Section 11(b) - Trial in a Reasonable Time (COVID-19 Delay): Difference between revisions
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==R. v. Kaur, 2021 ONSC 7519 (CanLII)<ref name="Kaur"/>== | |||
[39] There is no doubt that the pandemic created an existential crisis in the justice system that fundamentally altered the manner in which the court’s business is conducted. The spectre of closed or retrofitted courtrooms, zoom hearings, sombre accounts of cases of infections in court buildings, and proactive steps to reduce the risk of infection have collectively haunted the judicial landscape since March 2020. Additionally, the Ontario Court of Justice shut down on March 16, 2020, reopened in a limited capacity on July 6, 2020, and resumed full capacity in November. Thus, although the trial date in this case was set prior to the onset of the pandemic, the deleterious effects of the pandemic would have rendered any attempt to obtain an earlier trial date a futile exercise. | |||
[40] That said, Jordan requires that it is only where the discrete exceptional event caused the period of delay that the delay must be subtracted from the total period of delay “for the purpose of determining whether the ceiling has been exceeded”: para. 75. The court in <i>R. v. Schardt, 2021 ONSC 3143, at para. 68</i><ref name="Schardt"/>, similarly noted that: | |||
::<b><u>[I]t is not sufficient for the Crown to point to the pandemic as a discrete event to justify delay. The focus of the inquiry as required by Jordan is whether the discrete event caused the delay. The Crown must prove that but for the pandemic, earlier dates would have been obtained for this case to have been tried and completed within the 30-month ceiling.</b></u> | |||
[41] In my view, the Covid-19 pandemic, if considered a discrete event, did not cause the delay in this case. To that extent, the trial judge did not err in failing to consider the pandemic as an exceptional circumstance that has relaxed the Jordan ceiling. | |||
<ref name="Kaur">R. v. Kaur, 2021 ONSC 7519 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jkf63>, retrieved on 2022-02-25</ref> | |||
<ref name="Schardt">R. v. Schardt, 2021 ONSC 3143 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jg8cz>, retrieved on 2022-02-25</ref> | |||
Revision as of 16:45, 25 February 2022
| Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 © | |
|---|---|
| Date Retrieved: | 2024-05-18 |
| CLNP Page ID: | 1877 |
| Page Categories: | [Constitutional Law], [Provincial Offenses] |
| Citation: | Section 11(b) - Trial in a Reasonable Time (COVID-19 Delay), CLNP 1877, <>, retrieved on 2024-05-18 |
| Editor: | Sharvey |
| Last Updated: | 2022/02/25 |
R. v. Kaur, 2021 ONSC 7519 (CanLII)[1]
[39] There is no doubt that the pandemic created an existential crisis in the justice system that fundamentally altered the manner in which the court’s business is conducted. The spectre of closed or retrofitted courtrooms, zoom hearings, sombre accounts of cases of infections in court buildings, and proactive steps to reduce the risk of infection have collectively haunted the judicial landscape since March 2020. Additionally, the Ontario Court of Justice shut down on March 16, 2020, reopened in a limited capacity on July 6, 2020, and resumed full capacity in November. Thus, although the trial date in this case was set prior to the onset of the pandemic, the deleterious effects of the pandemic would have rendered any attempt to obtain an earlier trial date a futile exercise.
[40] That said, Jordan requires that it is only where the discrete exceptional event caused the period of delay that the delay must be subtracted from the total period of delay “for the purpose of determining whether the ceiling has been exceeded”: para. 75. The court in R. v. Schardt, 2021 ONSC 3143, at para. 68[2], similarly noted that:
- [I]t is not sufficient for the Crown to point to the pandemic as a discrete event to justify delay. The focus of the inquiry as required by Jordan is whether the discrete event caused the delay. The Crown must prove that but for the pandemic, earlier dates would have been obtained for this case to have been tried and completed within the 30-month ceiling.
[41] In my view, the Covid-19 pandemic, if considered a discrete event, did not cause the delay in this case. To that extent, the trial judge did not err in failing to consider the pandemic as an exceptional circumstance that has relaxed the Jordan ceiling.
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 R. v. Kaur, 2021 ONSC 7519 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jkf63>, retrieved on 2022-02-25
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 R. v. Schardt, 2021 ONSC 3143 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/jg8cz>, retrieved on 2022-02-25
