Monetary Compensation ONHRT

From Riverview Legal Group

Devoe v. Haran, 2012 HRTO 1507 (CanLII)

[55] The applicant seeks an award of $20,000 compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, and as punitive damages. This Tribunal is not empowered to award punitive damages. See Smith v. Menzies Chrysler Incorporated, 2008 HRTO 37 (CanLII), at para. 38. As such, I will only consider the applicant’s claim for compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. Such an award includes recognition of the inherent value of the right to be free from discrimination and the experience of victimization. The Ontario Divisional Court has recognized that the Tribunal must ensure that the quantum of damages for this loss is not set too low, since doing so would trivialize the social importance of the Code by effectively creating a “licence fee” to discriminate. See ADGA, supra, at para. 152.

[57] In Arunachalam v. Best Buy Canada, 2010 HRTO 1880 (CanLII), the Tribunal reviewed recent awards under this heading of damages, and stated at paras. 52-54:

(…) The Tribunal’s jurisprudence over the two years since the new damages provision took effect has primarily applied two criteria in making the global evaluation of the appropriate damages for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect: the objective seriousness of the conduct and the effect on the particular applicant who experienced discrimination: see, in particular, Seguin v. Great Blue Heron Charity Casino, 2009 HRTO 940 at para. 16 (CanLII).
The first criterion recognizes that injury to dignity, feelings, and self respect is generally more serious depending, objectively, upon what occurred. For example, dismissal from employment for discriminatory reasons usually affects dignity more than a comment made on one occasion. Losing long-term employment because of discrimination is typically more harmful than losing a new job. The more prolonged, hurtful, and serious harassing comments are, the greater the injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
The second criterion recognizes the applicant’s particular experience in response to the discrimination. Damages will be generally at the high end of the relevant range when the applicant has experienced particular emotional difficulties as a result of the event, and when his or her particular circumstances make the effects particularly serious. Some of the relevant considerations in relation to this factor are discussed in Sanford v. Koop, 2005 HRTO 53 (CanLII) at paras. 34-38.

[58] I find that the respondent’s discriminatory treatment of the applicant was moderate on the spectrum of seriousness. On the one hand, a landlord’s decision to refuse to rent an apartment to a person because of her disability is, objectively, a serious incident, and the applicant, who is elderly, has multiple disabilities, and mainly lives on a fixed government income is, objectively, vulnerable. I also accept the applicant’s evidence that she experienced serious emotional stress and anxiety as a result of the respondent’s discriminatory act. On the other hand, the seriousness of the incident is mitigated by the fact that the applicant continued to live in an apartment in the respondent’s building, the discrimination was not prolonged, and the respondent has agreed to abide by the Tribunal’s interim order not to rent the vacant main floor apartment until the Tribunal issues its final Decision.


[59] Two recent Tribunal decisions that have considered disability-related discrimination in the context of landlords refusing to rent apartments to individuals have awarded $5,000 (Taranco v. Michedes, 2010 HRTO 128 (CanLII), reconsidered on other grounds, Taranco v. Michedes (a.k.a. Michaelides), 2011 HRTO 1188 (CanLII)) and $10,000 (Dixon v. 930187 Ontario, 2010 HRTO 256 (CanLII)). However, in both those cases, the impact of the discrimination on the applicant was assessed to be more acute because there was also discrimination based another Code ground, and in neither case, did the Tribunal immediately order the respondent to rent a vacant apartment to the applicant.


[60] I find after considering the applicant’s individual circumstances and similar cases that $4,000 is an appropriate award of compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. The applicant has voluntarily agreed to have the amount offset by $67.47, which is the amount of damage that she caused to the door of main floor apartment on May 1, 2012, when she tried to move in and have the locks changed.