Retroactive Legislation: Difference between revisions
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==R. v. Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 701<ref name="Finta"/>== | ==R. v. Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 701<ref name="Finta"/>== | ||
The impugned sections do not violate ss. 7 and 11(g) of the Charter because of any allegedly retrospective character. The rules created by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and applied by the Nuremberg Trial represented "a new law". <b><u>The rule against retroactive legislation is a principle of justice. A retroactive law providing individual punishment for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed, however, is an exception to the rule against ex post facto laws. | The impugned sections do not violate ss. 7 and 11(g) of the Charter because of any allegedly retrospective character. The rules created by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and applied by the Nuremberg Trial represented "a new law". <b><u>The rule against retroactive legislation is a principle of justice.</b></u> A retroactive law providing individual punishment for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed, however, is an exception to the rule against ex post facto laws. Individual criminal responsibility represents certainly a higher degree of justice than collective responsibility. Since the internationally illegal acts for which individual criminal responsibility has been established were also morally the most objectionable and the persons who committed them were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them cannot be considered as incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of those committing such acts in spite of the fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they were performed. It follows that it was appropriate that the acts were made punishable with retroactive force. | ||
Revision as of 19:09, 3 November 2021
| Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 © | |
|---|---|
| Date Retrieved: | 2024-05-14 |
| CLNP Page ID: | 1797 |
| Page Categories: | [Legal Principles] |
| Citation: | Retroactive Legislation, CLNP 1797, <4Y>, retrieved on 2024-05-14 |
| Editor: | Sharvey |
| Last Updated: | 2021/11/03 |
R. v. Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 701[1]
The impugned sections do not violate ss. 7 and 11(g) of the Charter because of any allegedly retrospective character. The rules created by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and applied by the Nuremberg Trial represented "a new law". The rule against retroactive legislation is a principle of justice. A retroactive law providing individual punishment for acts which were illegal though not criminal at the time they were committed, however, is an exception to the rule against ex post facto laws. Individual criminal responsibility represents certainly a higher degree of justice than collective responsibility. Since the internationally illegal acts for which individual criminal responsibility has been established were also morally the most objectionable and the persons who committed them were certainly aware of their immoral character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them cannot be considered as incompatible with justice. Justice required the punishment of those committing such acts in spite of the fact that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they were performed. It follows that it was appropriate that the acts were made punishable with retroactive force.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 R. v. Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 701, <https://canlii.ca/t/1frvp>, retrieved on 2021-11-03
