Jurisdiction (LTB - Re: Questions of Law and Fact)

Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17

168 (1) The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal is continued under the name Landlord and Tenant Board in English and Commission de la location immobilière in French. 2006, c. 17, s. 168 (1).

(2) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act. 2006, c. 17, s. 168 (2).

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207 (1) The Board may, where it otherwise has the jurisdiction, order the payment to any given person of an amount of money up to the greater of $10,000 and the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. 2006, c. 17, s. 207 (1).

(2) A person entitled to apply under this Act but whose claim exceeds the Board’s monetary jurisdiction may commence a proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction for an order requiring the payment of that sum and, if such a proceeding is commenced, the court may exercise any powers that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board and within its monetary jurisdiction. 2006, c. 17, s. 207 (2).

Kaiman v. Graham, 2009 ONCA 77 (CanLII)

[12] The appellants have framed the issue on appeal as being whether a declaration terminating their tenancy should be granted. They submit that the Landlord and Tenant Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide this issue: see generally, Part V of the RTA and s. 168(2). However, their statement of claim does not contain a request for a declaration terminating a tenancy. It requests a declaration that a tenancy exists. The RTA does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to determine whether there is a valid tenancy agreement. The existence of a tenancy agreement is presumed: O’Brien v. 718458 Ontario Inc. (1999), 25 R.P.R. (3d) 57 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

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[14] In any event, even if the Board had jurisdiction to determine whether the tenancy was validly terminated, having regard to the appellants’ claim for damages in the amount of $250,000, the appellants were entitled to commence their proceeding in the Superior Court. Having done so, that court had all the jurisdiction that the Board would have had.

[15] Section 207(1) of the RTA states that the Board, where it otherwise has jurisdiction, may order the payment of the greater of $10,000 and the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court. Section 207(2) states:

A person entitled to apply under this Act but whose claim exceeds the Board’s monetary jurisdiction may commence a proceeding in any court of competent jurisdiction for an order requiring the payment of that sum and, if such a proceeding is commenced, the court may exercise any powers that the Board could have exercised if the proceeding had been before the Board and within its monetary jurisdiction.

Simply put, the Superior Court had jurisdiction to grant any and all of the relief claimed by the appellants. The Board did not. Any jurisdiction it did have was, by virtue of s. 207(2), non-exclusive.

[16] Accordingly, I would dismiss the appellants’ submission that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case.

Fraser v. Beach, 2005 CanLII 14309 (ON CA)

[9] The question on this appeal is whether the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24, unequivocally indicates the legislature's [page386] intent to limit the court's jurisdiction to make an order evicting a residential tenant.

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[13] The neighbours submit that the Superior Court's order that the tenants vacate the premises was simply the method of enforcing its earlier order restraining the landlords from operating the illegal rooming house. The earlier order is not attacked. They say it does not make sense to read the Tenant Protection Act as taking away the rights of governments and private persons simply because they are neither landlords nor tenants. They submit that the activities of residents of an illegal [page387] rooming house may affect the health and safety of neighbours, and that persons so affected must have a remedy. Likewise, a city must be able to enforce its by-laws. It cannot be the case, they say, that a landlord can continue to operate an illegal rooming house in flagrant contravention of the by-law while a city remains powerless to do anything about it. (In this case, the city is not a participant in the proceedings.)

[14] I do not accept these submissions. The following provisions of the Act are of central importance. Section 39(1) provides "A tenancy may be terminated only in accordance with this Act." These words could not be more unequivocal. Moreover, s. 41(b) provides: "A landlord shall not recover possession of a rental unit subject to a tenancy unless ... an order of the Tribunal evicting the tenant has authorized the possession." Section 157(2) provides "The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all applications under this Act and with respect to all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it by this Act." Finally s. 2(1) provides that the Tenant Protection Act applies with respect to rental units in residential complexes "despite any other Act" and s. 2(4) specifies that if a provision of the Tenant Protection Act conflicts with a provision of another Act (other than the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19), the provision of the Tenant Protecti on Act prevails.

[15] I am satisfied that the combined effect of these provisions is to oust the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to make an order requiring the tenants to vacate the premises. The statute clearly provides that only the Tribunal may make an order terminating a tenancy and evicting a tenant.