Section 1.1 does, however, provide context in a somewhat different way. The section contemplates the extension of the entire HTA or parts of it to places other than highways. This broad regulation-making power is inconsistent with the obiter in Shah that would limit the HTA to "highways". The regulation-making power in s. 1.1 is, however, entirely consistent with an interpretation of the HTA that extends beyond highways.

(vi)  The title

[45] I conclude my search for context in the legislation by reference to the title of the legislation -- the Highway Traffic Act.⁶ In Shah, at para. 35, the court stated:

Indeed, not surprisingly, the entire HTA applies to what its title foreshadows, highways.

[46] The title of an enactment can assist in the interpretation of a provision within the enactment: see Temelini v. Ontario Provincial Police (Commissioner) (1999), 1999 CanLII 3743 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 609, [1999] O.J. No. 1876 (C.A.), at pp. 620-21 O.R. In my view, it places far too much weight on the title of the HTA to suggest that a word that is given a specific definition in the text of the statute effectively becomes a description of the scope of the statute because that word is used in the title. Had the legislature intended the word "highway" to define the scope of the HTA, I would have expected a specific statutory provision addressing the scope of the Act, and not merely a definition of the word "highway" applicable to the legislation.

[47] I also agree with counsel for the appellant that a comparison of the English and French titles of the HTA supports his position. The French title of the HTA is "Code de la route". The French version defines "highway" as "voie publique". The title of the French version of the HTA considered along with the definition of "highway" in the French version suggests that the Act is not limited to "highways". The French and English versions of a statute are equally authoritative: Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F., s. 65. [page350]

B. The object of the HTA

[48] The modern approach to statutory interpretation looks to the purpose or object of the statute as an aid in interpreting the statute's provisions. This approach is legislatively mandated in Ontario by s. 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006:

64(1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

[49] There is no preamble to the HTA and nothing in the Act speaks directly to the objects of the HTA. Nor did counsel in their comprehensive presentations refer to any of the usual secondary sources that might assist in pinpointing the objects of the Act. In attempting to discern the object of the HTA, one is left with the circular proposition that the words of the HTA enlighten the reader as to the objects of the HTA which in turn assist the reader in giving meaning to the words in the HTA. As Rothstein J. recently cautioned in Canada v. Craig, [2012] S.C.J. No. 43, 2012 SCC 43, 347 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at para. 30, interpreting words by reference to unexpressed legislative intention purportedly discovered through a purposive reading of those words must be avoided: see, also, Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 647 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622, [1999] S.C.J. No. 30, at para. 43.

[50] Bearing that caution in mind, the case law does identify in broad terms the object of the HTA. In R. v. Raham (2010), 99 O.R. (3d) 241, [2010] O.J. No. 1091, 2010 ONCA 206, at para. 33, the court refers to the HTA as "public welfare legislation designed to protect those who use the roads of the province". Earlier, in Ontario (Hydro-Electric Power Commission) v. Bruell Float Service Ltd. (1974), 1974 CanLII 34 (ON CA), 3 O.R. (2d) 108, [1974] O.J. No. 1841 (C.A.), at p. 114 O.R., affd on other grounds 1975 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 9, [1975] S.C.J. No. 22, this court said:

[T]he general purpose of the Highway Traffic Act is the regulation of the use of the highways by persons on foot and in vehicles; that is not to say that certain provisions of the statute will not apply to the use of vehicles other than on a highway, but in an over-all sense the Legislature is directing itself to the regulation of vehicular traffic and not to commerce conducted in or by means of vehicles.

[51] In my view, regulation to protect the public using the province's roads is not necessarily limited to roads that fall within the meaning of "highway" in the Act. Public safety concerns might well demand regulation in respect of traffic in large private parking facilities even though those facilities are not used by the general public for "the passage of vehicles". Similarly, public safety concerns might well demand the regulation of private [page351] parking facilities as incidental to regulations maintaining the safety of the "highway" leading into and out of that facility.

[52] Insofar as s. 199 is concerned, I think it can be argued that public safety is enhanced by a general reporting requirement with respect to accidents involving injury or a certain level of property damage. Lessons learned from the reports with respect to those accidents may enhance the overall safety of the roads by identifying safety concerns that have application beyond the immediate circumstances of the particular accident.

[53] When I place the language of s. 199 in the context of its related provisions, the HTA as a whole and the object of the HTA, I see no reason to read the word "highway" into the Act. In my view, the section makes perfect sense and is consistent with the object of the HTA if it is read as written.