Hotel Room (Rental Unit - Defend)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-04-27
CLNP Page ID:	2357
Page Categories:	Contract Law, Leases, & Sub-Letting (LTB), Interference of Reasonable Enjoyment (LTB), Payment of Rent (LTB), Section 5 (RTA), Section 202 (RTA), Section 2 (RTA)
Citation:	Hotel Room (Rental Unit - Defend), CLNP 2357, <https://rvt.link/bb>, retrieved on 2024-04-27
Editor:	MKent
Last Updated:	2024/03/13

Re Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd. and Hodges et al., 1978 CanLII 1371 (ON SC)

Counsel for the respondent also argued that the hotel rooms occupied over the years by the Hodges family were not "residential premises", to which kind of premises Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act applies. He referred to the definition section, s. 1(c) [rep. & sub. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 13, s. 12] and argued that the evidence supported the proposition that the rooms constituted "premises occupied for business purposes with living accommodation attached ...", and that by reason of s. 1(c)(iii) the rooms could not constitute "residential premises".

On all of the evidence I cannot agree. I am satisfied that the rooms constituted "residential premises" as they are defined in the Act, and that, although the respondent did indeed engage in some business activities in the rooms, they were indeed "premises used or intended for use for residential purposes" as that phrase is used in s. 1(c)(i).

That leaves for determination the major problem, which is whether there was in existence between the parties to these proceedings a landlord and tenant relationship.

Essentially the facts are that the respondent and his family, as it was constituted from time to time over the years, have lived in the two hotel rooms for well over 15 years. There was at no time any agreement in writing with regard to this occupancy.

The respondent decided, for reasons which at least satisfied him, that it made sense to live in a well-constructed, well- managed hotel. The hotel was willing to provide to Hodges the two rooms which he and his wife ultimately selected. Hodges was charged on a per diem basis a somewhat lower rate than would have been charged to a transient guest. He was apparently generally billed monthly, for a long time, not only for room charges but also for room service, meals, and other sorts of services generally provided to its guest by a hotel. It is to be emphasized that the claim in these proceedings is limited to the amount allegedly owing for the rooms themselves.

There is really very little evidence indeed on the basis of which any meaningful, sensible and firm conclusions can be reached as to what was intended by the parties.

What seems to me to be fairly clear is that what was furnished to Hodges and members of his family was really in no way different from that which any guest at the hotel could reasonably expect to have had furnished to him. Daily maid service was provided and was available, although Hodges himself indicated that he was reluctant to have maids in the rooms at certain times.

Having reviewed again and again all of the factual circumstances of this case, including, but not to the exclusion of others, those elements to which I have made specific and direct reference, it has not been made out in this case that there existed at the material time a landlord and tenant relationship. It seems to me that essentially the only factual circumstance which points in this direction is the length of occupancy of the rooms by Hodges and his family. That is obviously of some importance but the difficulty is that whatever its length, the relationship between the parties was really no different than would have been that same relationship had Hodges' stay in the hotel lasted for a week. I do not and cannot accept that it was ever in the mind of either party to these proceedings that a legal estate of any kind had passed from the applicant to the respondent.

There was what might generally be described as exclusivity of possession but there remained a general, over-all control of the property by the applicant. While it is by no manner or means conclusive or even perhaps particularly important in this case, given the specific argument made on behalf of the applicant, I think, had the parties been asked before litigation became a possibility, both would have agreed that the occupant had absolutely nothing which he was entitled to assign or sublet to anyone else.

I have come to the conclusion on all of the evidence before me that the applicant has not made out its right to proceed under the provisions of Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act, and that it has not demonstrated that it was at the material time a "landlord" under the provisions of that statute. In this regard I should emphasize that counsel for the applicant specifically stated that he was not seeking to allege or argue that his client was a "person giving or permitting the occupation of the premises in question" thus qualifying to be considered as a landlord whether or not the applicant was a lessor. Similarly, counsel indicated that he did not wish to adopt the position that Mr. Hodges was an "occupant" and thus a tenant as that word is defined in the Landlord and Tenant Act. The whole case has proceeded and has been argued on both sides on the basis that the question for ultimate determination is whether there was a landlord and tenant relationship, that is, whether there was a lessor and lessee relationship involved between the parties during the period of time which is relevant to these proceedings and to the claim for arrears of rent now presented.

In the result, the applicant's claim must be dismissed with costs.

Claim dismissed.