Jurisdiction of Small Claims (LTB Claims)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-05-11
CLNP Page ID:	1842
Page Categories:	[Jurisdiction], [Interference of Reasonable Enjoyment (LTB)], [Maintenance Obligations (LTB)]
Citation:	Jurisdiction of Small Claims (LTB Claims), CLNP 1842, <5b>, retrieved on 2024-05-11
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2022/01/11

Kiselman v. Klerer, 2019 ONSC 6668 (CanLII)

[7] Section 89(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act provides:

A landlord may apply to the Board for an order requiring a tenant to pay reasonable costs that the landlord has incurred or will incur for the repair of or, where repairing is not reasonable, the replacement of damaged property, if the tenant, another occupant of the rental unit or a person whom the tenant permits in the residential complex wilfully or negligently causes undue dame to the rental unit or the residential complex and the tenant is in possession of the rental unit.

[8] Section 207 of the Residential Tenancies Act deals with the monetary jurisdiction of the Board, providing:

207(1) The Board may, where it otherwise has the jurisdiction, order the payment to any given person of an amount of money up to the greater of $10,000 and the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

[9] I pause to note that the time that this matter was dealt with, the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court was $25,000. As noted, the claim brought by the landlord in this case was for $17,166.55 in rent arrears and property damage.

[10] This issue has been considered in a number of decisions in Ontario. In Mackie v. Toronto (City), 2010 ONSC 3801, Perell J. noted at para. 43:

It is, therefore, my opinion that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the Plaintiffs’ repair claims…From a jurisdictional perspective, it is the substance and not the form of the claim that matters, and the substance of the Plaintiffs’ claim is a repair claim between a landlord and tenant that is within the monetary jurisdiction of the Board.

[11] In Fong v. Lemieux, [2016] O.J. No. 2695, T. Marshall, Deputy J., relied on the decision of Perell J. in Mackie and stated at paras. 61-62:

[61] The Board has the expertise and day to day experience in handling matters pertaining to what is before the Court today, namely, rent arrears and damage claims to rental units. While it is true such claims have to be in the Superior Court of Justice for claims above $25,000.00 [per s 207 of the Act], the Board deals with such smaller claims more expeditiously than if it were a Superior Court of Justice matter, even a Small Claims Court matter. This is a hallmark of the Board proceedings.

[62] I accept a broad interpretation of Mackie pays no heed to provisions in the Act as to certain consequences whether a tenant is in possession of a rental unit or is a former tenant. In my view, this difference is ill-founded. If an issue arose out of a landlord and tenant relationship, that the tenant has moved out does not change the underlying character of the dispute, in the matter before the Court, rent arrears and damage to the unit…

[12] In Effrach v. Cherishome Living, 2015 ONSC 472, Horkins J., sitting on appeal, dealt with an order of a deputy Small Claims Court judge dismissing a landlord’s claim in Small Claims Court for lack of jurisdiction. Horkins J. reviewed the legislation and Justice Perell’s decision in Mackie, and summarized the law as follows at paras. 5-6:

[5] The jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board is set out in the Residential Tenancies Act. The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all Applications under the Residential Tenancies Act with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by the Residential Tenancies Act. The Board has authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction under the Act.

[6] Where the Board has jurisdiction, the Small Claims Court has no jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the Board is exclusive and not concurrent.

[13] The landlord brought a claim in Small Claims Court for rent arrears and damage to the property. The claim was brought after the tenant had vacated the property. The amount of the claim did not exceed the $25,000 cap, then in place under s. 207(1) of the Act. It is plain and obvious that s. 168(2) of the Act gives the Board exclusive jurisdiction to determine claims of this type between landlord and tenant. The parties had a landlord and tenant relationship, and in my view, nothing turns on the fact that the action was started after the tenant was no longer in possession. It is clear that disputes of this sort are the daily fare of the Landlord and Tenant Board. When assessing claims, the Board is in the best position to determine whether claims for rent arrears and allegations of damage to property against the tenant amount to “undue damage” or simply wear and tear as a result of the normal occupancy of a residential unit.

[14] The appeal of the appellant. Uri Kiselman, is dismissed.

Brydges v. Johnson, 2017 ONSC 7410 (CanLII)

[9] The Respondent served on the Appellants a Form N4 Notice to End a Tenancy Early for Non-Payment of Rent while the Appellants still were in possession of the rented premises. The Appellants vacated the premises on February 5, 2010. The Claim in this matter was issued on March 4, 2010.

[10] The Appellants contend that based on s. 168 (2) of the RTA once the Respondent had served the N4 Notice while the Appellants were in possession of the rented premises, the Board had exclusive jurisdiction, even after the Appellants vacated the premises.

[11] Respectfully, I reject this argument. In my view s. 87 of the RTA is determinative of the issue. The Respondent, as a result of s. 87(1)(b), could no longer have resort to the Board by application for arrears of rent after the Appellants had vacated the premises. Therefore, s. 168 (2) was not a bar to the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to hear the claim brought by the Respondent on March 4, 2010. Since the Board did not have jurisdiction, the courts did.

[12] Further, an application under s. 87 for arrears of rent is made by virtue of s. 185 (1) by way of Form L9. The Form N4 notice could have been the basis for an application under s. 69 of the RTA to terminate a tenancy and evict a tenant; that type of application is made pursuant to s. 185 (1) by Form L1 styled Application to Evict a Tenant for Non-payment of Rent and to Collect Rent the Tenant Owes. That type of application was never made in this case.

Chu v Kokko, 2020 CanLII 20497 (ON SCSM)

5. Instead this is simply a claim for the utilities component of rental arrears, brought after the tenancy ended and the tenant gave up vacant possession on August 1, 2018. On the authority of Brydges v. Johnson, [2017] O.J. No. 6473 (Div. Ct.), this court has jurisdiction over such a claim. I am aware of the more recent decision in Kiselman v. Klerer, [2019] O.J. No. 5857 (Div. Ct.), which reached the opposite conclusion. Only one of those authorities can be correct. With respect, I prefer Brydges v. Johnson, which accords with the plain language of s. 87(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

Izumi v Skilling, 2020 CanLII 20510 (ON SCSM)

4. While jurisdiction was not challenged by the defence, I accept that this court has jurisdiction over the matter based on the authorities cited by Mr. Ellis: Capreit L.P. v. Griffen, [2016] O.J. No. 7338 (Div. Ct.); Brydges v. Johnson, 2016 CanLII 4942 (ON SCSM), [2016] O.J. No. 609 (Sm. Cl. Ct.), affirmed (June 24, 2016), (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported]. I am aware of Kiselman v. Klerer, [2019] O.J. No. 5857 (Div. Ct.), which reaches the opposite conclusion but without reference to those two prior cases. Faced with clear conflict amongst the Divisional Court authorities on point and until such time as the issue is resolved by the Court of Appeal, I must choose between them. I prefer to follow those earlier authorities.