Contracts (Human Rights)

Grant v. Willcock, 1990 CanLII 12509 (ON HRT)

[26] To have a liberty to discriminate on one of the prohibited grounds mentioned in s. 3 in the disposal of one's private property, would also amount to the liberty to impose wanton psychological hurt and other types of damage on others, on the basis of one of the characteristics mentioned in s. 3. Our society has deemed this unacceptable, and none of the relationships exempted from the operation of s. 3 [are] relevant here.

[27] I am in agreement with Ms. Judith Keene (see Human Rights in Ontario (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at p. 26) when she asserts that "the right to contract on equal terms may also be infringed in the making of an offer and the acceptance or rejection of an offer, if any of the steps in the contract process are influenced by discrimination on a prohibited ground."

[28] In this case, the conduct of the respondent prevented Mr. Grant from even making the offer. In such a situation, I would suggest extending Ms. Keene's statement of the ambit of s. 3 to include the invitation to treat or deal stage of the contractual process, which in many, if not most instances, is begun by an advertisement in a public place or in the news media. Not to extend the reach of s. 3 to the invitation to treat stage, would render the section ineffective in many instances. The ugly face of discrimination often makes a first appearance, when an advertisement is answered by a person who will be the target of discrimination prohibited by s. 3.