Previously Admitted Evidence (SPPA)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-04-28
CLNP Page ID:	2187
Page Categories:	[Evidence Law]
Citation:	Previously Admitted Evidence (SPPA), CLNP 2187, <https://rvt.link/5b>, retrieved on 2024-04-28
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2023/07/27

Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22

15.1 (1) The tribunal may treat previously admitted evidence as if it had been admitted in a proceeding before the tribunal, if the parties to the proceeding consent. 1994, c. 27, s. 56 (30).

(2) In subsection (1),

“previously admitted evidence” means evidence that was admitted, before the hearing of the proceeding referred to in that subsection, in any other proceeding before a court or tribunal, whether in or outside Ontario.

(3) This power conferred by this section is in addition to the tribunal’s power to admit evidence under section 15. 1997, c. 23, s. 13 (18).

7612 v Registrar, Real Estate and Business Brokers Act 2002, 2014 CanLII 70042 (ON LAT)

Material filed in the Court Proceedings

Mr. Kucey submits, in an apparent cross motion, that not only the court decisions but also the pleadings, affidavits, financial statements, net family property statements and worksheets and motions filed in either the criminal or the matrimonial proceedings ought to be admitted as “public documents”. He relies on the case of R. v. A.P. 1996 CanLII 871 (ON CA), [1996] O.J. No. 2986, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal set out a four part test for what constitutes an official or public document, admissible at common law as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. The four criteria for determining if a document is a public document are:

1. The document must have been made by a public official, that is a person on whom a duty has been imposed by the public;

2. The public official must have made the document in the discharge of a public duty or function:

3. The document must have been made with the intention that it serve as a permanent record, and

4. The document must be available for public inspection.

In a submission relating to the nature of a public document, Mr. Kucey refers to Section 137 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43, which provides that on payment of a prescribed fee, a person is entitled to see any document filed in a civil proceeding in a court, unless a statutory provision or court order provides otherwise.

The Registrar’s cross motion must fail on three grounds. First, Mr. Kucey has not demonstrated that the documents he wishes to tender as evidence have any relevance to this matter. Second, in terms of the evidence admissible before it, the Tribunal is bound by Section 15 of the SPPA. The documents referred to by Mr. Kucey would appear to be “previously admitted evidence” as defined in subsection 15.1(2) of the SPPA and therefore admissible under subsection 15.1 (1) only on consent of Mr. Racco. Third, even if it were open to the Tribunal to admit a “public document” in accordance with the four criteria set out in the R. v. A.P. case, the material referred to by Mr. Kucey would not qualify. The documents Mr. Kucey seeks to enter were not made by a public official but by, in the case of the matrimonial proceedings, the private parties or their lawyers. In the case of the criminal matter, it is possible that some of the documents alluded to by Mr. Kucey were prepared by a public official in the discharge of a public duty but it is not clear which documents might meet these criteria.

Accordingly, the Tribunal orders that for the purposes of the hearing before it in this matter:

1. The judgment, sentencing and appeal decisions relating to Mr. Racco’s criminal conviction, including the facts on which those decisions are based, are admissible.

2. The decisions in Mr. Racco’s matrimonial proceedings are admissible for the limited purposes set out above.

3. The pleadings, affidavits, financial statements, net family property statements and worksheets and motions filed in the criminal and matrimonial proceedings are subject to subsection 15.1(1) of the SPPA and admissible only on consent of Mr. Racco.

Leaf v Gonzalez, 2023 ONSC 3899 (CanLII)

[11] The Tenants’ other arguments, such as alleging errors in failing to mark certain documents as exhibits, or that the Landlords were not required to prove its case do not raise questions of law alone and, in any event, have no merit. What gets marked as an exhibit, if anything, is up to the Board, whose proceedings are not as formal as a court. Further, there was clearly evidence, from both sides, that proved the Landlords’ case that the Tenants smoked marijuana in the unit and that this affected the health of the Landlords’ children.

11849 v Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing, 2019 CanLII 83602 (ON LAT)

(b) Admission of Witness Evidence via Transcript

[52] Counsel for the Registrar indicated that she did not intend to call witnesses to prove most of the underlying facts in support of the Registrar’s proposal. Instead of calling witnesses, she intended to introduce into evidence transcripts from the first Tribunal hearing that contained the sworn testimony and cross-examination of the Registrar’s witnesses

[53] The appellant objected on the basis that the transcripts were not accurate in all areas and did not reflect the testimony that was provided. I note that the transcripts were not prepared by a court reporter who had attended the hearing, they were prepared from a recording of the proceeding made by the Tribunal member using a portable device.

[54] Section 15.1 of the Statutory Power and Procedure Act (“SPPA”) provides that:

The tribunal may treat previously admitted evidence as if it had been admitted in a proceeding before the tribunal, if the parties to the proceeding consent.

[55] In this case, the appellant did not consent.

[56] Although s. 15 of the SPPA allows the Tribunal to admit as evidence at a hearing any relevant document, whether or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or admissible as evidence in a court, I was not prepared to admit the transcripts under that general authority when the Act specifically requires the parties’ consent in the case of previously admitted evidence.

[57] In addition, that Registrar’s proposed approach would have prevented the appellant from cross-examining the witnesses and there was a question as to whether the transcripts were accurate in all respects.

[58] Since I was not prepared to admit the transcripts as evidence at the present hearing in place of the sworn testimony of witnesses, the Registrar decided to proceed without the transcripts and instead proceed on the testimony of a single witness, Ms. Cadeau, Senior - Manager of Registration and Compliance.

[59] The testimony in the transcripts was mainly relevant to the first main allegation - that the appellant made threats against another jockey and horse just before the race at Ajax Downs on July 17, 2017. Essentially the Registrar decided to call no evidence in respect of that allegation.

[60] Ms. Cadeau’s evidence, supported by some documentation, was directed to the second main allegation – the appellant’s reaction to the regulatory response to the alleged threats. Although Ms. Cadeau’s evidence on that issue was second hand, it was undisputed.

[61] Thus, the focus of the hearing became the appellant’s conduct in responding to the decision and actions of the racing officials and whether, having regard to that past conduct, there are reasonable grounds for the belief that, when acting as a licensee, the appellant will not act in accordance with the law, or with integrity, honesty, or in the public interest.