Discrimination Because of Association

Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19

12 A right under Part I is infringed where the discrimination is because of relationship, association or dealings with a person or persons identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination.

Allen v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2017 HRTO 787 (CanLII)

[9] The applicant argues that the WSIB should be held to account for discrimination on the basis of association – being the long term friendship between the initial case manager and the applicant’s former employer. The applicant argues that this ‘association’ resulted in biased decision making by the initial case manager whose decisions were followed for a period of time until overturned by a manager within the WSIB. The applicant outlines in significant detail the basis for his concern that the initial decision maker was biased. The applicant argues that this is discrimination because of association.

[10] The applicant outlines in great detail the basis for his concern that the initial decision maker was biased. His concern is understandable and for purposes of this Decision I have assumed that his assertions are true. However what he describes is not discrimination because of association.

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[12] It is clear that the protection afforded by section 12 is the prevention of discrimination because of an association the aggrieved person has with a person identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination. For example the Code might apply if the basis for the applicant’s claim was that he was treated differently because of his association with a Black person or a citizen of another country even though he was not Black himself or not a citizen of a country other than Canada. In short, the section simply does not apply to an allegation of discrimination by a person because of an alleged association between that person and another person, it protects the applicant against discrimination because of their associations with other persons who are themselves identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination such as disability, race, colour, etc.

Weiser v. Toronto District School Board, 2018 HRTO 1286 (CanLII)

[21] In my view, s. 12 of the Code is an interpretive provision, and does not give rise to a free-standing right beyond those protected under Part I of the Code. Section 12 expressly states that “a right under Part I” is infringed where the discrimination is because of relationship, association or dealings with a person or persons identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination. In order to constitute a violation of a Part I right, such as the right protected pursuant to s. 1 of the Code, it must be established that the discrimination was “because of” one of the protected grounds. Seen in this way, s. 12 is really an interpretive provision that extends the meaning of discrimination “because of disability” as protected by s. 1 to include discrimination because of relationship or association with a person with a disability. As a result, while the Tribunal’s application form may include a separate box for allegations of discrimination because of association, fundamentally such an allegation represents an allegation of discrimination “because of” the relevant protected ground, with the extended meaning given to this right as a result of s. 12.

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[23] Having carefully considered the materials and submissions before me, it is my view that the applicant does not have a reasonable prospect of success in establishing this, on the basis of evidence that he has or is reasonably available to him. The respondents’ primary concern as expressed in the letter was about the inappropriateness of the applicant speaking to another student at the school in the context of a school investigation. This is not disputed, and in my view and as acknowledged by the applicant, this concern is understandable. There also is no dispute regarding the respondents’ concern about the volume of e-mails sent by the applicant to the principal following the incident, which again is about the applicant’s personal conduct and not about his advocacy efforts on behalf of his son.

Brillinger v. Brockie (No. 2), 1999 CanLII 35203 (ON HRT)

[19] The respondents were aware that Brillinger, when he sought the printing service, represented the Archives. Brillinger's evidence, which was not disputed, was that he was there on behalf of his organization. The respondents' argument fails to consider that Brillinger, as a member and the then president of the Archives, was indirectly discriminated against when the service was denied to the Archives. Further, Brillinger was discriminated against because of his association with the Archives, pursuant to s. 12.

[20] It was Brockie's evidence that Imaging Excellence did not deny printing services to individuals who were known to it to be lesbians or gay men. Accepting his evidence on this point, I can conclude that, if Brillinger, as a gay man, sought personal printing services for a purpose unrelated to the Archives, he would have received the service. The only reason for the denial was the direct association between Brillinger and his organization, the Archives.

[21] In any event, when Brockie denied the printing service, it was Brillinger who received that message, and he who personally experienced the hurt and degradation of being rejected as a result of the position taken by Brockie.

[22] I therefore find that Brillinger was discriminated against contrary to ss. 1, 9 and 12 of the Code.

Manning v. Stoykovich, 2021 HRTO 5 (CanLII)

[38] To establish discrimination in this case, the applicants must show that Mx Manning had, or was perceived to have, a disability and that Ms Toews was associated with Mx Manning. I accept the applicants’ undisputed testimony that Mx Manning has medical conditions that cause him to use a cane daily as a mobility aid. Mx Manning’s testimony about his medical conditions was supported by a letter from his nurse practitioner. Based on this evidence, I am satisfied that Mx Manning had a disability within the meaning of section 10(1)(a) of the Code.

[39] I accept the undisputed testimony that the applicants are co-tenants who, together, sought to rent out the respondents’ basement rental unit. Based on this evidence, I am satisfied that when the applicants sought to rent out the basement unit from Ms Stoykovich, Ms Toews was associated with Mx Manning who had a disability, within the meaning of section 12 of the Code.

[40] To establish discrimination, the applicants must show that they experienced adverse treatment. I am satisfied based on the applicants’ testimony that they were subject to adverse treatment when Ms Stoykovich terminated the lease agreement by text on May 7, 2018. I find that this was adverse treatment as the decision to break the lease agreement was without warning, came after the date that the applicants expected to move in, and falsely blamed the applicants for not disclosing Mx Manning’s disability. The termination left the applicants in the difficult position of having to find alternate housing on short notice.

[41] Finally, to establish discrimination, the applicants must prove that Mx Manning’s disability was a factor in the adverse treatment. I am satisfied that disability was a factor in Ms Stoykovich’s decision to terminate the lease agreement. This finding is based on Ms Stoykovich’s text message dated May 7, 2018 in which she wrote that the contract for the basement rental is terminated “due to not disclosing information on disability conditions” and because the property did not fulfill building code regulations for people with disabilities. On its face, Ms Stoykovich’s text message indicates that her sudden decision to terminate the lease agreement was based on her assumption that the unit was not suitable for the applicants because of Mx Manning’s disability.