Under-Tenant, Boarder or Lodger (Non-RTA)

Caselaw.Ninja, Riverview Group Publishing 2021 ©
Date Retrieved:	2024-04-29
CLNP Page ID:	1974
Page Categories:	[RTA Exempt Tenancies]
Citation:	Under-Tenant, Boarder or Lodger (Non-RTA), CLNP 1974, <>, retrieved on 2024-04-29
Editor:	Sharvey
Last Updated:	2022/08/22

Newman v. Glanville, 2019 ONSC 1040 (CanLII)

[1] Mr. Newman owns a house which is located at 446 Whitmore Avenue in Toronto. Cedric Glanville became a tenant in Mr. Newman’s home in August, 1994. It appears that the two friends never did have a written lease but Mr. Glanville paid his rent weekly and they shared the house for many years.

[2] Mr. Newman now applies under rule 14.05 for an order to evict Mr. Glanville.

[3] Mr. Newman has filed an affidavit in which he indicates that he first gave written notice to Mr. Glanville to leave the house back in 2010. He has repeatedly asked him to leave since then but Mr. Glanville has refused. In the interim, Mr. Glanville has begun to drink heavily and makes no effort to clean up after himself. He has not paid his rent since March 9, 2018 and he refuses to pay his arrears despite repeated requests by Mr. Newman.

[4] Mr. Newman served a written Notice of Eviction on Mr. Glanville on August 8, 2018. The Notice gave Mr. Glanville 60 days to vacate the house. The notice clearly set out the reasons for the eviction including the failure to clean garbage from the home, a refusal to clean the bathroom leaving it in “a disgusting state” and the excessive use of utilities. Notwithstanding a very reasonable notice period, Mr. Newman has not vacated the house.

[7] Mr. Newman initially sought to evict Mr. Glanville from the home by applying to the Landlord and Tenant Board under the Residential Tenancies Act 2006. The board declined jurisdiction to hear the application citing section 5(i) of the Residential Tenancies Act which excludes jurisdiction in circumstances where the landlord and tenant share either a bathroom or a kitchen. Mr. Newman and Mr. Glanville share both. In those circumstances, the Commercial Tenancies Act applies rather than the Residential Tenancies Act.

[8] Mr. Newman’s grounds to bring this application can be found in section 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act. Under that section, the court has a wide discretion to grant relief where there has been a breach of a lease agreement. The court may:

a. order the payment of rent;

b. make a costs order;

c. award damages: and

d. issue injunctive relief to restrain any future breach of the lease agreement.

[9] Section 20 also permits the court to provide the respondent with an opportunity to remedy the defaults which gave rise to the breach of the leasing agreement.

[10] Under section 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, an eviction from the property can only be obtained if proper notice has been given. The notice provided to the tenant must specify the breach of the lease that is alleged by the landlord and provide an opportunity to the tenant to remedy that breach. Under section 28 of the Act, a weekly tenancy can be terminated on one week’s notice.

[12] Mr. Glanville has had sufficient opportunity to address the failings that gave rise to his breach of the lease. Mr. Newman served him with a very clear notice in writing on August 8, 2018 and no rent has been paid since that day. Mr. Glanville has done nothing to repair the damage that he has caused.

[13] Mr. Glanville is now wrongfully in possession of the home. I have received no evidence or submissions from him that would dissuade me from issuing an eviction order.

[14] There will be an order declaring that the lease was terminated on October 8, 2018.

[15] There will be a further order granting a writ of possession to Mr. Newman. The writ of possession may be enforced by the Sheriff’s office if Mr. Glanville does not vacate the premises by February 28th, 2019.

Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7

1 In this Act,

..

“landlord” includes a person who is lessor, owner, the person giving or permitting the occupation of the premises in question, and these persons’ heirs and assigns and legal representatives, and in Parts II, III and IV also includes the person entitled to possession of the premises; (“locateur”)

..

“tenant” includes a person who is lessee, occupant, sub-tenant, under-tenant, and the person’s assigns and legal representatives. (“locataire”) R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 1; 1994, c. 2, s. 1; 1994, c. 4, s. 1; 1997, c. 24, s. 213 (1, 2); 1999, c. 6, s. 9 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 10 (1, 2); 2020, c. 10, s. 1; 2020, c. 23, Sched. 2, s. 1; 2021, c. 4, Sched. 11, s. 2.

...

2 This Act does not apply to tenancies and tenancy agreements to which the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applies. 1997, c. 24, s. 213 (3); 2006, c. 17, s. 247.

...

4. All persons being grantees or assignees of the Queen, or of any person other than the Queen, and the heirs, executors, successors and assigns of every of them, shall have and enjoy like advantage against the lessees, their executors, administrators, and assigns, by entry for non-payment of the rent, or for doing of waste, or other forfeiture, and also shall have and enjoy all and every such like and the same advantage, benefit, and remedies, by action only, for the non-performance of other conditions, covenants, or agreements, contained and expressed in the indentures of their said leases, demises or grants against all and every of the said lessees and grantees, their executors, administrators, and assigns as the said lessors or grantors themselves, or their heirs or successors, might have had and enjoyed at any time or times.

...

6 The benefit of every condition of re-entry or forfeiture for a breach of any covenant or condition contained in a lease shall extend to and be enforced and taken advantage of by the person from time to time entitled, subject to the term, to the income of the whole or any part, as the case may require, of the land leased, although that person became, by conveyance or otherwise, so entitled after the condition of re-entry or forfeiture had become enforceable.

...

32 (1) In this section,

“under-tenant” means a tenant to whom the premises or some part of the premises in respect of which rent is distrained for have been sub-let with the consent of the superior landlord or in default of such consent under the order of the judge of the Superior Court of Justice as provided by subsection 23 (2). R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 32 (1); 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1).

Declaration by boarder, under-tenant, or lodger that immediate tenant has no property in goods distrained
(2) If a superior landlord distrains or threatens to distrain any goods or chattels of an under-tenant, boarder or lodger for arrears of rent due to the superior landlord by the superior landlord’s immediate tenant, the under-tenant, boarder or lodger may serve the superior landlord, or the bailiff or other person employed by the superior landlord to levy the distress, with a statutory declaration made by the under-tenant, boarder or lodger setting forth that the immediate tenant has no right of property or beneficial interest in such goods or chattels, and that they are the property or in the lawful possession of the under-tenant, boarder or lodger, and also setting forth whether any and what amount by way of rent, board or otherwise is due from the under-tenant, boarder or lodger to the immediate tenant, and to the declaration shall be annexed a correct inventory, subscribed by the under-tenant, boarder or lodger, of the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration, and the under-tenant, boarder or lodger may pay to the superior landlord, or to the bailiff or other person employed by the superior landlord, the amount if any, so due, or so much thereof as is sufficient to discharge the claim of the superior landlord. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 32 (2).

Penalty for improper levy
(3) If the superior landlord, bailiff or other person, after being served with the declaration and inventory, and after the under-tenant, boarder or lodger has paid or tendered to the person the amount, if any, which by subsection (2) the under-tenant, boarder or lodger is authorized to pay, levies or proceeds with a distress on the goods or chattels of the under-tenant, boarder or lodger, the superior landlord, bailiff or other person is guilty of an illegal distress, and the under-tenant, boarder or lodger may replevy the goods or chattels in any court of competent jurisdiction, and the superior landlord is also liable to an action, at the suit of the under-tenant, boarder or lodger, in which the truth of the declaration and inventory may be inquired into. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 32 (3).

Effect of payments by under-tenant, boarder or lodger
(4) Any payment made by an under-tenant, boarder or lodger under subsection (2) is a valid payment on account of the amount due from the under tenant to the immediate tenant. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 32 (4).

...

74 (1) Where a tenant after the tenant’s lease or right of occupation, whether created by writing or by parol, has expired or been determined, either by the landlord or by the tenant, by a notice to quit or notice pursuant to a proviso in a lease or agreement in that behalf, or has been determined by any other act whereby a tenancy or right of occupancy may be determined or put an end to, wrongfully refuses or neglects to go out of possession of the land demised to the tenant, or which the tenant has been permitted to occupy, the tenant’s landlord may apply upon affidavit to a judge of the Superior Court of Justice to make the inquiry hereinafter provided for and the application shall be made, heard and determined in the county or district in which the land lies. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7, s. 74 (1); 1993, c. 27, Sched.; 2006, c. 19, Sched. C, s. 1 (1).

2503257 Ontario Ltd. v. 2505304 Ontario Inc. (Good Guys Gas Bar), 2020 ONCA 149

[1] As a courtesy by letter dated June 17, 2019, this court’s Senior Legal Officer alerted the parties to a potential problem regarding this court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order granting vacant possession. She suggested that they could bring a motion before a single judge of this court or file a consent order transferring the appeal to the Divisional Court without the necessity of today’s attendance.

[2] The parties did not do so but argued that this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

[3] We disagree. The application judge granted vacant possession to the respondent which, in our view, is caught under s. 78 (1) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1990. C. L.7, when read in light of the statutory scheme set out in s. 74 to 78, which deal with who is entitled to possession after a notice under the Commercial Tenancies Act is served. The February 13, 2019 order of Hourigan J.A., refusing a stay of the order under appeal and consequentially granting a writ of possession, was ancillary to the order granting vacant possession. It is therefore not an impediment to the Divisional Court’s jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

[4] As a result, the appeal from the January 23, 2019 order granting vacant possession must be made to the Divisional Court.

[5] Accordingly, the appeal in this court is transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110 (1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.