Jurisdiction (LTB - Re: Questions of Law and Fact)

Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17

3 (1) This Act, except Part V.1, applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes, despite any other Act and despite any agreement or waiver to the contrary. 2013, c. 3, s. 22 (1).

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(4) If a provision of this Act conflicts with a provision of another Act, other than the Human Rights Code, the provision of this Act applies. 2006, c. 17, s. 3 (4).

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168 (1) The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal is continued under the name Landlord and Tenant Board in English and Commission de la location immobilière in French. 2006, c. 17, s. 168 (1).

(2) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 168 (2).

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174 The Board has authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 174.

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207 (1) The Board may, where it otherwise has the jurisdiction, order the payment to any given person of an amount of money up to the greater of $10,000 and the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. 2006, c. 17, s. 207 (1).

(2) A person entitled to apply under this Act but whose claim exceeds the Board’s monetary jurisdiction may commence a proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction for an order requiring the payment of that sum and, if such a proceeding is commenced, the court may exercise any powers that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board and within its monetary jurisdiction. 2006, c. 17, s. 207 (2).

Kaiman v. Graham, 2009 ONCA 77 (CanLII)

[12] The appellants have framed the issue on appeal as being whether a declaration terminating their tenancy should be granted. They submit that the Landlord and Tenant Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide this issue: see generally, Part V of the RTA and s. 168(2). However, their statement of claim does not contain a request for a declaration terminating a tenancy. It requests a declaration that a tenancy exists. The RTA does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to determine whether there is a valid tenancy agreement. The existence of a tenancy agreement is presumed: O’Brien v. 718458 Ontario Inc. (1999), 25 R.P.R. (3d) 57 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

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[14] In any event, even if the Board had jurisdiction to determine whether the tenancy was validly terminated, having regard to the appellants’ claim for damages in the amount of $250,000, the appellants were entitled to commence their proceeding in the Superior Court. Having done so, that court had all the jurisdiction that the Board would have had.

[15] Section 207(1) of the RTA states that the Board, where it otherwise has jurisdiction, may order the payment of the greater of $10,000 and the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court. Section 207(2) states:

A person entitled to apply under this Act but whose claim exceeds the Board’s monetary jurisdiction may commence a proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction for an order requiring the payment of that sum and, if such a proceeding is commenced, the court may exercise any powers that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board and within its monetary jurisdiction.

Simply put, the Superior Court had jurisdiction to grant any and all of the relief claimed by the appellants. The Board did not. Any jurisdiction it did have was, by virtue of s. 207(2), non-exclusive.

[16] Accordingly, I would dismiss the appellants’ submission that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case.

Fraser v. Beach, 2005 CanLII 14309 (ON CA)

[9] The question on this appeal is whether the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24, unequivocally indicates the legislature's [page386] intent to limit the court's jurisdiction to make an order evicting a residential tenant.

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[13] The neighbours submit that the Superior Court's order that the tenants vacate the premises was simply the method of enforcing its earlier order restraining the landlords from operating the illegal rooming house. The earlier order is not attacked. They say it does not make sense to read the Tenant Protection Act as taking away the rights of governments and private persons simply because they are neither landlords nor tenants. They submit that the activities of residents of an illegal [page387] rooming house may affect the health and safety of neighbours, and that persons so affected must have a remedy. Likewise, a city must be able to enforce its by-laws. It cannot be the case, they say, that a landlord can continue to operate an illegal rooming house in flagrant contravention of the by-law while a city remains powerless to do anything about it. (In this case, the city is not a participant in the proceedings.)

[14] I do not accept these submissions. The following provisions of the Act are of central importance. Section 39(1) provides "A tenancy may be terminated only in accordance with this Act." These words could not be more unequivocal. Moreover, s. 41(b) provides: "A landlord shall not recover possession of a rental unit subject to a tenancy unless ... an order of the Tribunal evicting the tenant has authorized the possession." Section 157(2) provides "The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act." Finally s. 2(1) provides that the Tenant Protection Act applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes "despite any other Act" and s. 2(4) specifies that if a provision of the Tenant Protection Act conflicts with a provision of another Act (other than the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19), the provision of the Tenant Protecti on Act prevails.

[15] I am satisfied that the combined effect of these provisions is to oust the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to make an order requiring the tenants to vacate the premises. The statute clearly provides that only the Tribunal may make an order terminating a tenancy and evicting a tenant.

Efrach v. Cherishome Living, 2015 ONSC 472 (CanLII)

[20] The appellant commenced her action in the Small Claims Court after the expiry of the one year limitation period in s. 29(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act. This Court’s jurisdiction to entertain her claim is governed by s. 207(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act which states as follows:

A person entitled to apply under this Act but whose claim exceeds the Board’s monetary jurisdiction may commence a proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction for an order requiring the payment of that sum and, if such a proceeding is commenced, the court may exercise any powers that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board and within its monetary jurisdiction.

[21] Since the one year limitation period for making a claim to the Landlord and Tenant Board had already expired when the appellant issued her claim in the Small Claims Court, she had no right to seek relief from the Landlord and Tenant Board. It follows pursuant to s. 207(2) that since the claim was statute barred before the Board, it is likewise barred from being transferred to the Superior Court of Justice, since this Court can only exercise powers “that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board”.

Davies v. Syed, 2020 ONSC 7388 (CanLII)

[5] On September 23, 2020, I released reasons in which I ultimately came to the conclusion that this court did not have jurisdiction to grant an eviction order given the application of s. 168(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 S.O. 2006 c. 17 (“the Act”), which reserves to the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications in matters where jurisdiction is conferred under the Act.

[6] While I ultimately came to the conclusion that this court did not have jurisdiction to grant what effectively would amount to an eviction order, what I did do on September 24, 2020 was to order (“the September 24 order”) - amongst other things, that the Defendants restore the residences to their former status as a single family residence so as to thereby comply with the provisions of the local zoning bylaws which prohibit rooming houses.

Dolan v Ccoc, 2015 ONSC 2145 (CanLII)

[39] It is important to understand that under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 issues relating to eviction of a tenant from residential premises are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.[15] The Board is also seized of issues relating to tenant compensation arising from eviction which rights are set out in the Act. I note there are modified duties and rights for non profit or social housing which may or may not apply.[16] In any event a tenant who is evicted may seek compensation and may exercise other rights.

[40] A landlord may obtain an eviction order when vacant possession is necessary to repair a unit but the Board may refuse eviction if amongst other things, the landlord is found to be in “serious breach of the landlord’s obligations”.[17] The Board found that the landlord was not in serious breach and granted the eviction order because “it would defy common sense to delay the eviction and to allow the Tenants to continue to expose themselves to the health risks associated with mould in this context”.

Bye Estate v. Adair, 2020 ONSC 7439 (CanLII)

[22] Section 168(2) of the RTA states: “The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act.”

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[27] To determine whether it is the Board or a court that has jurisdiction over a dispute involving a landlord and a tenant, it is not the nature of the dispute that governs. The key question in such disputes relates to whether the essential character of the dispute, in its factual context, arises either expressly or inferentially from the statutory scheme: Regina Police Association Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 360, at para. 39. So, in Mackie v. Toronto (City) and Toronto Community Housing Corporation, 2010 ONSC 3801, the Court held at para. 44:

“If the essential character of the dispute, in its factual context, arises from the statutory scheme, it does not matter that the claim is asserted for a cause of action which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the courts and upon which the legislation may be silent. The characterization of the dispute is resolved by whether the subject matter of the dispute expressly or inferentially is governed by the statute[.]”

[28] The jurisdiction of the Board is set out in the RTA. The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under the RTA with respect to all matters in which it is given jurisdiction by the RTA. Because of this exclusivity of jurisdiction, if the Board has jurisdiction, then the Small Claims Court does not, even though both have a monetary jurisdiction of $25,000: Efrach v. Cherishome Living, 2015 ONSC 472, at paras. 5-6.

Firm Capital Management v. Heather Tessier, 2019 ONSC 55 (CanLII)

[30] The LTB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all applications under the RTA with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on the LTB under the RTA (RTA, s. 168(2)).

[31] Further, the LTB has the authority to deal and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction (RTA s. 174).

[32] The RTA applies to all “rental units” despite any term in a tenancy agreement that suggests otherwise. “Rental Unit” is defined in s. 2(1) of the RTA as “any living accommodation used or intended for use as rented residential premises.” The LTB has exclusive authority to determine whether a premise is a “rental unit” and hence subject to the RTA.

Sutton v. Patterson and Morrow, 2021 ONSC 1403 (CanLII)

[27] The Appellant filed an application under s. 48(1) of the RTA. It is uncontested that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine it. By virtue of ss. 168(2) and 174, in so determining, the Board had authority to hear and determine all questions of fact and law with respect to the application.

[28] This Court has held that whether someone is an “owner” of their dwelling for purposes of the RTA involves an assessment of the factual and contractual underpinnings of the relationship between the parties and the application of those underpinnings to the provisions of the statute. The Court characterized this as a question of mixed fact and law which is not reviewable by this Court: see North York General Hospital Foundation v. Armstrong (2004), 2004 CanLII 13872 (ON SCDC), 69 O.R. (3d) 603 (Div. Ct.), at para. 23.