Illegal Rooming House - Re: Tenant

Davies v. Syed, 2020 ONSC 5732

[34] The Court of Appeal in Fraser dealt with a motion where the plaintiffs were a group of neighbours who lived near an illegal rooming house in Ottawa. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the landlords restraining them from operating the rooming house. The landlords had been convicted of operating a rooming house without a license and in fact, consented to an order granting the injunction. The injunction order provided that no steps would be taken to enforce the order until notice had been given to the tenants or for the orderly sale of the property. An application was brought by the landlords to the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal for an order terminating the tenancies. The tribunal refused the landlords’ application, and when faced with the continued operation of the rooming house the plaintiffs sought an order of the Superior Court on notice to the tenants requiring that the tenants vacate the rooming house. An appeal was brought to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to make the order. The appeal was allowed.

[40] On the facts of this case, there is no order of the LTB evicting any of the occupants of the various residences that are described in the Statement of Claim. I am satisfied that s. 168(2) of the Act provides exclusive jurisdiction for the granting of an eviction order to the LTB. This has been made clear by the Court of Appeal in Fraser.

[41] What distinguishes this case, however, in my view, is the fact that there are numerous orders made by the various fire protection services as well as zoning notices that, in essence, declare that at least some if not all of the residences are residential dwelling homes that have been converted into rooming houses. The unsuspecting occupants of the residences believe that they are renting rooms from Syed. Syed obtained lease agreements from the various plaintiffs as a result of a fraudulent misrepresentation that he would be occupying the residences as a single-family residential home occupied only by himself and his family. The evidence in my view is overwhelming, that Syed obtained the right to lease the various residences at issue in this lawsuit as a result of a fraudulent misrepresentation that renders such lease agreements void ab initio.

[44] My conclusion that the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief does not ignore the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTD. Rather, the Legislature chose not to limit the jurisdiction of this court by providing that s. 440 was superseded by the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB. This issue was, in part, dealt with by Howden J in Neighbourhoods of Winfield Limited Partnership v. Death, 2008 CanL11 42428, where Howden J. granted an order under s. 440 of the Municipal Act restraining the respondent landlords from using their houses as multi-unit rentals, contrary to the municipal by-law which did not allow lodging houses containing more than two bedrooms for rent. The multi-unit rentals were occupied by groups of students as tenants.

[45] It is noteworthy that the decision of Howden J. in Winfield was upheld by the Court of Appeal (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused). The decision of the Court of Appeal was released within four years of its decision in Fraser. As noted by D.C. Shaw J. in Kenora (City) v. Eikre Holdings Ltd., 2018 ONSC 7635 at para. 66, “There was no suggestion in Neighbourhood of Winfields that the Residential Tenancies Act defeated the statutory jurisdiction of the Superior Court to make a restraining order under s. 440”.

[46] The Court of Appeal in Fraser makes clear that the Superior Court has broad jurisdiction to grant an injunction. In my view, such broad power coupled with the enforcement powers of s. 440 of the Municipal Act are such that this court should grant the plaintiffs who are “taxpayers” an injunctive remedy that is in no way inconsistent with the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB.

[47] The occupants of the various residences described as the defendants John Doe 1 to John Doe 12 as well the defendants Syed, are ordered to comply with all outstanding orders from any fire protection service that are directed at the residences.

[48] The occupants of the various residences described as John Doe 1 to John Doe 12 as well as the defendant Syed, are further ordered to comply with all outstanding Municipal Notices requiring that the defendants conform with all zoning by-laws, including any by-law that requires the residences to be returned to the status of a single-family residence.

[49] The occupants of the various residences described as John Doe 1 to John Doe 12 and the defendant Syed, are further ordered in the absence of any Municipal Notice to comply with all municipal zoning by-laws that may govern the residences. Where such zoning by-law allows for a single-family residence, the defendants are ordered to cease and desist using any of the residences as a rooming house.

[50] The occupants of the residences described as John Doe 1 to John Doe 12 and the defendant Syed are to comply with the orders of this court within 7 days, failing which the plaintiffs may seek further relief from this court to enforce these orders.

Fraser v. Beach, 2005 CanLII 14309 (ON CA)

[1] The appellants are the residential tenants of an illegal rooming house in Ottawa. The respondents are neighbours who brought an action against the landlords seeking damages for nuisance and for an interim and final injunction restraining them from operating the rooming house. The defendants, who did not participate in the appeal, are the landlords of the rooming house and have been convicted of operating a rooming house without a licence and fined pursuant to a city by-law.

[2] The single legal issue in this appeal is whether the Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction to order the eviction of the tenants, or whether the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to do so.

[8] The court's jurisdiction, however, is not fixed. It has long been settled that the jurisdiction of a superior court may be limited by statute. In Board v. Board (1919), 1919 CanLII 546 (UK JCPC), 48 D.L.R. 13, [1919], W.W.R. 940 (P.C.), at p. 18 D.L.R., Viscount Haldane, in reviewing cases dating as far back as 1774, said that "nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court, but that which specially appears to be so". In Michie Estate v. Toronto (City), 1967 CanLII 202 (ON SC), [1968] 1 O.R. 266, 66 D.L.R. (2d) 213 (H.C.J.), at p. 268 O.R., Stark J. wrote that "... the Supreme Court of Ontario has broad universal jurisdiction over all matters of substantive law unless the Legislature divests from this universal jurisdiction by legislation in unequivocal terms". Brooke J.A., speaking for this court in 80 Wellesley St. East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd., 1972 CanLII 535 (ON CA), [1972] 2 O.R. 280, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 386 (C.A.), stated at p. 282 O.R., "As a superior Court of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Ontario has all the powers that are necessary to do justice between the parties. Except where provided specifically to the contrary, the Court's jurisdiction is unlimited and unrestricted in substantive law in civil matters."

[11] These definitions, which are clear, do not exclude an illegal rooming house from their application. Not only does the text of the Act provide no basis for holding otherwise, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to withhold the protections it provides from residents of the illegal residential units leaving them at the mercy of landlords. I conclude that the Act applies to the relationship between the landlords and the tenants in this case.

[13] The neighbours submit that the Superior Court's order that the tenants vacate the premises was simply the method of enforcing its earlier order restraining the landlords from operating the illegal rooming house. The earlier order is not attacked. They say it does not make sense to read the Tenant Protection Act as taking away the rights of governments and private persons simply because they are neither landlords nor tenants. They submit that the activities of residents of an illegal [page387] rooming house may affect the health and safety of neighbours, and that persons so affected must have a remedy. Likewise, a city must be able to enforce its by-laws. It cannot be the case, they say, that a landlord can continue to operate an illegal rooming house in flagrant contravention of the by-law while a city remains powerless to do anything about it. (In this case, the city is not a participant in the proceedings.)

[14] I do not accept these submissions. The following provisions of the Act are of central importance. Section 39(1) provides "A tenancy may be terminated only in accordance with this Act." These words could not be more unequivocal. Moreover, s. 41(b) provides: "A landlord shall not recover possession of a rental unit subject to a tenancy unless ... an order of the Tribunal evicting the tenant has authorized the possession." Section 157(2) provides "The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act." Finally s. 2(1) provides that the Tenant Protection Act applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes "despite any other Act" and s. 2(4) specifies that if a provision of the Tenant Protection Act conflicts with a provision of another Act (other than the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19), the provision of the Tenant Protecti on Act prevails.

[15] I am satisfied that the combined effect of these provisions is to oust the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to make an order requiring the tenants to vacate the premises. The statute clearly provides that only the Tribunal may make an order terminating a tenancy and evicting a tenant.

[17] First, it clearly remains within the Superior Court's jurisdiction to restrain behavior that constitutes a nuisance. In my view, a just and convenient remedy for behavior that creates a nuisance would be one that was directed to the behaviour of the perpetrators rather than their place of abode.

[18] Second, I do not agree that the landlord is unable to secure the tenants' eviction under the Act thus hindering the neighbours' application to enforce the May 13, 2002 order. The neighbours point out that the landlords' application to the Tribunal to evict the tenants was refused. The Tribunal's decision was a consequence of the wording of the landlords' application and the provision of the Act upon which they relied, s. 53(1)(c). Subsection 53(1)(c) permits a landlord to give notice of termination of a tenancy if the landlord [page388] requires possession of the rental unit to do repairs or renovations that are so extensive that a building permit and vacant possession are required. The landlords, while making reference to the Superior Court's injunction and their conviction for operating a rooming house without a licence, applied to evict the tenants in order to convert the premises "to larger self-contained apartments or to a single-family dwelling". Section 71 of the Act provid es that the Tribunal shall not make an order evicting a tenant pursuant to a landlord's application under s. 53, unless the landlord has obtained the necessary permits required to carry out the activity on which the notice of termination is based. The landlords, in this case, had not obtained the requisite building permits needed to convert the rooming house. The Tribunal considered itself bound by the statute to refuse the application they had brought.

[19] The consideration of the ambit and application of other provisions of the Act to which the landlord might resort is a matter for the Tribunal and not for this court. Likewise, whether the landlords have made conscientious and diligent efforts to comply with the May 13, 2002 order to cease operating a rooming house is a matter for the Superior Court on a proper motion.

Decision

[20] I would allow the appeal and set aside the Superior Court's order dated December 16, 2003 requiring the tenants to vacate the premises.

[21] Counsel for the parties indicate that neither side is seeking costs. Accordingly, I would make no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.