Motion to Void (Per Tenancy Agreement)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-04-28
CLNP Page ID:	1891
Page Categories:	[Payment of Rent (LTB)], [Set Aside]
Citation:	Motion to Void (Per Tenancy Agreement), CLNP 1891, <6g>, retrieved on 2024-04-28
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2022/03/24

Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17

2 (1) In this Act,

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“tenancy agreement” means a written, oral or implied agreement between a tenant and a landlord for occupancy of a rental unit and includes a licence to occupy a rental unit; (“convention de location”)

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13 (1) The term or period of a tenancy begins on the day the tenant is entitled to occupy the rental unit under the tenancy agreement. 2006, c. 17, s. 13 (1).

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38 (1) If a tenancy agreement for a fixed term ends and has not been renewed or terminated, the landlord and tenant shall be deemed to have renewed it as a monthly tenancy agreement containing the same terms and conditions that are in the expired tenancy agreement and subject to any increases in rent charged in accordance with this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 38 (1).

(2) If the period of a daily, weekly or monthly tenancy ends and the tenancy has not been renewed or terminated, the landlord and tenant shall be deemed to have renewed it for another day, week or month, as the case may be, with the same terms and conditions that are in the expired tenancy agreement and subject to any increases in rent charged in accordance with this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 38 (2).

(3) If the period of a periodic tenancy ends, the tenancy has not been renewed or terminated and subsection (2) does not apply, the landlord and tenant shall be deemed to have renewed it as a monthly tenancy, with the same terms and conditions that are in the expired tenancy agreement and subject to any increases in rent charged in accordance with this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 38 (3).

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74 (11) A tenant may make a motion to the Board, on notice to the landlord, to set aside an eviction order referred to in subsection (3) if, after the order becomes enforceable but before it is executed, the tenant pays an amount to the landlord or to the Board and files an affidavit sworn by the tenant stating that the amount, together with any amounts previously paid to the landlord or to the Board, is at least the sum of the following amounts:

1. The amount of rent that is in arrears under the tenancy agreement.

2. The amount of additional rent that would have been due under the tenancy agreement as at the date of payment by the tenant had notice of termination not been given.

3. The amount of NSF cheque charges charged by financial institutions to the landlord in respect of cheques tendered to the landlord by or on behalf of the tenant, as allowed by the Board in an application by the landlord under section 87.

4. The amount of administration charges payable by the tenant for the NSF cheques, as allowed by the Board in an application by the landlord under section 87.

5. The costs ordered by the Board. 2006, c. 17, s. 74 (11); 2009, c. 33, Sched. 21, s. 11 (1).

Refusal to accept motion

(11.1) The Board shall refuse to accept for filing a motion under subsection (11), if the tenant has not complied with all the requirements of that subsection. 2017, c. 13, s. 15 (1).

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(12) Subsection (11) does not apply if the tenant has previously made a motion under that subsection during the period of the tenant’s tenancy agreement with the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 74 (12).

Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 67 (SCC)

106. Furthermore, the interpretation suggested by the appellants would deprive the word "financing" in s. 44(2)(a) of its meaning. The word would then have little or no practical effect. There will be very few cases indeed where employees who are not themselves on strike will contribute voluntarily to a strike fund in order to support a particular labour dispute. In reading a statute it must be "assumed that each term, each sentence and each paragraph have been deliberately drafted with a specific result in mind. Parliament chooses its words carefully: it does not speak gratuitously" (P.‑A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (1984), at p. 210).

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), (1998) 1 SCR 27

Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11

10. Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything that the Legislature deems to be for the public good or to prevent or punish the doing of any thing that it deems to be contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.

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17. The repeal or amendment of an Act shall be deemed not to be or to involve any declaration as to the previous state of the law.

20 At the heart of this conflict is an issue of statutory interpretation. Consistent with the findings of the Court of Appeal, the plain meaning of the words of the provisions here in question appears to restrict the obligation to pay termination and severance pay to those employers who have actively terminated the employment of their employees. At first blush, bankruptcy does not fit comfortably into this interpretation. However, with respect, I believe this analysis is incomplete.

21 Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter “Construction of Statutes”); Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Recent cases which have cited the above passage with approval include: R. v. Hydro-Québec, 1997 CanLII 318 (SCC), (1997) 3 S.C.R. 213; Royal Bank of Canada v. Sparrow Electric Corp., 1997 CanLII 377 (SCC), (1997) 1 S.C.R. 411; Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 1996 CanLII 186 (SCC), (1996) 3 S.C.R. 550; Friesen v. Canada, 1995 CanLII 62 (SCC), (1995) 3 S.C.R. 103.