Talk:Motion to Void (Per Tenancy Agreement)

Discussion

• What does it mean "...during the period of the tenant's tenancy agreement..."?

Analysis of Section 74 (11) and (12)

Section 74 (11) of the RTA states as follows:

74 (11) A tenant may make a motion to the Board, on notice to the landlord, to set aside an eviction order referred to in subsection (3) if, after the order becomes enforceable but before it is executed, the tenant pays an amount to the landlord or to the Board and files an affidavit sworn by the tenant stating that the amount, together with any amounts previously paid to the landlord or to the Board, is at least the sum of the following amounts:

1. The amount of rent that is in arrears under the tenancy agreement.

2. The amount of additional rent that would have been due under the tenancy agreement as at the date of payment by the tenant had notice of termination not been given.

3. The amount of NSF cheque charges charged by financial institutions to the landlord in respect of cheques tendered to the landlord by or on behalf of the tenant, as allowed by the Board in an application by the landlord under section 87.

4. The amount of administration charges payable by the tenant for the NSF cheques, as allowed by the Board in an application by the landlord under section 87.

5. The costs ordered by the Board. 2006, c. 17, s. 74 (11); 2009, c. 33, Sched. 21, s. 11 (1).

The only limit to the application of section 74 (11) is found in section 74 (12) of the RTA which states:

(12) Subsection (11) does not apply if the tenant has previously made a motion under that subsection during the period of the tenant’s tenancy agreement with the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 74 (12).

The question that has to be asked is, what is meant by the phrase "...during the period of the tenant’s tenancy agreement..."? In Hills v. Canada (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 67 (SCC), at paragraph 106 the Supreme Court of Canada states in part

... In reading a statute it must be "assumed that each term, each sentence and each paragraph have been deliberately drafted with a specific result in mind. Parliament chooses its words carefully: it does not speak gratuitously"...[Emphesis Added]

In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), (1998) 1 SCR 27, the Supreme Court of Canada stated the modern rule of statutory interpretation as follows:

21 Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g., Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter “Construction of Statutes”); Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Applying the rules of statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court of Canada, when parliament drafted section 74 (12) of the RTA they clearly did not intend to have the phrase "tenancy agreement" used as a synonym for "tenancy".